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ABSTRACT 
 
 Rhetorical analyses of collective memory study how perceptions of a shared past 
are maintained through public texts.  This analysis explores an alternative relationship 
between rhetoric and remembrance.  Rather than study the textual form of public 
memory alone, I argue that communities actively interpret artifacts of public discourse as 
public memory.  The most enduring form of this practice is ceremonial repetition, or the 
deliberate recitation of a text during moments of communal observance.  When 
performed effectively, ceremonial repetition imagines a text by highlighting a resonant 
virtue through public reading.  Such strategies to mold the meaning of a text occur 
through a variety of messages adjoining recitation, such as formal speech, visual display, 
written testament, or spatial and bodily enactment.  Ceremonial repetition illustrates the 
extensional evolution and legacy of speech in the public imagination. 
 In a range of historically grounded case studies, this work explores the 
effectiveness and dominant strategies of ceremonial repetition different eras of American 
public discourse.  These examples include the rhetorical invocation of a text within the 
discursive space of repetition, illustrated in Frederick Douglass’s August First orations 
on the Emancipation Proclamation in the late nineteenth-century; the pairing of visual 
icons and ceremonial repetition, as exemplified in official and public readings of George 
Washington’s Farewell Address within the context of a political flag display during the 
Civil War; the disjunction of repetition and written reflection, as evidenced by the U.S. 
Senate’s institutional recitation of the Farewell Address on Washington’s birthday; and 
  iii 
the emerging genre of repetition performed through multiple voices and resonant 
scenery, as clarified in a variety of modern performances, such as the reading of the “I 
Have a Dream” speech by elementary school students celebrating the King holiday.  
These case studies illuminate various strategies used to translate past words by 
constraining their meaning for the needs of the present.  Though ceremonial repetition 
offers audiences the opportunity to reconstitute a text’s properties and public legacy, this 
study concludes that such epideictic practice is most effective during moments of 
perceived crisis wherein core tenets of a political culture are profoundly questioned or 
disrupted. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
To the thinking soul images serve as if they were contents of perception (and when it asserts or denies
them to be good or bad it avoids or pursues them).  That is why the soul never thinks without an image. 
—Aristotle.1 
 
Neither is the imagination simply and only a messenger; but is invested with, or at leastwise usurpeth no 
small authority in itself, besides the duty of the message. 
—Francis Bacon.2 
RHETORIC AND REPETITION 
 We need repetition.  The life cycle demands a retreading of what came before:  a 
new heartbeat, a new breath, a new sunrise, and a new rotation of the planet.  These 
things fold into a pattern that is fleeting, previously established, and vital to our enduring 
existence.  Repetition nurtures more than base survival.  As R. G. Collingwood 
suggested, the basis of knowledge—“all history”—is “the re-enactment of past thought 
in the historian’s own mind,” producing a fresh encounter with the past “in the context 
of [our] own knowledge” and circumstances.3  Though the life metaphor is a provocative 
framework for repetition, artifacts of popular culture offer a grimmer side to a 
phenomenon’s return.  Sisyphus pushes his boulder in perpetuity.  By the time the 
characters in Jean-Paul Sartre’s play “No Exit” realize they are dead, the full weight of 
their sentence—recollecting past misdeeds—is made more profound by the proviso that 
they must endure this process in the company of others:  “Hell is—other people!”4  The 
tension between repetition as life and repetition as a purgatory condition resides in the 
                                                
1 Aristotle, On the Soul, in Introduction to Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York:  The Modern 
Library, 1992), 236-237. 
2 Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning (New York:  Modern Library, 2001), 124. 
3 R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (New York and Oxford:  Galaxy Book, 1956), 215.  
4 Jean-Paul Sartre, No Exit and Three Other Plays (New York:  Vintage International, 1989), 45. 
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perceived dichotomy between the authentic experience and the less fulfilling—or, in 
Sartre’s example, torturous—nature of a phenomenon’s return.  Though central to the 
persistence of life, fear of recycling the inauthentic explains the primary concern 
intrinsic to repetition. 
 The promise of life and fear of purgatory that define repetition in the realms of 
biology and mythology are equally well represented in the history of rhetoric.  Since its 
introduction to the lexicon of intellectual investigation, rhetoric has been defined, and in 
some ways burdened, by the question of imitation.5  Mimesis, the Greek word for 
imitation, and its Latin counterpart, imitatio, are central to the development of rhetorical 
theory.  Theorists have grappled with the functionality of repetition and pedagogy, 
rhetorical invention, and perceptions of reality and its replica from the broad canvas of 
mimesis.  As Thomas Farrell has noted, the “double standard for appreciating and 
engaging the mimetic status of rhetorical discourse” in classical texts like Aristotle’s 
Poetics and Rhetoric foster an ongoing entanglement with imitation that is both essential 
and suspicious.6   
 Much of the puzzle with imitation derives from its multiple forms and public 
expressions.  Robert Hariman defines the scope of imitation between linguistic ties that 
form “the relationship between text and context” and aid in “the construction of the 
canon,” to the vacuous messages that appeal to a “market-driven, consumption oriented” 
                                                
5 Plato, Gorgias and Phaedrus, as printed in Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg, The Rhetorical 
Tradition:  Readings From Classical Times to the Present, 2nd Edition (Boston and New York:  
Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2000), 87-168. 
6 Thomas Farrell, Norms of Rhetorical Culture (New Haven and London:  Yale University Press, 1993), 
131. 
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sensibility.7  Imitation can nurture a constructive inheritance of symbols and iconic 
works, or perpetuate a superficial loop of messages akin to communication purgatory.   
Whether traditional or transient, imitation seeps into our rhetorical practices, and is 
intrinsically bound up in how we construct and comprehend public messages.  Confusion 
arises, however, as to how—in the age of reverberating slogans and Internet memes—
scholars can heed the advice of Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and “call attention to imitation” 
in contemporary rhetorical criticism, especially when prospective material for analysis is 
vast.8  Such a task offers potential insight to the evolving relationship between rhetoric 
and repetition, and the complex spectrum between the lively bloom and suffering retreat 
that define each. 
 This study offers additional perspective on the relationship between rhetoric and 
repetition by investigating the richly enduring practice of ceremonial repetition in 
American public address.  Ceremonial repetition refers to practices of reciting rhetorical 
discourse during moments of communal remembrance and observance.  As I argue in 
later chapters, the act of oralizing speech out of its original time and context is the first 
step of the process, but not the only matter of significance in understanding the impact of 
the practice.  Through ceremonial repetition communities enact the opportunity to 
reimagine discourse as public memory, and, through a variety of communicative 
strategies, foster and alter a sense of communal identity.  Unlike the familiar and 
                                                
7 Robert Hariman, “Afterword:  Relocating the Art of Public Address,” in Rhetoric and Political Culture 
in Nineteenth-Century America, ed, Thomas W. Benson (East Lansing:  Michigan State University Press, 
1997), 174. 
8 Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, “Rhetorical Criticism 2009:  A Study in Method,” in The Handbook of Rhetoric 
and Public Address, eds, Shawn J. Parry-Giles and J. Michael Hogan (West Sussex, UK:  Wiley-
Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2010), 97. 
  4 
important mode of criticism that analyzes the inventive savvy of agents crafting what 
Lloyd Bitzer called a “fitting response” to a rhetorical situation,9 this study 
acknowledges the constitutive dimension of public discourse beyond the intended 
meaning encased by a rhetor.  In other words, the central meaning of a text emerges 
from the inventive and stylistic choices of its author as well as its extended existence in 
public invocations and innovations that follow.  
 Rhetorical theorist Kenneth Burke proposed two definitions essential to 
beginning an investigation of ceremonial repetition.  First, Burke defined rhetoric as 
being “rooted in an essential function of language itself, a function that is wholly 
realistic, and is continually born anew; the use of language as a symbolic means of 
inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols.”10  The process of 
meaning making inherent to rhetoric is evident in renewed efforts to experience a speech 
text through repetition.  As I elaborate in chapter two, every moment of repetition is a 
new opportunity to refashion, reimagine, and reconstitute the meaning of public 
discourse as it relates to a moment of ceremonial reflection.  Such a response, in turn, 
also incorporates acts of conveyance that give shape and texture of ceremonial 
repetition.  The fifth canon of rhetoric—delivery—is often overlooked in favor of 
criticism regarding the invention of arguments, despite Cicero’s well-known claim that 
delivery was the crucial component separating an “average speaker” and the “best 
                                                
9 Lloyd Bitzer, “The Rhetorical Situation” Philosophy and Rhetoric 1 (1968):  3. 
10 Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley and Los Angeles:  University of California Press, 
1969), 43. 
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orators.”11  The second term central to an investigation of ceremonial repetition is 
Burke’s conception of form.  Form, Burke suggested, is “the creation of an appetite in 
the mind of the auditor, and the adequate satisfying of that appetite.”12  Repetition is 
normally representative of a sense of constancy.  By analyzing the influence of messages 
contributing to the form of a text repeated, we can begin to witness how ways of 
repeating are also ways of remembering and, as such, ways of altering and amending the 
meaning of texts.13  Instead of analyzing the design of speech acts within contingent 
circumstances, ceremonial repetition asks critics to consider how the form of such acts—
often conveyed in adjoining messages and communicative signals—function to shape 
and influence public perceptions of the text repeated. 
 Despite the volume and variety of publics engaging in practices of ceremonial 
repetition, and rhetorical scholars’ valuable position to analyze such phenomena, critics 
have rarely translated such practices into critical analysis.  One key exception is 
Bradford Vivian’s study of the one-year commemoration of 9/11 in 2002.  The occasion 
featured the recitation of revered public texts in lieu of original speeches, and gave way 
to what Vivian described as “neoliberal epideictic,” or a hollow, “apolitical vocabulary 
of democratic excellence” that, though intended for collective reflection, nevertheless 
“define[d] citizen’s involvement” in public affairs as “irrelevant” to enriching and 
                                                
11 Cicero [trans. James M. May and Jakob Wisse], On the Ideal Orator (De Oratore) (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 290. 
12 Kenneth Burke, Counterstatement (Berkeley and Los Angeles:  University of California Press, 1968), 
31. 
13 Burke’s oft-quoted observation on the relationship between rhetoric and identification is crucial here:  
“You persuade a man only insofar as you talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, 
attitude, idea, identifying your ways with his.”  In many respects, the latter half of Burke’s sentence reads 
as a summary of the multiple ways a text might be reimagined in connection with ceremonial repetition.  
See:  Kenneth Burke,  A Rhetoric of Motives, 55, emphasis mine. 
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sustaining “civic memory, tradition, and virtue.”14  This study expands Vivian’s initial 
exploration of repetition as remembrance by probing deeper into a variety of historical 
contexts and audience strategies of commemoration.  By doing so, I hope to better 
account for the positive and negative implications and possibilities such commemorative 
practice contributes the texts and communities in question.   
 Though vast and varied in form, ceremonial repetition most often includes 
veneration of an iconic rhetorical text that carries an enduring relevance between the 
words of dead authors and the attitudes of living publics.  In their analysis of iconic 
imagery in the American experience, Robert Hariman and John Louis Lucaites argue 
that the proliferation of certain photos are essential to the ongoing process of cultural 
definition:  Such images “highlight some roles and relationships and therefore make 
others less vital or intelligible or legitimate.”15  In similar fashion, François Furstenberg 
defines keystone episodes of public discourse as “civic texts,” or messages that were 
used to teach Americans to “subscribe to the values of their fathers.”16  Civic texts are 
not always clearly understood or universally agreed upon, Furstenberg elaborates.  In 
“the very act of trying to interpret these documents,” he writes, “…ultimately served to 
exalt them even further.  Through their continual appropriation by the popularizing civic 
texts, and through their institutionalization in school curricula and other sites of civic 
                                                
14 Bradford Vivian, “Neoliberal Epideictic:  Rhetorical Form and Commemorative Politics on September 
11th, 2002.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 92 (February 2006): 4. 
15 Robert Hariman and John Louis Lucaites, No Caption Needed:  Iconic Photographs, Public Culture, 
and Liberal Democracy (Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press, 2007), 12. 
16 François Furstenberg, In the Name of the Father:  Washington’s Legacy, Slavery, and the Making of a 
Nation (New York:  Penguin, 2006), 22.  In Furstenberg’s analysis three artifacts represent “civic texts”:  
The Declaration of Independence, The Constitution, and George Washington’s Farewell Address.  It 
should be noted, however, that his analysis is largely limited to the early and mid-nineteenth century. 
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education, these canonical texts embodied and promoted American nationalism.”17  In 
image and word, some ideas persist in the public imagination.   
 Ceremonial repetition is a cultural practice as old as the republic itself, often 
organized around public expressions instrumental to the tenets of American public 
philosophy.  No amount of case studies could present a comprehensive picture of this 
rhetorical phenomenon.  However, in the chapters that follow I have selected moments 
of ceremonial repetition that represent both a variety of historical eras as well as a 
multitude of forms through which iconic texts have been interpreted, imagined, and, in 
some cases, institutionalized.  These case studies offer additional insight to the rhetorical 
dynamics involved in both reimagining the meaning of words and affirming or 
reconstituting the identity of communities.  Among the texts included in this study, I 
examine post-Civil War recitals of the Emancipation Proclamation—“the sacred 
document” used to celebrate African American suffrage18; the repetition of George 
Washington’s Farewell Address (both as an isolated moment of remembrance in 1862, 
and a continuing tradition in the U.S. Senate); and twenty-first century treatments of 
some of America’s most sacred and enduring public texts, including the Declaration of 
Independence, the U.S. Constitution, and Martin Luther King Jr.’s “I Have a Dream” 
oration.  Taken together, these case studies will illustrate both the various forms by 
which communities remember the meaning of texts, and the extent to which repetition 
contributes to the life of texts and the life of publics alike. 
                                                
17 Furstenberg, In the Name of the Father, 233-234. 
18 Ellen M. Litwicki, American Public Holidays, 1865-1920 (Washington, D.C. and London:  Smithsonian 
Institution Press, 2000), 51. 
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 Before engaging these case studies or outlining a theoretical framework for 
analyzing ceremonial repetition, it is important to explore deeper questions of how and 
why rhetoric and repetition were combined in the first place.  Put differently, what were 
some of the original premises and motives for using repetition as rhetoric?  Beginning 
from this line of inquiry allows us to highlight prior observations of repetition from 
classical theories of education and performance into later analyses on more 
contemporary methods of practice.  In the remainder of this introductory essay, I explore 
three classical perspectives important to ceremonial repetition, as I’ve defined it thus far:  
declamation, prosopopoeia, and ekphrasis.  Though no longstanding framework for 
analyzing ceremonial repetition exists, a brief review of these classical theories is both 
appropriate and strategically prudent.  In the pages that follow, I argue that these early 
orientations relating and translating the text to both students and publics establishes a 
foundation of repetition as an art form.  Repetition should be designed to accomplish 
something for the rhetor or public in question.  More directly, however, these classical 
theories indicate that while repeating the words of others is not a new phenomenon, the 
qualities of such practice functions best when it is directed toward the production or 
reappraisal of an artifact. 
LEARNING VIRTUE:  EDUCATION, REPETITION, AND INVENTION 
 Repetition is the oldest and surest way to learn.  In his work Poetics, Aristotle 
claimed that imitation is “inherent in human beings,” elaborating that we “learn our 
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earliest lessons from imitation.”19  The re-creation of thoughts, ideas, or language was 
not universally endorsed among classical philosophers, however.  As one might expect, 
Plato’s description of imitation in the tenth book of The Republic rubs contrary to his 
theory on the realm of ideas:  imitation is thrice removed from the original form of ideal 
truth, partial in relation and “only an image at that.”20   Plato’s position on imitation 
distinguished him from other philosophers of education.  As Ekaterina Haskins has 
argued, Plato positioned the impersonation of another as a “woeful inadequacy” in the 
context of “its corrupting effect on the listener.”21  Virtue derived from speaking in 
another’s words was, however, an important step in elementary education for several 
well-known theorists.  In her historical overview of mimesis dating back to fifth century 
BCE Greece, Vivienne Gray elaborates on the varied interpretations of imitation.  
Mimesis denoted “the recreation of reality, encompassing recreation of both character 
and emotion.”22  To repeat or imitate was not merely a means of exercising voice, but 
was also a serious preparation of one’s public ethic:  following another’s words was a 
means to creating “speech in character” by example.23   
                                                
19 Aristotle, Poetics in Classical Literary Criticism eds and trans., Penelope Murray and T.S. Dorsch (New 
York:  Penguin, 2000), 60-61. 
20 “The art of imitation, therefore, is far removed from truth, and the reason why it produces everything, so 
it seems, is that it grasps only a small part of any object, and only an image at that.  The painter, for 
example, will paint a cobbler for us, or a carpenter, or any other craftsman, without understanding any of 
their crafts; but nevertheless, if he is a good painter, he may paint a carpenter and show it from a distance, 
and deceive children and stupid men into thinking it is a real carpenter.”  Republic, as printed in Penelope 
Murray and T.S. Dorsch [trans.], Classical Literary Criticism (New York:  Penguin, 2000), 44. 
21 Ekaterina V. Haskins, “Mimesis Between Poetics and Rhetoric:  Performance Culture and Civic 
Education in Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle,” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 30 (Summer 2000), 9. 
22 Vivienne Gray, “Mimesis in Greek Historical Theory,” The American Journal of Philology 108 
(Autumn, 1987), 469. 
23 George Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric & Its Christian and Secular Tradition From Ancient to Modern  
Times (Chapel Hill and London:  The University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 27. 
  10 
 No classical philosopher took imitation more seriously or saw the virtue of this 
pedagogical tool more clearly than Isocrates.  Haskins’s summary offers insight into the 
rigor and value of repetition as a preparatory exercise:  “A student of Isocrates for 
instruction should expect not only to memorize poetry and prose for the sake of gaining 
facility in speech, but also gradually to become a public person whose actions are worthy 
of being praised in similar discourses.”24  Repetition was part of a cycle of civic 
excellence.  This logic drew directly from the positive educational benefits of mimesis.  
Haskins further argues that “by identifying with what fictional and historical characters 
say and do, a student grasps the repertoire of social roles and the range of situations 
more fully than a person who receives lessons in moral philosophy without ‘living’ its 
principles.”25  Doing civic affairs emerges from a lived experience charged by the 
evolving transition of “speech-thought-action.”26  Imitation also cultivates new thoughts.  
More specifically, repeating another’s words was not only cultivating memorization of 
ideas, but was meant to reveal what Robert Hariman describes as “judgments” on how to 
move in new situations, as well as “qualities of usage that can succeed only if fitted to 
the distinctive features of the speaker and the specific situation.”27 
 Similar musings on the educational effects of speaking by imitation are evident 
in other writings from the classical period.  George Kennedy has detailed the common 
rite of passage for students of rhetoric in the progymnasmata, including a review of parts 
of a speech, practice addressing the class and listening as the teacher “declaimed a 
                                                
24 Haskins, “Mimesis Between Poetics and Rhetoric,” 14 and 16. 
25 Haskins, “Mimesis Between Poetics and Rhetoric,” 21. 
26 Haskins, “Mimesis Between Poetics and Rhetoric,” 22. 
27 Robert Hariman, “Civic Education, Classical Education, and Democratic Polity,” in Isocrates and Civic 
Education, eds, Takis Poulakos and David Depew (Austin:  University of Texas Press, 2004), 222. 
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speech as a model treatment,” after which students would write a version of the speech 
from a selected topic.28  In his study of Greek declamation, D.A. Russell further 
elaborated that most forms of the declamation exercise—or, to use the Greek equivalent 
word, “meletē”—were defined by two constraints:  The exercise was to be “the 
reproduction” of a “forensic speech or a deliberative one,” and the student was to 
perform “a complete oration, not just part of one.”29  Before sophists and philosophers 
began writing a “systematic teaching of rhetoric,” Russell has argued, “there was already 
an established tradition of making up speeches in character for a variety of literary 
purposes.”30  Practices of the progymnasmata varied from imaginary speeches, speech 
fragments, and whole iterations of discourse, and firmly establish the precedent of 
repetition as a key tool in Greek education.  Notably absent, however, is any mention of 
pedagogical declamation of ceremonial texts, a key nuance that will be explored in later 
chapters. 
 Latin treatises followed the trend set by Greek writers in the fourth and fifth 
centuries.  As Donald Lemen Clark has noted, “belief in the value of imitation was 
undeviating” for theorists of rhetoric from Isocrates through Saint Augustine.31  The 
endgame of imitation, however, was soundly educational:  students absorb another’s 
work to produce their own in the future.  In On the Sublime, for instance, Longinus 
proposed that one way to achieve sublimity resides in “the imitation and emulation of 
                                                
28 George Kennedy, A New History of Classical Rhetoric (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1994), 
83-84. 
29 D.A. Russell, Greek Declamation (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1983), 10. 
30 Russell, Greek Declamation, 15. 
31 Donald Leman Clark, Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education (Westport, CT:  Greenwood Press, 1957), 
149. 
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the great writers and poets of the past.”32  Imitative language was a social value, and, 
more importantly, considered a means to achieving creativity.  Quintilian’s summary of 
imitation and education further highlights the expectation among educators that miming 
the old text was a path to forging new discourse: 
 The boys will thus accustom themselves to the best writings, and they will always have in their 
 memory something which they may imitate and will unconsciously reproduce that model of style 
 which has been impressed upon their minds.  They will have command, moreover, an abundance 
 of the best words, phrases, and figures, not sought or the occasion, but offering themselves 
 spontaneously from a treasure house, as it were within them.33  
 
Imitating speeches affected students.  Or, in Dale Sullivan’s terms, texts left an 
“impression” on a student that could direct practices of production.34  Old texts were 
imagined as germinal frameworks for future fruit is further evident in medieval memory 
practices.  As Mary Carruthers explains, the metaphorical path of a text as it traverses 
the organs of a student’s body gave new meaning to the idea (and diet) of mental health:  
“the memory is a stomach, the stored texts are the sweet-smelling cud originally drawn 
from the gardens of books (or lecture), they are chewed on the palate.”35   
 Though declamation exercises were vital to one’s rhetorical education, writers 
past and present have articulated fear of relying too heavily on repetition as a statement 
unto itself.  Indeed, the status of repetition hinged upon practitioners moving beyond the 
text, even as remnants of its presence lingered.  Faith in a mimetic pedagogy, though 
absent from U.S. curriculum since roughly the nineteenth-century, has recently re-
                                                
32 Aristotle, Poetics, 131. 
33 Quintilan quoted in Donald Leman Clark, “Imitation:  Theory and Practice in Roman Rhetoric” 
Quarterly Journal of Speech, 19.  
34 Dale Sullivan, “Attitudes Toward Imitation:  Classical Culture and the Modern Temper” Rhetoric 
Review 8 (Fall 1995): 5. 
35 Mary Carruthers, The Book of Memory, 2nd Edition (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
206. 
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emerged in contemporary scholarship.36  Robert Terrill’s suggestion that a mimetic 
pedagogy will reinvigorate the values of citizenship in the twenty-first century reaffirms 
the parameters of imitation as a path to civic engagement.  Imitation, Terrill explains, is 
a way to “take on some characteristics of the exemplar, but never to become the 
exemplar.”37  Extending his point further, he argues that a situated speech—the most 
reliable form of rhetoric—“may have been a fitting response to a particular past 
situation,” but a routine repetition planted in a present context would be “absurd, and 
perhaps repulsive.”38  Terrill’s observations have genuine value beyond his admirable 
advocacy for education built on civic consciousness.  His orientation of repetition 
obligates one to focus on when, or under what circumstances, repetition is meaningful.  
The suggestion, however, that repeating a text out of context may be easily dismissed 
not only misses larger potentials for rhetorical criticism on the life of public address, but 
also ignores key facets of classical rhetorical theory that would allow—even 
commend—the effort of citizens to briefly become their subject while speaking their 
words.  With this tension in mind, I now turn to consider more closely the stylistic 
purpose of rhetorical personification and its relation to ceremonial repetition.   
 
 
                                                
36 Nan Johnson provides a careful summary of imitation as a pedagogical tool in this era:  “The 
assumption that the study and imitation of an exemplary literacy canon is a crucial means of acquiring a 
command of eloquent communication was incorporated in nineteenth-century theory as a normative 
premise.”  See:  Nan Johnson, Nineteenth-Century Rhetoric in North America (Carbondale and 
Edwardsville:  Southern Illinois University Press, 1991), 83. 
37 Robert Terrill, “Mimesis, Duality, and Rhetorical Education” Rhetorical Society Quarterly 41 (2011), 
303. 
38 Terrill, “Mimesis, Duality, and Rhetorical Education,” 303. 
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REPETITION AND PRESENCE 
 Personification has been the subject of expansive rhetorical and literary theory 
for ages and remains a powerful strategy for bringing presence to those who are absent 
and voice to those who are silent.  Paul Ricoeur is sensitive to the point of temporality 
and the texture of repetition.  “The creative power of repetition is contained entirely in 
this power of opening up the past again to the future,” he writes, further noting, 
“repetition can be considered an ontological recasting of the gesture of historiography, 
seized in its most fundamental intentionality.”39  In his ambitious study on the intricacies 
of human communication, John Durham Peters ponders the technological advances that 
sustain traces of a message beyond an author’s physical life.  He writes, “we can read the 
traces of the dead, but we cannot interact directly with them.”40  In other words, our 
interaction with dead authors becomes a textbook case of hermeneutics, or, what Peters 
calls, “the art of interpretation where no return message can be received.”41  As an 
important component to classical arts and drama, mimesis was a performative “re-
enactment” of “events of myth,” that could take a variety of forms, both in “speech 
alone, or on the level of speech combined with bodily movement” for added effect.42   
 Ceremonial repetition closely mirrors the process of performing the identity of 
dead or inanimate objects normally attributed to personification.  Here both the identity 
of the writer and the speaker are recast.  In provocative fashion, Walter Burkert called 
                                                
39 Paul Ricoeur [trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer], Memory, History, Forgetting (Chicago:  The 
University of Chicago Press, 2004), 380. 
40 John Durham Peters, Speaking Into The Air:  A History of the Idea of Communication (Chicago and 
London:  The University of Chicago Press, 1999), 149. 
41 Peters, Speaking Into the Air, 149. 
42 “Mimesis,” in The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism, Volume 1:  Classical Criticism, ed, George 
A. Kennedy (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1989), 47. 
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personification “a meeting of linguistics, morality, and religion in the house of 
rhetoric.”43  In more precise terms, personification is traditionally considered the act of 
enlivening non-human objects through speech—“fear has stricken me,” “sorrow eats my 
heart,” or “time is running by.”44  The stylistic device offers speakers the chance to 
mimic the dead and create a sense of presence beyond the grave.  Again, the function of 
such invocation was primarily educational.  Conjuring the dead was a common exercise 
throughout the progymnasmata manuals.  George Kennedy provides the example of 
Aphthonius, who prescribed fourteen exercises related to declamation, including three 
branches of personification:  “eidolopoeia,” or speech that is “attributed to the ghost of a 
known person,” “prosopopoeia,” or the general personification of “an imaginary or 
mythological character,” and “ethopoeia,” or the personification of a historical 
character.”45  James Paxon extends this observation, noting that prosopopoeia, the 
general connotation of personification, was likely “a means of mimetic character 
invention before it described mode of rhetorical ornamentation.”46  Like the central idea 
of a mimetic education, prosopopoeia could help students find their own voice by 
speaking through the words of another. 
                                                
43 Walker Burkert, Heisoid in Context:  Abstractions and Divinities in an Aegean-Eastern koiné,” in 
Emmas Stafford and Judith Herrin (eds), Personification in the Greek World:  From Antiquity to 
Byzantium (Aldershot, Hampshire, UK:  Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2005), 3. 
44 Burkert, “Hesoid in Context,” 4. 
45 George Kennedy, A New History of Classical Rhetoric, 205-206. 
46 James Paxon, The Poetics of Personification (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2009 [1994]), 
13. 
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 Prosopopoeia also functioned in a dual sense to both “represen[t] an absent 
person as present,”47 and also display a speaker’s appropriated character, or as the root 
translation of the term defines, “to make a face” (proson and poein).48  The variety of 
people whose voice might be appropriated has varied throughout the history of 
personification theory, from the useful measure of taking on a “hypothetical voice” in a 
law exercise, to the notion that, if effective, a speaker employing prosopopoeia “will (if 
only briefly) become some other person.”49  Presumably, a distinction between 
hypothetical character appropriation and historical character appropriation would be 
marked in the difference between what José Antonio Mayoral calls the two subsets of 
prosopopoeia:  “‘indirect discourse’ (prosopopoeia oblique)” and “‘direct discourse’ 
(prosopopoeia recta).”50  Furthermore, C. Jan Swearingen has highlighted the long 
history of imitation and the construction of a public persona.  As she argues, the 
contemporary focus on authenticity was not a concern in classical theory:  ethos, or the 
“projected apparent character” and prosopopoeia, or “speaking the words of another in 
order to learn, understand, persuade and communicate,” were both accepted and widely 
practiced ways in which speakers imitated the words of others in order to “find a second 
self.”51   
                                                
47 [Cicero] [trans. Harry Caplan], Rhetorical ad Herennium (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 1954), 
399. 
48 Paxon, The Poetics of Personification, 39. 
49 Paxon, Poetics of Personification, 17; James Jasinski, Sourcebook of Rhetoric (Thousand Oaks, 
California:  SAGE, 2001), 555.  
50 José Antonio Mayoral, “Prosopopoeia,” in Thomas O. Sloane (ed), Encyclopedia of Rhetoric (Oxford:  
Oxford University Press, 2001), 637; Also see Richard A. Lanham, A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms, 
Second Edition (Berkeley and Los Angeles:  University of California Press, 1991), 71 and 123. 
51 C. Jan Swearingen, “Ethos:  Imitation, Impersonation, and Voice,” in Ethos:  New Essays in Rhetorical 
and Critical Theory, eds, James S. Baumlin and Tita French Baumlin (Dallas:  Southern Methodist 
University Press, 1994), 119. 
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 Rhetorical and literary theorists do not present prosopopoeia as an exercise of 
ceremonial repetition.  Indeed, examples of repeating a rhetorical text wholesale—word-
by-word—appears on first sight as a cue of personification taken too literally.  However, 
the stylistic device—particularly in its rich history of appropriated character—introduces 
the importance of perceived subjectivity within the act of repetition.  Though the 
Declaration of Independence or the Emancipation Proclamation may not invite listeners 
to see the shadow of their authorial ghosts in the act of reading, these performances 
indicate both a relationship with the past forged in repetition, as well as a purposeful 
transition of character—or fashioning a second self—described by Swearingen.  As 
prosopopoeia indicates, repetition isn’t about the text alone.  It concerns the new 
relationship between the speaker, the dead author’s voice, and the words bridging the 
two.   
 Repetition plays a key functional purpose in public address.  Further, repetition 
of discourse pulls our focus to the standing of the speaker and the text alike, as each are 
in a state of appropriating the character of the other within the moment of turning words 
of the past into meaning in the present.  If prosopopoeia helps us understand the 
significance of breaking the quiet between a text’s original delivery and its latest 
iteration, the final concept for our preliminary canvas of rhetorical theory helps us 
comprehend the significance of speech that is displayed, performed, and made visible 
before an audience.  Though ekphrasis does not pertain precisely to repetition per se, it 
remains the best longstanding concept that speaks to the process of presenting language 
to an audience, and addresses the implications of repetition on shaping the meaning of 
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words within a listener’s private imagination as well as the tangible sense of public 
display. 
IMAGINING THE WORDS OF OTHERS 
 Ceremonial repetition showcases a speech text.  Exercises of declamation and 
prosopopoeia affirm the rich history of reciting texts for different educational and 
rhetorical purposes.  To better comprehend the presentation of discourse that is inherent 
to ceremonial repetition, we must better understand the classical concept of ekphrasis 
and the implications of moving a text from its environment on the page to one of the 
lived experience.  Ekphrasis is derived from the Greek terms ek (“out”) and phrasein 
(“speak”).52  As a rhetorical function, the term refers to a litany of possible actions open 
to a diverse range of meaning.53  Surviving texts of the progymnasmata attribute 
ekphrasis with expository or descriptive speech “bringing the thing shown vividly before 
the eyes.”54  Composing such work traditionally came after mastering narrative, 
encomium, and ethopoiia, all exercises that cultivated a student’s ability to engage an 
accomplished level of vividness in their speech.55   
                                                
52 Claire Barbetti, Ekphrastic Medieval Visions:  A New Discussion in Interparts Theory (New York:  
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 5. 
53 Barbetti, Ekphrastic Medieval Visions, 142; Ruth Webb supports the generally ambiguous nature of the 
term, calling its varied applications “vague and elusive, though essential to understanding the relations of 
audience, speakers, and words.”  See:  Ruth Webb, Ekphrasis, Imagination, and Persuasion in Ancient 
Rhetorical Theory and Practice (Farnman, Surrey (England):  Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2009), 3. 
54 Quoted in Liz James and Ruth Webb, “‘To Understand Ultimate Things and Enter Secret Places:  
Ekphrasis and Art in Byzantium.” Art History 14 (1) 1991:  4.  Also see:  The New Princeton 
Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, s.v. “EKPHRASIS, ecphrasis (Gr. “description,” pl. ekphraseis),” 
accessed July 03, 2012, 
http://www.credoreference.com/entry/prpoety/ekphrasis_ecphrasis_gr_description_pl_ekphraseis; Also 
see:  Donald Lemen Clark, Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education (Westport, CT:  Greenwood Press. 
Publishers), 1957. 
55 James and Webb, “‘To Understand Ultimate Things and Enter Secret Places:  Ekphrasis and Art in 
Byzantium,” 4. 
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 Engaging the imagination is familiar in some of the earliest treatises on the 
power of speech.  In his “Encomium of Helen,” the Greek sophist Gorgias compared 
human reaction to frightening images to the power of speech on the imagination:  “In 
this way the sight engraves upon the mind images of things which have been seen.  And 
many frightening impressions linger, and what lingers is exactly analogous to [what is] 
spoken.”56  Aristotle’s discussion of metaphors in the third book of On Rhetoric profiles 
the “urbanities” of metaphors and comparisons that succeeded by “bringing-before-the-
eyes” a subject to an audience.57  When speech gives energeia to its subjects, Aristotle 
noted, the metaphor—and the image it creates—is achieved by verbally “making the 
lifeless things living” within the speech.58  Francis Bacon, moreover, summarized the 
utility of rhetoric as the process to “apply reason to imagination for the better moving of 
the will.”59  In Bacon’s conception, rhetoric required imagination, for unless a virtue is 
demonstrated to “the imagination in lively representation” through speech, its meaning 
may be lost.60  To engage an imagination, Burke argued, was a “reordering objects of 
sense, or taking them apart and imagining them in new combinations (such as centaurs) 
that do not themselves derive from sensory experience.”61  Preoccupation with the 
relationship between rhetoric and the imagination was a central focus to rhetorical 
                                                
56 Gorgias, “Encomium of Helen” in Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg (eds), The Rhetorical Tradition:  
Readings from Classical Times to the Present, 2nd Edition (Boston and New York:  Bedford/St. Martin’s, 
2001), 46. 
57 Aristotle [Trans. George Kennedy], On Rhetoric:  A Theory of Civic Discourse (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 1991), 248. 
58 Aristotle [Trans. George Kennedy], On Rhetoric, 249. 
59 Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning (New York:  The Modern Library, 2001), 149. 
60 Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, 150. 
61 Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, 79. 
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theorists, not only in the contemporary sense, but also in the methods and practices by 
which the verbal was made visible. 
 As Ruth Webb argues, the use of language to stir a visual image in the mind of 
an audience was essential in rhetorical practice, particularly as “the reception of texts 
remained an essentially aural experience.”62  In her impressive overview, Webb notes 
that ancient definitions of ekphrasis are enriching to our understanding of the 
relationship between speakers, audiences, and the power of words.63  Classical educators 
were concerned with grooming students’ ability not only to speak well in a sense of civic 
excellence, Webb writes, but also to exercise a connection between speech and 
imagination.  As James and Webb clarify, ekphrasis was the sole activity of the 
progymnasmata that was “defined in terms of its effect on the audience” and not “by its 
content or scope.”64  
 The transformative implications of ekphrasis make for a durable and elastic 
frame for understanding how words are translated across different mediums of 
communication.  Ekphrasis is, by definition, a “linguistically impossible” feat of 
translation via medium:  “Language translates thoughts into words,” while ekphrasis 
“translates the visible into words which are somehow communicated as a visual 
experience to the audience.”65  Instead of using words to craft and image in the mind of 
the audience, the ceremonial repetition of speech presents audiences with an image of 
                                                
62 Ruth Webb, Ekphrasis, Imagination, and Persuasion in Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Practice 
(Farnman, Surrey (England):  Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2009), 26. 
63 Webb, Ekphrasis, Imagination, and Persuasion in Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Practice, 3. 
64 James and Webb, “‘To Understand Ultimate Things and Enter Secret Places:  Ekphrasis and Art in 
Byzantium,” 6. 
65 Webb, Ekphrasis, Imagination, and Persuasion in Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Practice, 52 and 58. 
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discourse via form:  words presented in voice and sight.  Claire Barbetti’s study of 
ekphrasis in medieval contexts adds a greater level of support for connecting ceremonial 
repetition and ekphrasis.  As Barbetti explains, ekphrasis is “part of the process of 
making a mental model of a composition,” and, in this sense, “needs to be thought of as 
a verb, not a noun.”66   Even more, Barbetti claims, ekphrasis is not beset to the linear 
trajectory from image to word, but is rather a composite collection of engaging 
“memory, translation, interpretation,” among other things as “a composition translating 
another composition.”67  Texts are always in process of moving across medium, whether 
they are verbal, visual, or other.  The expository texture of ekphrasis is applicable in the 
“translation from one medium into another,” the likes of which may include “reverse 
ekphrasis” or some variant.68 
 Principles of ekphrasis move our attention to how form contributes to a public 
image of a text.  Quintilian’s discussion of enargeia—a close approximation to 
ekphrasis—is especially illuminating to this point, Webb argues.  Bringing words before 
the eyes of an audience doesn’t happen naturally, Webb continues, but is instead most 
effective when it acts as a “re-presentation of familiar and accepted material,” which 
constitutes a visualization, not of the object or thing described, but of “the effect of 
seeing that thing” to the audience.”69  The effective use of ekphrasis, she posits, extends 
or re-presents an image familiar to the audience to activate “the images already stored in 
                                                
66 Barbetti, Ekphrastic Medieval Visions, 5. 
67 Barbetti, Ekphrastic Medieval Visions, 11. 
68 Barbetti, Ekphrastic Medieval Visions, 142. 
69 Webb, Ekphrasis, Imagination, and Persuasion in Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Practice, 122. 
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the listener’s mind” throughout the speech between speaker and listener.70  Part of 
visualizing the text, in other words, means aligning images of cultural memory by which 
a text can be understood and made familiar.  The connection between the classical theory 
and the contemporary practice is not a direct overlap, but is another way of enriching the 
texture of repetition beyond a rote looping of words.  Webb’s thesis on the fragmentary 
and evolving form of ekphrasis sheds important light on the relative, though not 
consistent, similarities to ceremonial repetition.  One episode of ekphrasis does not 
necessarily relate to another via a close framework of intricate components, Webb 
suggests.  However, taking ekphrasis seriously means studying “the individual’s relation 
to the word and the intersection between language, memory, and imagination.”71 
 Ekphrasis offers two important insights that help frame the development of this 
analysis.  First, ceremonial repetition as I’ve described it appears to maintain the original 
concern with words and images presented before the audience, but in a reverse flow of 
direction, shifting from a concern with the vision affected in words to the displayed 
vision of words.  The repetition of speech is, furthermore, also a re-presentation of 
speech, providing a new image of discourse as an object of communal recollection and, 
even more, presenting different forms of display familiar to an audience’s disposition.  
Ekphrasis is repetition of sorts.  It “is not only a form of mimesis,” notes Grant F. Scott, 
“but a cunning attempt to transform and master the image by inscribing it”:  a repetition 
                                                
70 Webb, Ekphrasis, Imagination, and Persuasion in Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Practice, 127. 
71 Webb, Ekphrasis, Imagination, and Persuasion in Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Practice, 195. 
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and a translation of an image.72  By translating an image to words (or vice versa), the act 
of repetition begets change, not constancy. 
CONCLUSION 
 Though ceremonial repetition inherits ideas from classical theories of 
declamation, prosopopoeia, and ekphrasis, it remains a distinctive blend of public 
address and visual display with important insights yet to be uncovered.  At the center of 
our study resides the question of what audiences and publics are doing with rhetorical 
texts and to what effect.  In their influential study The New Rhetoric, Chaïm Perelman 
and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca illustrate the virtues of repetition in the context of 
argumentation theory.  “A man, a social class, a period can be typified,” the authors 
write, “by the models they adopt and their way of looking at them.”73  In a similar 
regard, ceremonial repetition is both a communal argument of presence and importance, 
as well as a re-fashioning—within a cultural and political moment—of how publics 
imagine texts as artifacts of communal memory.  Drawing out the central importance of 
a text’s particular form helps us move beyond the questions of presence, and move into 
deeper relationships forged in the act of repetition as they align or deviate from the 
traditional context of public speech. 
 This review of concepts central to classical rhetorical theory has proven that the 
intellectual resources to account for the rhetoric of repetition are diverse, and offer a 
compelling point for considering repetition as a productive rhetorical exercise.  Terrill’s 
                                                
72 Grant F. Scott, “The Rhetoric of Dilation:  Ekphrasis and Ideology.” Word & Image 7 (4) (October-
December 1991):  302. 
73 Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca [trans. John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver], The New 
Rhetoric:  A Treatise on Argumentation (Notre Dame:  University of Notre Dame Press, 2008 [1969], 364. 
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earlier point on the limits of repetition should be taken seriously, however.  After all, the 
transition of imitation from the classical progymnasmata to contemporary 
commemoration shifts attention away from rhetorical invention as it is conventionally 
understood:  instead of favoring imitation as a first step to creating something new, 
public iterations position repetition as a rhetorical gesture of its own, absent the sense of 
discovery or engagement that defines the art of rhetoric.  Indeed, Quintilian’s praise and 
cautious limit on the virtues of imitation should be instructive to rhetorical scholars 
today:  “imitation alone is not sufficient, if only for the reason that a sluggish nature is 
only too ready to rest content with the inventions of others.”74  As the history of rhetoric 
has shown, imitation has its limits.75  It would be unwise to expect past speeches to 
fulfill the needs of the present in every situation.  The inventive discovery of 
arguments—with the help of past models—allows for a more fulfilling exploration of 
ideas and relationships.  Yet, it is possible to advocate the continued expansion of 
rhetorical invention while also accounting for the creative possibility imbued in 
reimagining the words of others in ceremonial repetition.  The moments of repetition 
under consideration in this study are not tools to cultivate individual students’ 
imagination and invention of speech.  When removed from the private study of rote 
tutelage, repetition engages a public imagination, and hence should be understood and 
                                                
74 Quintilian doesn’t mince words in his distinction between imitation and art, offering the comparison 
between a shadow and its substance.  See:  Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria, Vol. IV, trans. by H. E. 
Butler (New York:  G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1922), Book X. Ch. II. 4 (77).  
75 Examples of repetition applied to an absurd degree come to mind.  George Kennedy’s summary of 
Renaissance humanists is instructive to the stifling effect of close imitation.  So dedicated to the classical 
style and standard, many “sought to use no Latin word that could not be found in Cicero, as well as to 
imitate his composition sentences.”  See:  George Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and 
Secular Tradition From Ancient to Modern Times (Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 
1999), 239. 
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studied as public persuasion. When we recognize that repeating another’s words can 
constitute new relations in the world, or reaffirm existing perceptions between the living 
and the dead, we may discover more life in repetition than previously considered. 
 Classical theories and practice of declamation, prosopopoeia, and ekphrasis raise 
instructive questions about the continued practice of repetition.  As this study progresses, 
we will encounter historical cases wherein the importance of these concepts will be 
advanced, expanded, or proven adaptable to unforeseen contexts.  Though the preceding 
review helps situated repetition in an educational context, our concern with repetition 
will follow the practice into public settings of ceremonial display, and require additional 
tools of interpretation.  In chapter two I summarize and extend our theoretical reach to 
better understand repetition as a rhetorical act.  Beyond the limited frame of declamation 
exercises, constitutive rhetoric offers a way of studying language as subject to expansive 
meaning and application.  Like the concern of subjectivity implied in prosopopoeia, I 
will also consider how repeating the words of another within an epideictic context 
provides opportunities to both invoke and share a sense of shared subjectivity through 
the act of repetition.  Finally, I offer insight from contemporary sources on the 
relationship between words and images, as well as the bodily enactment of communal 
memory at the root of ceremonial repetition.   
 Bringing a speech into a new context relies on certain deliberative choices in 
reimagining the original form of public address.  Speech is both made visible in 
performance and display, but is also designed to interact with different symbolic 
expressions within a given epideictic moment.  To repeat a speech, in short, is also to 
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visualize a speech and extend its constitutive capacity as public memory.  While the 
mimetic model of education sought to instill civic virtue in students mouthing the words 
of others, the contemporary position of repetition in the context of remembering together 
raises further implications on the place of public virtue bound up in a moment of 
iteration.  Lastly, I address important implications of positioning a speech text as a 
common object of public memory, and issues of interpretive communities that emerge 
within such frameworks.  
 Chapters three, four, five, and six represent case studies of analysis.  Accounting 
for ceremonial repetition in the American experience is unfathomable.  However, each 
selected text and performance featured in these chapters illustrates the phenomenon in a 
way that adds to our understanding of its implications, possibilities, and consequences.  
Chapter three focuses on the extensional life of the 1863 Emancipation Proclamation, 
and its position in August First celebrations following the Civil War.  Specifically, this 
chapter analyzes the peculiar character of the Emancipation Proclamation, and how, 
unlike other texts repeated, it relies on the discursive invocations and extensions to 
negotiate its meaning.  To clarify this point, I analyze the ceremonial rhetoric of 
Frederick Douglass who, as keynote speaker on a variety of occasions, gives us insight 
into how the discourse in conjunction of repetition directed public interpretations of the 
text within the moment of its new performance.  This essay presents what is perhaps the 
most conventional approach to accounting for the meaning of ceremonial repetition in 
that the primary objects of analysis are speech texts.  
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 Chapter four focuses on how the channel by which the public images at text 
alters the landscape of ceremonial repetition.  This essay focuses on the 1862 
celebrations of George Washington’s birthday and the overlapping political and public 
recitations of his 1796 Farewell Address.  This event was equally distinctive for 
government orchestration as it was for public participation.  Instead of focusing on only 
the discourse around the repetition of Washington’s Farewell Address, however, I 
position the repetition of the text within the context of the illustration of the event 
featured in the popular newsprint Harper’s Weekly, and the potential of remembering 
discourse within the explicit visualization of public address through the hybrid reading 
of text and image.   
 Chapter five offers additional insight to habits of repetition for Washington’s 
Farewell Address, but within a different timeframe.  Here I analyze the longstanding 
commemoration of Washington’s birthday from the institutional perspective of the 
United States Senate.  America’s deliberative body—which has been reading the 
document aloud for 110 years (as of this writing)—represents a unique case wherein the 
austere reading of the text marks the beginning and end of the commemoration insofar as 
the public is concerned.  The Senate’s maintenance of a paper journal to record the 
thoughts and reflections of individual Senators who read the address—privately held 
and, until recently, secret—marks a distinctively personal and inward shift in our 
understanding of ceremonial repetition.  Though this essay focuses largely on private 
comments associated to the act of repetition, the Senate’s practice offers insight to refine 
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our expectations on how texts may thrive or wither as public memories, and how such 
practices provide insight to the maintenance of texts and communities of memory alike.   
 Chapter six offers criticism of the most contemporary treatments of texts by way 
of ceremonial repetition.  Here I analyze four separate moments and modes of repetition 
united by the common style of delivery.  These examples exemplify the recent trend to 
splinter texts into fragments delivered through a collective performance.  This mode of 
delivery is apparent in respective video productions of Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address 
and the Declaration of Independence.  The same habit is also evident in the U.S. House 
of Representatives’ reading of the Constitution in January 2011, as well as the emerging 
tradition of reading King’s “I Have a Dream” speech by elementary school students.  By 
considering these occasions together, I argue that contemporary methods of ceremonial 
repetition have given way to a networked method of performing and understanding the 
text, with varying results and consequences for each practice. 
 The final chapter offers closing thoughts of how the varied approaches to 
analyzing ceremonial repetition alter our understanding of the relationship between 
rhetoric and repetition.  Removed from its original time and place, speech exists and 
persists as public memory, and as such, provides communities with an opportunity to 
forge a collective experience and translate a sense of public virtue from its imbued 
meaning in repetition.  As we move first to building a set of methodological 
presumptions to explore the various forms of ceremonial repetition, we should remain 
mindful of the important possibilities of witnessing a text’s extended life through words, 
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images, and methods of enactment that re-present, reinvigorate, and nurture its sustained 
relevancy as a necessary aid to remembering together. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
LIVING TEXTS 
The meaning of a text is thus not simply to be found within it, to be dug out like a mineral treasure, nor 
does it come from the reader, as if he were a kind of movie projector.  It resides in the life of reading itself, 
to which both text and reader contribute. 
—James Boyd White.1 
SPEECH AS PUBLIC MEMORY 
 In his literary work Invisible Cities, Italo Calvino introduces readers to a 
dreamlike borough called Zora.  Unlike other places, Zora is unforgettable.  “This city,” 
Calvino writes, “…is like an armature, a honey-comb in whose cells each of us can place 
the things he wants to remember:  names of famous men, virtues, numbers, vegetable 
and mineral classifications, dates of battles, constellations, parts of speech.”2  Holding 
and sustaining multiple objects in tandem makes Zora a tempting but fatal residence.  
“[F]orced to remain motionless and always the same, in order to be more easily 
remembered,” the city succumbs to being “languished, disintegrated, disappeared.”3  
Constancy prompts decay.  Could Zora be sustained under conditions of change?   Does  
memory require a stable structure to endure? 
  Calvino’s poetic illustration asks us to consider the stability and perceived 
rigidity of repetition as a rhetorical act.  Denotative associations of repetition are rarely 
praiseworthy, often focusing on the return of something, often in rote, recurring, or 
                                                
1 James Boyd White, When Words Lose Their Meaning:  Constitutions and Reconstitutions of Language, 
Character, and Community (Chicago and London:  The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 19. 
2 Italo Calvino, Invisible Cities (New York and London:  Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1972), 15. 
3 Italo Calvino, Invisible Cities, 16. 
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replicated form.4  Presumably, repetition aids in retention through a considerable amount 
of real or perceived sameness, the very quality that led to Zora’s downfall.  If words 
were akin to bricks in their physical constancy, the comparison between the repetition of 
a speech and a sturdy (and untenable) environment of memory would be apt.  Within the 
discursive space of repetition—however consistent a routine or practice may seem—the 
presentation of form always arises from choice and the dismissal of its alternatives.  Can 
ceremonial repetition ever nurture and sustain memory while staving off its own 
deterioration?  In what ways, moreover, does the practice of ceremonial repetition lend 
itself to critical appraisal?  Answering the second question helps us confront the essential 
notion of evaluation bound up in the first.  By shifting from the conventional sense of 
repetition as rigidity to a more nuanced perspective that accounts for the choice in design 
and form, we can better distinguish and evaluate repetition as the sustenance of textual 
life and repetition as rhetorical taxidermy. 
 Proposing a critical framework for analyzing ceremonial repetition is not easy.  
Few scholars have seriously considered analysis of speech texts beyond their immediate 
context of delivery, and even less have confronted the rhetorical implications of 
repetition as a strategy of remembrance.  This chapter begins by categorizing ceremonial 
repetition within the theory of constitutive rhetoric.  Specifically, I highlight what 
scholars have defined as extensional constitutive rhetoric, or how the meaning of a text 
is expanded through public appropriation and invocation, and not confined by original 
                                                
4 Some neutral attitudes toward the word include “recital” or “restoration”; one particularly unattractive 
definition cited in the Oxford English Dictionary illustrates the often poor standing of repetition:  “The 
return of a taste or flavor, some time after food or drink has been swallowed, as a result of belching or 
indigestion.”  See:  Repetition, n.1 Third edition, December 2009; online version March 2012. 
[http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/162794] accessed 18 May 2012. 
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authorial intentions.  As epideictic display, ceremonial repetition inherits components 
that will inform how the iteration of speech contributes to conceptions of public virtue 
through shared memory and visual display, each of which are important avenues for 
future analysis.  Finally, I introduce a framework for gauging the implications of 
political subjectivity inherent from constitutive rhetoric and commemorative identities.  
This final question pertains to the sustenance of certain public philosophies through the 
treatment of a text and its public display.  As my discussion of these three theoretical 
frameworks illustrates, ceremonial repetition is a rhetorical phenomena that should be 
understood through what James Boyd White calls the “life of reading,” where memory, 
author, and audience converge and texts live anew. 
RECONSTITUTING A TEXT:  INHERITED AND EXTENDED MEANING 
 Contrary to the belief that repetition either requires sameness or leads to a point 
of diminished quality, numerous scholars have positioned repetition as a process of 
continuation and regeneration.  Sociologist Anthony Giddens posits that repetition is 
central to understanding the evolving character of human relationships.   Giddens’s 
important term “structuration” refers to the ongoing construction of meaning between 
individuals and the institutions they inhabit.  Language is the key component of 
structuration:  “language has structure, language has form, but it isn’t visible and it is 
only ‘there’ in so far as it actually forms part of what people do in their day-to-day use 
of it.”5  Meaning, in short, has to be practiced repeatedly.  Constancy and change are 
also interrelated by practice:  change is always a possible outcome, but our presumptions 
                                                
5 Anthony Giddens and Christopher Pierson, Conversations with Anthony Giddens:  Making Sense of 
Modernity (Cambridge, UK:  Polity Press, 1998), 76. 
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of social life are made resonant by impressions from “social reproduction.”6  What we 
perceive as sameness, Giddens suggests, is only a result of social maintenance over an 
alternate choice.  The human practices of language, Giddens elaborates, is central to this 
understanding. “Every instance of the use of language is a potential modification of that 
language at the same time as it acts to reproduce it.”7  Hollow forms of habit and looped 
consumer messages persist.  Yet, the potential for alteration and change is equally 
steadfast.  The notion of an exact repetition of a previous act is, by Giddens’s theory of 
structuration, nonviable.  The sustenance—if any—derived from repetition is derived 
from both authors and readers, or, more precisely, from the continued momentum 
readers pass on from authors.  Texts, in this regard become “the concrete medium and 
outcome of a process of production, reflexively monitored by its author and reader.”8   
 The productive value of repetition is also central to Judith Butler’s theory of 
linguistic representation.  Like Giddens, Butler argues that repetition produces meaning.  
Some linguistic acts embody a characteristic wherein meaning returns to its author “in a 
different form,” indicating that the act “is not a momentary happening, but a certain 
nexus of temporal horizons, the condensations of iterability that exceeds the moment it 
occasions.9  Time and space meet in speech acts, and shift the position of textual agency 
away from the author.  “The speaker assumes responsibility precisely through the 
citational character of speech,” Butler argues, continuing, “The speaker renews the 
                                                
6 Giddens and Pierson, Conversations, 89. 
7 Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure, and Contradiction in Social 
Analysis (Berkeley and Los Angeles:  University of California Press, 1979), 220. 
8 Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, 43. 
9 Judith Butler, Excitable Speech:  A Politics of the Performantive (New York and London:  Routledge, 
1997), 14. 
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linguistic tokens of a community, reissuing and reinvigorating such speech.  
Responsibility is thus linked with speech as repetition, not origination.”10  A speech act 
is cultural inheritance passed on.  To understand the meaning of language, Butler posits, 
we must study its public use.  “One speaks a language that is never fully one’s own,” she 
claims, “but that language only persists through repeated occasions of that invocation.  
That language gains its temporal life only in and through the utterances that reinvoke 
and restructure the conditions of its own possibility.”11  Giddens and Butler offer 
distinctive visions of repetition as necessary to sustaining meaning itself.  Less a 
mimicking of the original by the replica, repetition is a sustaining return, reaffirmation, 
or reconstitution of a public language.  How—and with what implications—such a 
position may be transferred from the study of individual words and phrases to the 
ongoing recitation of a comprehensive speech text is a question I now consider within 
the theory of constitutive rhetoric.   
 The history of rhetorical theory is an ongoing story of how critics have taken 
fewer components of the textual encounter for granted.  This is evident in the transition 
from focusing on argumentative appeals and canons of discourse central to Neo-
Aristotelianism to later scrutiny of words and images under the rubric of “symbolic 
action.”12  This history does not offer a clear framework for analyzing the repetition of 
                                                
10 Butler, Excitable Speech, 39.   
11 Butler, Excitable Speech, 140. 
12 The record of this development is covered in numerous sources:  Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles:  University of California Press), 1969; Edwin Black, Rhetorical Criticism:  A 
Study in Method (Madison, WI:  The University of Wisconsin Press), 1978; Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar, 
“The Idea of Rhetoric in the Rhetoric of Science,” in Rhetorical Hermeneutics:  Invention and 
Interpretation in the Age of Science, eds, Alan G. Gross and William M. Keith (Albany:  State University 
of New York, 1997), 25-88; Robert Hariman, “Afterword:  Relocating the Art of Public Address,” in 
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speech texts.  However, distinguishing rhetoric’s functional and constitutive capacities 
invites an accessible mode of framing the process of repetition within rhetorical theory.  
According to James Jasinski, the distinction between these two perspectives is 
determined by how critics position the context of speech emerging in the realm of 
human relations.  “Functionalist” perspectives focus on speech as a mode of influence to 
“an immediate audience” with the speaker attempting to solve “a particular problem or 
exigence.”13  A public apology might be scrutinized, for example, as a way to understand 
how different modes of appeal are designed to assuage public perceptions.  Constitutive 
analysis, by contrast, analyzes language as representative and world creating.  Words 
“create what they describe as they simultaneously describe what they create.”14  The 
distinction between functionalist and constitutive frameworks is not mutually exclusive, 
and ceremonial repetition is one example wherein a sense of each perspective is 
important.  However, as I explain in the paragraphs that follow, a constitutive framework 
represents the best starting point by which we may position ceremonial repetition as a 
phenomenon accessible to critical analysis.   
 As one of the foremost theorists of constitutive discourse, James Boyd White 
defines rhetoric as “the study of ways we constitute ourselves as individuals, as 
                                                                                                                                           
Rhetoric and Political Culture in Nineteenth-Century America, ed, Thomas W. Benson (East Lansing:  
Michigan State University Press, 1997), 163-184; For a cogent argument on the links between rhetorical 
theory and the emergence of visual rhetoric, see:  Lester C. Olson, “Intellectual and Conceptual Resources 
for Visual Rhetoric:  A Re-examination of Scholarship Since 1950,” The Review of Communication 7(1) 
(2007): 1-20.   
13 James Jasinski, “A Constitutive Framework for Rhetorical Historiography:  Toward an Understanding 
of the Discursive (Re)constitution of ‘Constitution’ in The Federalist Papers” in Doing Rhetorical 
History:  Conceptions and Cases, ed, Kathleen Turner (Tuscaloosa and London:  The University of 
Alabama Press, 1998), 73. 
14 Jasinski, “A Constitutive Framework for Rhetorical Historiography,” 74. 
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communities, and as cultures, whenever we speak.”15  Identity and relationships become 
known only through words used to bring subjectivities into being.  For White 
constitutive rhetoric includes “all language activity that goes into the constitution of 
actual human cultures and communities.”16  Maurice Charland, another important 
theorist of constitutive rhetoric, argues that the identification of a subject shifts attention 
to “the textual nature of social being.”17  Subjects are brought into being, ascribed a 
collective identity, a collective history, and given expected actions within a historical 
identity through language.18  “Constitution precedes persuasion,” Charland has 
clarified,” but persuasion can still occur.”19   By inheriting and reconstituting language, 
White further suggests, speakers are defining a textual community forged through 
speech “in the ways in which it invites its reader to become active in engaging with it.”20  
To analyze rhetoric as a constitutive phenomenon abolishes any perceived separation 
between language and culture:  language is inherited from culture; culture is constituted 
and reconstituted by language.21   
 Jasinski elaborates the possibilities of constitutive rhetoric as a tool for analyzing 
the language as inherited public practice.  Specifically, Jasinski argues that constitutive 
                                                
15 James Boyd White, Heracles’ Bow:  Essays on the Rhetoric and Poetics of the Law (Madison and 
London:  The University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 39. 
16 White, Heracles’ Bow, 39 (emphasis in original). 
17 Maurice Charland, “Constitutive Rhetoric:  The Case of the Peuple Quebecois.” Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 73 (1987):  137. 
18 Maurice Charland, “Constitutive Rhetoric,” in Encyclopedia of Rhetoric, ed, Thomas O. Sloane 
(Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2001), 617. 
19 Charland, “Constitutive Rhetoric,” 617. 
20 James Boyd White, When Words Lose Their Meaning, 282.  Also see:  Heracles’ Bow, 45-46.  
21 White elaborates:  “Since the text—whether it is an argument, a poem, or a work of history or 
philosophy—is always a reconstitution of the culture, it is necessarily about the culture, whether it 
idealizes it, ironically repudiates it, or elaborates its incoherences.  The text is not a closed system but an 
artifact made by one mind and offered to another; it recreates the materials of the world for use in the 
world.”  See:  When Words Lose Their Meaning, 280. 
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discourse embodies two realms of creative potential.  The distinction merits close 
attention:  “Intentionally, texts exhibit constitutive potential through the invitations 
inscribed in various discursive forms (tropes, arguments, etc.).  Extensionally, texts 
exhibit constitutive force through the cultural circulation and discursive articulation of 
their textual forms in ways that enable and constrain subsequent practice.”22  Texts 
create relationships, arguments, and positions for audiences in the world.  Audiences, in 
turn, “appropriate, articulate, circulate, and/or subvert these textual forms in ways that 
release and transform their potential constitutive energy.”23  This formulation represents 
an ideal starting point for analysis of ceremonial repetition.  By attending to the 
extensional constitution of speech texts, or, using Butler’s terminology, the later 
iterations of speech acts, critics reverse the traditional lineage between author to 
audience, and attend to the creative ways in which audiences inherit, incorporate, and 
invoke meaning passed down to them from authors.  Such a constitutive approach 
recognizes, in Jasinski’s words, that “language itself is (re)constituted through 
performance.”24  In their study of respective state resolutions written by Thomas 
Jefferson and James Madison in response to the 1798 Alien and Sedition Acts, for 
example, James Jasinski and Jennifer Mercieca illustrate how this analytical perspective 
might be applied.  First, they analyze the intentional or “interior” invitation of the texts, 
explaining how “discourse constitutes individual and group identities,” including an 
orientation and commitment of key terms and perceptions of time and space.25  Next, 
                                                
22 Jasinski, “A Constitutive Framework for Rhetorical Historiography,” 74. 
23 Jasinksi, “A Constitutive Framework for Rhetorical Historiography,” 75. 
24 Jasinksi, “A Constitutive Framework for Rhetorical Historiography,” 78. 
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they explore the extensional or “exterior” legacy of the resolutions, or how circulation 
and reception demonstrated “the way constitutive invitations become realized, and 
constitutive legacies established.”26   
  Studies on extensional constitutive rhetoric have not examined ceremonial 
repetition at length.  However, few interpretive actions are more closely parallel to the 
process of reconstituting language through performance than the act of ceremonial 
repetition.  As White has stated, understanding constitutive rhetoric begins by asking 
what kind of world an author creates within a text.  The extensional study of texts pushes 
the question further.  Critics ask how that world re-appears and is altered in certain ways 
or reconstituted in the broader circulation of the text.  Repetition reworks texts as a new 
voice or melody alters the seemingly fixed nature of old lyrics.27  Form influences 
                                                                                                                                           
25 James Jasinski and Jennifer Mercieca, “Analyzing Constitutive Rhetorics:  The Virginia and Kentucky 
Resolutions and the ‘Principles of ‘98’” in Shawn J. Parry-Giles and J. Michael Hogan (eds), The 
Handbook of Rhetoric and Public Address (West Sussex, UK:  Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2010), 
320. 
26 James Jasinski and Jennifer Mercieca, “Analyzing Constitutive Rhetorics,” 333. 
27 Consider some examples from popular culture to illustrate this point.  Does anyone remember that Otis 
Redding was the original author of a song titled “Respect,” made famous by Aretha Franklin’s later cover?  
In the original version, Redding pleads with his female partner, to whom he has dedicated significant time 
and money, “All I’m asking is for a little respect when I come home.”  Few would deny that “Respect” is 
now Franklin’s song, or that the denotative associations of the text have been reconstituted in its cultural 
circulation as a call for fairness that resonates with multiple movements for gender and racial equality (not 
the equity of a romantic relationship), all from merely editing the last four words of the refrain and the 
persona of the singer. Franklin has noted, “It [“Respect] was…one of the battle cries of the civil rights 
movement. The song took on monumental significance.  It became the "Respect" women expected from 
men and men expected from women, the inherent right of all human beings.”  See:  Otis Redding, 
“Respect,” The Very Best of Otis Redding, Atlantic Recording Corp., 1992; Aretha Franklin and David 
Ritz, Aretha:  From These Roots (New York: Villiard Books, 1999), 112, Accessed from:  
[http://solomon.bltc.alexanderstreet.com/cgi-bin/asp/philo/bltc/getvolume.pl?S7948#DIV20] on 1 August 
2012.  Also, consider Gus Van Sant’s 1998 cinematic shot-for-shot “remake” of Alfred Hitchcock’s 
Psycho, which, while mostly faithful in dialogue and image, added nuanced alterations to sound that 
shifted audience perceptions of certain characters.  With the emergence and repetitive circulation of these 
texts, the notion of attributed authorship is questioned and, at times, redrawn.  See:  Keith Negus, 
“Authorship and the Popular Song,” Music & Letters 92 (4) (2011):  607-629; Shannon Donaldson-
McHugh and Don Moore, “Film Adaptation, Co-Authorship, and Hauntology:  Gus Van Sant’s Psycho 
(1998),” Journal of Popular Culture 39 (2) (2006):  225-233. 
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content, and through the public iteration of texts, the constitutive meaning of discourse is 
reinforced or reconstituted in repeated practice.  
 Extensional constitutive rhetoric invites scholars to consider texts through a life 
metaphor.  Such a comparison is inviting, John McDermott has argued, because “of the 
preeminence of the experience of nature as open and as subject to reconstruction,” 
including “notions of growth, experiment, liberty, and amelioration” that color dominant 
threads of American thought.28  Applying this metaphor to public address studies, Robert 
Itlis and Stephen Browne provide readers with a sense of how rhetorical texts exist on 
two planes separated by an author’s intention:  The first life is fleeting and restricted to 
“a historical moment,” which, once passed, ushers the text into a longer and more diffuse 
existence at the hands of “a secondary auditor” and “fresh encounter.”29 Several theorists 
and contributors have utilized the life to describe its proximity to or separation from 
authorial intentions.  Michel Foucault saw texts as “objects of appropriation” best 
understood as acts rather than a products, meant to be studied on a situational mode of 
existence.30  Roland Barthes, in a similar respect, defined the text as a seemingly infinite 
object of study, or “a methodological field” and an “activity of production,” 
distinguished from the “fragment of substance,” such as the physical object of a book 
                                                
28 John J. McDermott, The Culture of Experience:  Philosophical Essays in the American Grain (New 
York:  New York University Press, 1976), 9.  
29 Robert S. Itlis and Stephen H. Browne, “Tradition and Resurgence in Public Address Studies” in Gerald 
M. Phillips and Julia T. Tood (eds), Speech Communication:  Essays to Commemorate the 75th 
Anniversary of the Speech Communication Association (Carbondale and Edwardsville:  Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1990), 89. 
30 These modes might include “circulation, valorization, attribution, and appropriation” within the varying 
practices of a given culture.  See:  Michel Foucault, “What is an Author?” in José V. Harari (ed), Textual 
Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-Structuralist Criticism (Ithaca, New York, 1979), 148 and 158. 
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that defines a “work.”31  James W. Chesebro, finally, expanded Barthes position, 
defining a work as a physical fragment and a text as “any king of response to or 
experience derived from the work”:  “any king of textual analysis, such as a performance 
or critical assessment” that “functions independently of the original work, ultimately 
displacing the original work.”32   
 If the oralizing of the text in later performances represents a reconstitution of the 
original discourse, what implication does this bring to the relationship between authors 
and audiences?  Michael Calvin McGee proposed critics read texts as “larger than the 
apparently finished discourse that presents itself as transparent,” and, even more, that it 
was consumers, not authors, who were the contemporary “producers of discourse.”33  
Michael Leff’s project on close reading, by contrast, emphasized a text’s wholeness as 
an artistic design whereby critic “move from what is given in the text to something that 
they themselves produce—an account of the rhetorical dynamics implicit within it.”34  
The position of a text also resided, Leff later clarified, as “at once a point of local 
closure, an event in the ongoing development of a genre of utterance, and a productive 
moment in the unending process of interpreting and re-interpreting the social world.”35  
This calibration makes a special contribution to our understanding of ceremonial 
repetition and the tension between authorial intention and public reception of texts.   
                                                
31 Roland Barthes, Image, Music, Text (New York:  Hill and Wang, 1977), 156-157.  
32 James W. Chesebro, “Text, Narration, and Media,” Text and Performance Quarterly 9 (1989):  2-3. 
33 Michael Calvin McGee, “Text, Context, and the Fragmentation of Contemporary Culture,” Western 
Communication Journal of Speech Communication 54 (Summer 1990):  279 and 288. 
34 Michael Leff, “Textual Criticism:  The Legacy of Gerald Morhmann,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 72 
(1986): 378. 
35 Leff, “Lincoln Among the Nineteenth-Century Orators,” 134. 
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 How can a rhetorical critic account for a text repeated?  Do texts coalesce as 
fragments of public consciousness collected by the critic, as performances that replace 
original works they invoke, or as wholesale artifacts consistent with an author’s design?  
For clarity, I suggest we maintain the helpful distinction between the lives of public 
address and also return to the situational definition of a text nestled in etymology of the 
Latin word textus—a weaving or organized body of work that “designates a texture or 
network of relations interwoven with the problem of language.”36  Analysis of 
ceremonial repetition invites critics to scrutinize the shape and form of a text repeated 
within the context of reappraisal and public presentation.  Through its reappearance, the 
text engages with a broader weaving, and takes shape by way of its interaction with 
contextual components in a new setting:  a fusion of intended and inherited meaning.37  
The perceived constancy of content gives way to functionality of form in ascribing 
meaning.  In an apt illustration, Burke noted the significance of a scene in this regard:  
“A ringing bell is in itself as meaningless as an undifferentiated portion of the air we are 
breathing.  It takes on character, meaning, significance (dinner bell or door bell) in 
accordance with the contexts in which we experience it.”38  The intentions of the author 
are not extinguished in the later performances or invocations of a text, as Chesboro has 
argued.  Instead, Jasinski argues, an “audience’s actions in this case actualize the 
                                                
36 Dominick LaCapra, Rethinking Intellectual History:  Texts, Contexts, and Language (Ithaca:  Cornell 
University Press, 1983), 19; This definition is also found in The Bantam New College Latin & English 
Dictionary, Third Edition [John C. Traupman] (New York:  Bantam Dell, [1966] 2007), 421 and 679. 
37 LaCapra defines texts as “events in the history of language,” and further argues, “One of the most 
important contexts for reading texts is clearly our own—a context that is misconstrued when it is seen in 
narrowly ‘presentist’ terms.”  See LaCapra, Rethinking Intellectual History, 65. 
38 Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change:  An Anatomy of Purpose, Third Edition (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles:  University of California Press, 1984), 7. 
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constitutive potential of the text, thereby generating extensional force, without the 
necessarily sharing in the intentions of the author or speaker.”39  The extensional 
“historiography” or trajectory of a text in the hands of an audience does not dispense 
with the functional perspective of language completely, but rather “attempts to fold the 
instrumental moment of discursive action into the larger process of social and cultural 
(re)constitution.”40  Relationships between authors and audiences are maintained, in part, 
by the act of reading, or the attention recurring form inscribes in ceremonial repetition.   
 In summary, tracing the path from first to second life of public address requires 
consideration of both authorial craft and public interpretation.  As Jasinski and 
Mercieca’s analysis of extensional constitutive rhetoric posits, accounting for a text’s 
legacy isn’t possible without including critical intentional analysis as well.  We cannot 
tell what has been produced from a reading, in short, without considering what an 
audience or reader has either maintained or reconstituted in the act of recitation.  Readers 
can define the influence of authorial intention by way of their attention to and display of 
the text.  The sense of wholeness in which texts re-appear in commemoration signals an 
appropriation of an author’s words, and critics of ceremonial repetition should account 
for this connection, even if it is reduced to answering how a performance reconstitutes 
the original language within or beyond the intentions of the author.   
 An exploration of constitutive rhetoric and various conceptions defining the text 
provides important insight to conducting rhetorical criticism of ceremonial repetition.  
As critics approach this phenomenon, they must recalibrate the traditional relationship 
                                                
39 Jasinksi, “A Constitutive Framework for Rhetorical Historiography,” 78. 
40 Jasinksi, “A Constitutive Framework for Rhetorical Historiography,” 91. 
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between speakers and audiences.  Ceremonial repetition means the actions of the 
audience—replaying the words of others—become the dominant signals influencing how 
texts are reimagined in ways that are congruent or radically altered from an original 
authorial design.  This insight, however, is only the beginning.  In the words of Gilles 
Deleuze, “[r]epetition changes nothing in the object repeated, but does change 
something in the mind which contemplates it.”41  While repeating a speech does not 
inherently alter its substantive qualities, we must also know more about how an audience 
rhetorically alters presumptions of a text beyond its base denotative meaning.  If we 
maintain the traditional terminology of the text, we must also account for other threads 
that are woven into its design and meant draw relational implications from its new life.   
 Observing a text in repeated form invites another insight from Burke’s theory of 
human language:  “associational clusters.”42  For Burke, human messages include a set 
of “implicit equations” that reveal how particular concepts are defined through “what 
kind of acts and images and personalities and situations go with” other major ideas 
within author’s disposition of a text.43  Though Burke’s original conceptions of 
                                                
41 Giles Delueze, Difference and Repetition (New York:  Columbia University Press, 1968), 70 (emphasis 
in original). 
42 Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form:  Studies in Symbolic Action, Third Edition (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles:  The University of California Press, 1973), 20. 
43 Ibid. Burke’s theory of “symbolic mergers” has produced a popular method of rhetorical analysis 
commonly referred to as cluster criticism.  One major premise of this method is that an author’s “true 
subject” cannot be hidden if critics follow the disposition of words and ideas as they appear through either 
quantitative frequency or qualitative impact within the text.  Though I do not follow the formula of cluster 
criticism wholesale in the case studies that follow, I am clearly appropriating the substantive presumption 
that the repetition of a text invites a new public appraisal of its meaning, which is evident by virtue of its 
associative symbolism and “implicit equations.”  For an elaborated view of clusters and cluster criticism, 
see:  Kenneth Burke, Attitudes Toward History, Third Edition (Berkeley and Los Angeles:  University of 
California Press, 1984), especially 232-234 and 328-329; William Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the 
Drama of Human Relations, Second Edition (Berkeley and Los Angeles:  University of California Press, 
1982), 86-90; Joseph Schwartz, “Kenneth Burke, Aristotle, and the Future of Rhetoric,” College 
Composition and Communication 17 (1966):  210-216; Carol A. Berthold, “Kenneth Burke’s Cluster-
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associational clusters derived from his analysis of lyric poetry, the public appropriation 
of rhetorical texts in ceremonial repetition invites a similar insight with regard to the 
epideictic context wherein a speech is reimagined.  In the following section, I push 
beyond the helpful framework of extensional constitutive rhetoric to explain how the 
multifaceted genre of epideictic speech adds further insight into how components of 
ceremonial repetition interact with one another.  Repetition alone creates the potential 
for change.  Strategies to remember the text and strategically bring the discourse before 
the eyes—literally and figuratively—illustrate the dominant threads of repetition by 
which critics can account for the imbrication of the text repeated and its new emergence 
from an audience’s “constitutive energy.”44 
MEMORY AND SIGHT:  REPETITION AND THE EPIDEICTIC GENRE 
 Speech genres mold the relational perceptions of speakers and audiences.  In 
Aristotle’s original formulation of rhetorical genres, epideictic speech was distinguished 
from its forensic or deliberative counterparts by positioning audience members as 
spectators and observers rather than critical evaluators.  Epideictic occasions profile a 
speaker’s ability to amplify relevant virtues of the occasion, whether the claims 
established in speech be praise or blame.45  Perelman and Olrechts-Tytecha echo this 
observation, attributing the genre to communal education and the “strengthening the 
adherence to what is already accepted.”46  Celeste Condit outlines the function of 
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epideictic speech as establishing communal knowledge and moments of shared 
reflection.  Eulogies, tributes, and apologies allow speakers to engage audiences on a 
variety of levels:  “understanding and definition,” sharing and creation of community, 
and entertainment and display.”47  The “sharing of community” is both understood and 
displayed:  epideictic occasions allow audiences to “share, live, and display their 
community.”48  Chief among the integral components of the epideictic encounter is the 
focus on communal virtues, the use of cultural memory to organize the meaning of such 
occasions, and the role of display in collective observance. 
 Epideictic rhetoric is not based on argumentative appeals in the same manner as 
legal or political rhetoric, yet the purpose of such discourse is equally selective and 
strategic.  As Gerald Hauser has written, epideictic occasions are opportunities to 
translate a sense of communal virtue for a shared reflection.  Using the Aristotelian 
concept of phronesis as his guide, Hauser posited that such occasions proceed by 
“celebrating the deeds of exemplars that set the tone for civic community and the 
encomiast serves an equally unique role as teacher of civic virtue.”49  Virtues, Alasdair 
MacIntrye argued, represent “an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of 
which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the 
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lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.”50  Within the 
epideictic framework, mimesis is once again central to civic education.  “If the poet 
makes a mark through discourse mimetic of life,” Hauser observed, “the encomiast 
makes one encouraging a life mimetic of public morality constituted through 
discourse.”51  Epideictic rhetoric encourages the tenets of public virtue worthy of 
emulation by the audience that would otherwise be left unstated.  Under Hauser’s 
conception of epideictic discourse, ceremonial repetition is a phenomenon of mimesis 
attempting to be doubly applied.  First, the act of ceremonial rhetoric should provide a 
model worthy of imitation.  Second, if the model for emulation is conveyed through 
imitation, or the repetition of public discourse, communities would ideally need to 
somehow translate such a rhetorical act in order to understand the fresh iteration with the 
appropriate sense of praise and blame to organized and reify communal relations.   
 As Lawrence Rosenfield elaborates, the moment of ceremonial reflection “instills 
the meaning of what is in the collective memory and so commemorates a person or 
event.”52  Remembering together is a mode of public witnessing:  an epideictic moment 
“envelop its participants in reminders of excellence” and “rescue it in memory.”53  By 
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positioning the text as the central mode of understanding public virtue, the repetition of 
past words are substituted for the encomiasts’ appeal:  the text repeated is an argument 
of public virtue and communal focus, while the display—the mode of conveying the act 
of repetition—should ideally focus or constrain an understanding of the text that 
replenishes a sense of public virtue.  Epideictic occasions that define public virtue would 
necessarily rely on a level of shared understanding between speaker and audience, giving 
ceremonial repetition a unique constraint of public understanding:  for a virtue to be 
publicly emulated requires a sense of common comprehension of the text, or a mutual 
understanding as to what behaviors and actions such words repeated mean in a present 
moment.  This expectation seems to be an incredible weight for mere words repeated 
across time.  Appropriators of discourse are not without their own arsenal of rhetorical 
strategies to convey such meaning, however.  As several scholars have attested, the 
precise texture of epideictic rhetoric is conveyed in a sense of shared memory and 
communal vision.  As I argue in the paragraphs below, these same components are 
equally essential to analyzing the public virtue embedded in a text repeated. 
 Public memory represents a subjective and selective relationship with the past, 
and the ideal fabric from which a shared identity is forged.54  Memory’s function is 
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evident, Barbie Zelizer elaborates, in the “constitution and reconstitution of social 
groups,” which, by remembering together shapes perceptions of “belonging, exclusivity, 
social order, and community.”55  Any conception of identity, John Gillis echoes, 
“depends on the idea of memory, and vice versa.”56  More than a story of self-
constitution, W. James Booth adds, memory is both a shared evaluation and a shared 
story:  it is “a unifying ingathering of experiences that are decisive in some way or other 
for an individual or a community, for its sense of justice and its identity.”57   Such habits 
and evaluations of memory emerge, furthermore, from social frameworks.  For Maurice 
Halbwachs and other scholars of public memory, group identity provides the deliberate 
shape and texture of re-imagining the past according to present circumstances.  “The 
past does not recur,” Halbwachs argued, “…but is reconstructed on the basis of the 
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present.”58  With the exception of dreams, Halbwachs elaborated, individuals remember 
“as group members” reflecting together.59  The past is imagined within social 
frameworks.  Though individuals may remember the past within a singular 
consciousness, the same individuals, Halwbachs continues, derive thoughts and 
recollections “that come to us from the social milieu.”60  As Booth reiterates this point, 
the individual and the group are intertwined:  “the memory of one’s own past is the 
recollection of one’s place in a family, a profession, a community of faith, or a political 
community, and it is shaped by the surrounding group.”61   
 Categorizing the recitation of a text as epideictic speech expands our sense of 
public discourse as public memory.  However, we are still less certain as to how 
collective frameworks might imbue a text with particular qualities or forms of 
remembering beyond its verbal performance.  To answer this question, we must consider 
a second dimension of public memory relative to ceremonial repetition:  speech as 
common object of commemoration.  Memory thrives in a shared space when “people 
meet and interact in a single scene of interaction,” Edward Casey writes, further arguing 
that memory acts to “gathe[r] place, people, and topics in its encompassing embrace,” 
creating an “external horizon that encircles the situation … the place we are always at 
when we are not merely standing by others or with family and friends.”62  In addition to 
a shared space of remembrance, Casey writes, communities remember with common 
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focus on a common object:  “Through the appropriate commemorabilia I overcome the 
effects of anonymity and spatio-temporal distance and pay homage to people and events 
I have never known and will never know face-to-face.”63  Bodies collected together, in 
other words, don’t remember without an appropriate channel or focus of 
commemoration.  From a rhetorical standpoint, audiences “remember through” objects 
of commemoration and “participate with” such objects in honor of the person or idea of 
shared attention.64  The common object of commemoration, Barbie Zelizer elaborates, is 
primarily language.65  Our shared symbolic associations of words are undoubtedly the 
building blocks of a public sense of the past.  Of the many forms public memory can 
take, however, Casey clarifies that “a public speech meant for the moment,” can become 
a memory when it is “preserved despite its author’s intentions.”66  Ceremonial repetition 
complicates the study of commemoration and public memory in a profound way:  
instead of memory emerging from epideictic discourse, the text itself is the memory; 
instead of declamation as an exercise in personal education, the recitation is subject to 
altered conceptions of time and differing levels of interpretation within textual 
communities.   
 Speech as a commemorabilia, or the vehicle of shared remembrance, mirrors 
Émile Durkheim’s theory of “totemism.”  When individuals share attention to objects in 
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these moments, Durkheim suggested, there was “a force which they all partially share in, 
but which is nonetheless separate from them.”67  This infusion of shared symbolic 
energy is representative of the collective body around which rituals occur:  “The god of 
the clan,” Durkheim wrote, “can therefore be nothing else than the clan itself, but 
transfigured and imagined in the physical form of the pant or animal species that serve as 
totem.”68  Durkheim and Casey’s respective work on the social implications of 
commemoration folds together the broader claim of Halbwachs’ proposition that a 
collective sense of memory “retains from the past only what still live or is capable of 
living in the consciousness of the groups keeping the memory alive.”69   
 Accounting for the public memory of public address may seem impossible within 
the confines of mere repetition.  How much, after all, could repetition alter words to 
speak to the conditions and needs of an audience in the present moment?  However, 
when repetition is read as a dominant thread within the texture of commemoration, 
critics can discern the suggested shape and relevance of discourse as memory by 
considering how the public language itself appeals to a suggested meaning for the 
recital.  In other words, critics should consider the adjoining messages of repetition, and 
ask how these forms of communication invite a consistent or altered depiction of the text 
as memory.  Kendall Phillips suggests critics may analyze the “publicness of memory,” 
or “the memorial dimensions enacted in our repeated practices, discourses and 
languages, our every cultural action being laden with cultural memories that give these 
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actions their meaning and purpose.”70  By examining external factors of the situation, 
such as “the mutative nature of repetition,” critics can draw out implications of speech 
repeated joined with messages framing the situational remembrance of discourse.71  
External factors around an episode of ceremonial repetition might include the 
discussions, speeches, and invocations of a text that give shape to its reading in the 
present moment.  As Murray Edelman argued, “Political symbols bring out in 
concentrated form those particular meanings and emotions which the members of a 
group create and reinforce in each other.”72  Specifically, Edelman elaborates, the “forms 
of expression or settings indicating the public or restricted character to which the 
language is addressed” represents one of the “observable responses” that political 
language can take on listeners.73  Tracing the discourse around a ceremony, or the 
invocations of a text within the context of its repetition represents one way critics may 
analyze how a public text is made relevant to the present or illustrative of a civic virtue.  
 Equally important to the linguistic pairings of speech repeated, is the relationship 
between repetition and the visible display presented in political commemoration.  As 
Francis Yates has demonstrated, classical treatises on memory frequently compared 
remembrance to the stamping “a signet ring makes on wax.”74  More importantly, the 
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relationship between visibility and memory is rooted in the etymology of epideictic 
speech itself.  Yun Lee Too’s review is instructive:  “The adjective epideictic comes 
from the Greek verb epideiknumi, which seems to have a nontechnical sense of ‘to reveal 
or to tell,’” which, Too clarifies, is found in some legal rhetoric but “central to the aim of 
the genre of epideictic discourse.”75  The amplification of personal or public virtues was 
achieved through descriptio, the Latin term for ekphrasis, “meaning such a 
representation of an object that it appears to the imagination as if it were present and 
even alive.”76  Reimagining the words of others in a present moment means inevitably 
altering the shape and character of speech through public remembrance.  To understand 
the prescribed public virtue and memory of a speech repeated, in other words, involves 
an analysis of visual messages.  Rosenfield illustrates the relationship between 
commemoration and public vision explicitly, calling epideictic occasions the opportunity 
to “gaze at the aura glowing form within” a communal remembrance.77   Thus, a second 
method of accounting for the public memory of rhetorical discourse enacted in 
ceremonial repetition is to focus on the text’s display.  Lawrence Prelli describes the 
richness of this inquiry more closely, arguing: 
 Whether constituted through vocal enunciation, textual inscription, visual portrayal, material 
 structure, enacted performance, or some combination, rhetorical study of displays proceeds from 
 the central idea that whatever they make manifest or appear it the culmination of selective 
 processes that constrain the range of possible meanings available to those who encounter them.78 
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Prelli’s point highlights a recurring claim in this study thus far:  the central object of 
ceremonial repetition is not merely the text repeated, but the sensory dimensions of the 
epideictic occasion that “constrain” the reading of the text and reveal both the memory 
work of such repetition, whether such rhetorical junctures occur through speech, image, 
or the design of remembrance that invites the audience to witness the world of the text.  
 Visual rhetoric bridges the concerns of epideictic discourse and repetition as 
public memorializing.79  According to Lester C. Olson, Cara A. Finnegan, and Diane S. 
Hope, visual rhetoric “seeks and produces communities of viewers, spectators, 
witnesses, and participants through actions visualized in various forms.”80  Concern with 
visual messages conveyed through repetition invites analysis of how one complements 
and often complicates the other.  As Bradford Vivian and Anne Teresa Demo argue, 
“images powerfully invoke memory, and that memory is profoundly informed by visual 
media, through rhetorical dynamics:  visual and memorial forms coalesce according to 
the ways in which practices of interpretation, argumentation, or communication assign 
shared meaning to them.”81  This point echoes Prelli’s argument that a likely outcome of 
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delivering a speech—or, in our case, repeating a speech—is a comingling of text, image, 
and other features on an expansive rhetorical canvas:  “Visual depictions rhetorically 
constrain our verbal responses, much has verbal depictions rhetorically constrain what 
we are prompted to see.”82   
 When ceremonial repetition makes the display of a speech text public, we are 
witnesses not only to a decorous detail within substantive communal remembrance, but 
also to a visual memorializing of public discourse itself.  To draw the distinction another 
way, whereas Cara A. Finnegan once proposed rhetorical scholars take on “public 
address about the visual,”83 ceremonial repetition is a rhetorical phenomenon asking 
critics to account for the ways publics visualize (or imagine) public address in public 
memory.  When repetition conjoins with other messages within the moment of 
remembrance, the text is purposefully set into the public imagination with particular 
relations of symbolic associations revealing how it has been publicly remembered.  The 
critic of ceremonial repetition begins by considering the relationship between words and 
images, and how symbolically constrains or impacts the other. 
 The relations between repetition and components of the epideictic occasion are 
not reducible to visible messages alone.  Enacting or presenting a rhetorical vision of a 
text could hypothetically run a gamut between accompanying discourse, visual display, 
physical presence, or the written word.  Once made public a speech repeated might 
interact with accompanying speeches, images, or even dynamics of the performers in 
                                                
82 Prelli, “Rhetorics of Display,” 13. 
83 Cara A. Finnegan, “Recognizing Lincoln:  Image Vernaculars in Nineteenth-Century Visual Culture,” 
Rhetoric & Public Affairs 8 (1) 2005: 35. 
  56 
ways that narrow or direct the preferred memory of the text.  In his important research 
on collective memory, Paul Connerton argues that memory must be performed to be 
sustained.  Festivals often fall on familiar dates, and texts generate value as “repeatable 
utterances” in the sense that their “efficacy is in their uttered repetition.”84  For 
Connerton, commemoration always includes a presentation of memory that is both 
repeated and performed to an audience. 
 There is a certain type of repetition which we are familiar with when a film or recorded music or 
 a work of literature is perceived by us for the second time or several times.  The repetition of such 
 works, which do not require within the work itself the mediation of interpreters, is in an important 
 way analogous to the repetition of words, for instance in their theatrical performances, where the 
 mediation of such interpreters is required; for just as the repeated performance of the same play 
 by different actors at different times accentuates the specific nature of each performance and 
 brings to our attention the differences between these performances, so also, even if in a 
 qualitatively different way, the ‘repeated’ perception of the same text or recorded disc or film 
 discloses the development of the perceiver’s consciousness and brings to our attention the 
 differences in each reading.85 
 
Connerton and Prelli’s respective observations of the sight and performance of memory 
give additional momentum to viewing moments of ceremonial repetition as opportunities 
to transfer meaning in performance.  Memory, Edward Casey adds, can also take form in 
bodily performance, a facet of memory usually attributed to unconscious habit.  “In such 
memory,” Casey writes, “the past is embodied in actions.  Rather than being contained 
separately somewhere in mind or brain, it is actively ingredient in the very bodily 
movements that accomplish a particular action.”86 
 Publics have multiple ways in which to negotiate a relationship with discourse as 
memory.  As this brief summary has illustrated, by framing ceremonial repetition within 
the constraints and opportunities of epideictic rhetoric, we are better positioned to 
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investigate how a particular meaning of a text is implied in the act of breaking the bonds 
of the past and making a new vision of the text in the present.  We may push the nature 
of our inquiry beyond questions of perceived sameness or difference in repetition and 
ask the more compelling rhetorical questions:  How has this community remembered the 
text?  What image of the text is remembered, and what does such a display tell us about 
the capacity of such practices to alter or maintain communal identity?  How do the 
interactions of what is seen and what is heard invite listeners to “see” a sense of common 
public virtue?   
 Whether by word, image, or performance, ceremonial repetition impels us to 
consider discourse repeated within the larger weaving of messages that nurture public 
memory through acts of repetition.  Indeed, the choices publics make in giving life to a 
text repeated are crucial to the effectiveness of such commemoration.  As the case 
studies that comprise this study illustrate, different forms of repeating lend themselves to 
a range of investigations—sometimes the public address accompanying repetition, 
sometimes the visual display, and other times the bodily enactment that imply something 
about this iteration of a text’s life and its meaning to a community of listeners.  In the 
final section of this interpretive summary, I elaborate on the implications of public 
remembrance through repetition, and the range of possibilities that emerge from 
repetition for the constitution of political identities. 
TEXTUAL COMMUNITIES AND THE THICKNESS OF MEMORY 
 The texts at the center of ceremonial repetition exist as durable and enduring 
artifacts of public interest.  Their form and display becomes a multidimensional way of 
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understanding how repetition can nurture a sense of identity and involvement in public 
affairs.  In their study on iconic photographs, Robert Hariman and John Louis Lucaites 
note that the mass circulation and extension of resonant images plays an important role 
in negotiating the relationship between the witnessing public and the formulation of 
political culture.  Such photos, the authors elaborate, tell a history through their use, 
including citizens’ efforts to “negotiate self-understanding” within a political culture, 
and “work out public opinion and personal attitudes about specific political actors, 
policies, and practices.”87  In a similar regard, an analytical treatment of ceremonial 
repetition begs the question of not only how publics utilized speech as memory, but how, 
once introduced, texts can also constitute a sense of public identity in their display.   
 The relationship between texts and publics has been the source of multiple 
interpretations.  Michael Warner’s influential work Publics and Counterpublics posits 
that communities are recognized as such only by virtue of the texts that bind them 
together.  Discourse, in short, is an accessible way to “offer its members direct and 
active membership through language, to place strangers on shared footing.”88  Not just 
words alone, but the act of reading itself can bring into being a communal sensibility.  
For Brian Stock, this relation is evident in what he terms “textual communities,” or 
“microsocieties organized around the common understanding of a script.”89  His 
description warrants elaboration:   
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 Wherever there are texts that are read aloud or silently, there are groups of listeners that can 
 potentially profit from them.  A natural process of education takes place within this group, and, if 
 the force of the word is strong enough, it can supersede the differing economic and social 
 backgrounds of the participants, welding them, for a time at least, into a unit.  In other words, the 
 people who enter the group are not precisely the same as those who come out.  Something has 
 happened, and this experience affects their relations both with other members and with those in 
 the outside world.  Among the members, solidarity prevails, with the outside, separation.  The 
 members may disperse, but they can also institutionalize their new relations, for instance, by 
 forming a religious order or a sectarian movement that meets on regular occasion.  If they take 
 this course, the community acquires the ability to perpetuate itself.  An aspect of the social lives 
 of the group’s members will from that moment be determined by the rules of membership in 
 the community.90 
 
Stock’s “textual communities” do not require an original interpretation of the text, but 
instead emerge from within the moment of collective attention to the text.  In a similar 
vein, Stanley Fish has claimed that meanings attributed to texts emerge not from acts of 
reading, but are “the shape of reading,” suggesting communal frameworks “give texts 
their shape, making them rather than as is usually assumed, arising from them.”91   
 Whether texts arise from public interpretations inherent in reading, or publics 
originate from texts (akin to Benedict Anderson’s claim that national identity is imbued 
from “the style” in which communities are “imagined”92), the epideictic form of 
ceremonial repetition constitutes and contributes to the perceived ideological 
commitments of a political community.  While constitutive of public identity, 
ceremonial repetition invites others to observe and participate in political perceptions of 
the world as well.  In his study on the communal memory of Abraham Lincoln and the 
allegation the sixteenth president was gay, Charles Morris III explored the “symbolic 
contest for the communal meaning of historic identity” between dueling factions of the 
                                                
90 Brian Stock, Listening for the Text, 150. 
91 Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? (Cambridge, MA and London:  Harvard University Press, 
1980), 13. 
92 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities:  Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London:  Verso, 2006), 6. 
  60 
debate, and the reactionary vitriol displayed from historians and local Springfield 
residents.93  Memory, Morris concluded, is a constitutive activity:  “to constitute 
Lincoln’s memory is to be constituted by Lincoln’s memory.”94   
 Presuming the display of texts constitutes a sense of political identity, Bradford 
Vivian has suggested critics also evaluate the public memory by considering “The 
quality of the social relationship established or sustained through [memory’s] 
expression.”95  His criticism of public recitations for the one-year anniversary of 9/11 in 
2002—which featured sampled well-known political texts such as Roosevelt’s “Four 
Freedoms” Address, the Preamble of the Constitution, the opening of the Declaration of 
Independence, and the Gettysburg Address—help provide understanding for repetition 
as both a reflection of interpretive strategies as well as operative discourse sustaining of 
political relationships.  By Vivian’s account, the 9/11/2002 commemorations featuring 
recitals of various political texts failed.  “For commemorative purposes,” Vivian noted, 
“the very ritual or symbolic action of reciting traditional texts is often more essential to 
maintaining the continuity of collective memory than conjuring new turns of phrase.”96  
In the midst of remembering tragedy, the recital of texts outside their literal meaning or 
political alignments was designed by organizers to “unify heterogeneous audiences in a 
public display of mourning that would transcend intervening social, political, or 
economic divisions,” while, by way of the indirect and non-confrontational form, “not 
                                                
93 Charles Morris III, “My Old Kentucky Homo:  Lincoln and the Politics of Queer Memory,” Framing 
Public Memory, ed. Kendall R. Phillips (Tuscaloosa:  Alabama University Press, 2004), 90-92. 
94 Morris III, “My Old Kentucky Homo,” 99. 
95 Bradford Vivian, “‘A Timeless Now’:  Memory and Repetition,” in Framing Public Memory, ed, 
Kendal R. Phillips (Tuscaloosa:  The University of Alabama Press, 2004), 205. 
96 Bradford Vivian, “Neoliberal Epideictic:  Rhetorical Form and Commemorative Politics on September 
11th, 2002.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 92 (February 2006), 5. 
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summon citizens for public advocacy in the presence of others, but excus[e] them from 
the preoccupations of private life.”97  Citizens, in short, were not asked to respond, 
partake, or ponder meaning, but were instead positioned in the midst of shallow 
incantations.  Epideictic situations need not always be wholly original, Vivian suggests, 
but should nevertheless be evaluated on whether an act has worked toward “replenishing 
the political resources of civic remembrance.”98 
 The bridge between texts as constitutive of publics and publics as interpretive 
communities of texts emerges, Jasinski notes, through an analysis of textual 
historiography.  Again, he argues that the extensional constitution of a text is inherent 
between two worlds—that of the text and that of its continued circulation—and presents 
four potential points of analysis:  “self-constitution and the formation of subjectivity or 
subject positions”; the organization or structure of “an individual’s or culture’s 
experience of time and space”; “norms of political culture and experience of communal 
existence (including collective identity)”; and “the linguistic resources of the culture 
(including, in particular, the stock of fundamental political concepts that shape the 
culture’s understanding of political existence).”99  In addition to the extensional and 
epideictic components of reading, critics analyzing moments of repetition must account 
for the cultural presumptions implicit in the performance of ceremonial repetition, as 
                                                
97 Vivian, “Neoliberal Epideictic,” 15-16. 
98 Near the end of his analysis of the 2002 commemoration of 9/11, Vivian clarifies that his conclusions do 
not eliminate the possibility of constructive mimesis, so long as such a formula were “constructively 
employed” to the audience in question.  See Vivian, “Neoliberal Epideictic,” 19 and 21.   
99 Jasinski, “A Constitutive Framework for Rhetorical Historiography,” 75. 
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well as the invitations such repetition offers to observers to be part of the world the 
reading implies.100    
 Critics should, moreover, be able to analyze both the extensional life of public 
address constituted through reading, as well as inferences that reflect the presence or 
absence of an interpretive community at work.  Though it is beyond the scope of this 
chapter to provide a comprehensive overview of the major public philosophies in the 
United States, two perspectives of political theory—liberalism and communitarianism—
provide an orientation to self-constitution that illustrates the question of subjectivity in 
the context ceremonial repetition.   
 Liberalism is and remains, in the words of Robert Bellah et al., the “first 
language” of public life, and built on an individualistic belief in “personal effort” and a 
“sink-or-swim” approach to mutual success.101  Liberalism centers on individual liberty, 
and by implication, stresses that the government should not interfere with the moral ends 
of public life.  Instead, a neutral framework of universal fairness presides and the “fair 
procedures over particular ends,” in the words of Michael Sandel.102  The cause of 
liberal fairness, John Rawls claimed, necessitates that the individual take on the “original 
position” and the “veil of ignorance.”  Rawls’ premise was that society requires a certain 
                                                
100 James Boyd White observes this dualistic implication when he writes, “For while a person acts both 
with and upon the language that he uses, at once employing and reconstituting its resources, his language 
at the same time acts upon him.”  When Words Lose Their Meaning, 8. 
101 Robert Bellah, Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven M. Tipton, Habits of 
the Heart:  Individualism and Commitment in American Life, 2nd Edition (Berkeley and Los Angeles:  The 
University of California Press, 1996), viii. 
102 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 2nd Edition (Cambridge:  Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), 4. 
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thinness of individuals on matters of political importance in order to achieve a fair 
conception of justice.  He elaborates: 
  The reasons the original position must abstract from and not be affected by the contingencies of 
 the social world is that the conditions for a fair agreement on the principles of political justice 
 between free and equal persons must eliminate the bargaining advantages that inevitably arise 
 within the background institutions of any society form cumulative social, historical, and natural 
 tendencies.  These contingent advantages and accidental influences form the past should not 
 affect an agreement on the principles that are to regulate the institutions of the basic structure 
 itself from the present into the future.103 
 
Suggestions that an individuals perception on issues like religion or other political 
viewpoints can be contemplated “independent of life’s contingencies,” remains, in 
Sandel’s view, untenable.104  By thinning the theory of the self, Sandel writes, the 
Rawlsian approach to political liberalism lessens the extent to which personal values, 
commitments, and activities constitute the very being of the self:  “a sense of community 
describes a possible aim of antecedently individuated selves, not an ingredient or 
constituent of their identity as such.”105   
 In contrast to political liberalism, the communitarian or civic republican political 
philosophy positions individuals as part of a collective consciousness that shift and 
shape through the involvement in communal activities.  Republican political theory, 
Sandel adds, is built upon “a knowledge of public affairs and also a sense of belonging, a 
concern for the whole, a moral bond with the community whose fate is at stake.”106  
Being an individual in the philosophy of civic republicanism, “does not entail escaping 
our ties to others,” Bellah et al. note, clarifying, “real freedom lies not in rejecting our 
                                                
103 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York:  Columbia University Press, 1993), 23. 
104 Michael Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent:  America in Search of a Public Philosophy (Cambridge:  
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996), 13. 
105 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 64. 
106 Michael Sandel, Democracy’s Discontents, 5. 
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social nature but in fulfilling it in a critical and adult loyalty” with special regard to 
responsibility and a shared effort.107  Insofar as political philosophies are implied 
through public practice, our perceptions of individualism and communal identity is 
shifting with each public and political expression of a text repeated.108 
 Living between “the empty self and the constituted self,” Bellah et al. suggest, is 
the price of clinging to either a thin or thickened view of political consensus and 
collective attachment.109  At the risk of walking through tall theoretical grass, we can 
position both the thin and thick recognition of the self within the epideictic actions of 
ceremonial repetition and the rhetorical commitments displayed therein.  As texts are 
repeated as communal memory and reconstituted through their display and re-
imagination, public positions relative to a text are also being refashioned through 
practice.  Philippe-Josepha Salazar refers to such subjectivity in discourse as “plasma,” 
or the “kind of fiction that gives both audience and orator a sense of communality, of 
awareness of the world,” representing “a scenario for reality.”110  The necessary question 
remains how ceremonial repetition promotes an invitation of public involvement within 
a textual community for listening and observing audiences. 
 
 
                                                
107 Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart, x. 
108 Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent, 4. 
109 Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart, 254; Not all political theorists accept a dichotomy between 
communitarianism or republicanism and individualism or liberalism.  Richard Dagger, for instance, has 
appealed for “republican liberalism,” or an ethic that “strengthens the appeal of duty, community, and the 
common good while preserving the appeal of rights.”  See Richard Dagger, Civic Virtues:  Rights, 
Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1997), 5. 
110 Philippe-Joseph Salazar, An African Athens:  Rhetoric and the Shaping of Democracy in South Africa 
(Mahwah, NJ:  Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 2002), 26. 
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CONCLUSION  
 As I’ve argued in this summary of relevant literature, the plague of permanence 
that led to Zora’s downfall in Calvino’s poem is clearly not our own.  Repetition is a 
flexible, malleable, and persuasive activity subject to a diverse range of textual relations 
organized by human hands and meant to invite a sense of communal identity, virtue, and 
memory.  Using interpretive frameworks from constitutive rhetorical theory, the 
epideictic genre of speech, and a broad sense of American political philosophy, I have 
proposed a number of ways to account for the “life of reading” that will be relevant in 
the case studies of ceremonial repetition that follow.  The traditional functions of 
epideictic speech—amplification and display of civic virtue—meet in an interactive 
space during repetition wherein speech as memory is influenced by a commemorative 
context of messages, including public address, visual rhetoric, and dimensions of 
performance, that become part of the situational weaving giving shape to the reading 
within a present moment.  Audiences both extend the public and political legacy of a 
text, and are, in turn, shaped by its public form.  Finally, I have outlined the degree to 
which imagining the words of others defines and reconstitutes public relations to both 
the memory of a text and one another.   
 Our primary object of criticism in this study is the second life of public address.  
Yet, this life takes on multiple forms—speech, image, performance—that are 
inconsistently accounted for or implemented in particular contexts.  Not all moments of 
ceremonial repetition are created equally.  Nor do instances of such repetition call on a 
uniform means of interpreting commemoration.  Possibilities of productive repetition 
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exist through the form in which a text repeated is made public, and each episode of 
ceremonial repetition in the chapters that follow will be addressed on its own terms.  As 
we transition to our first case study of analysis, we will better understand how the life of 
reading emerges when a text is repeated in a new context and joined within a set of 
shared messages nurturing its commemoration.   
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CHAPTER III 
 
FREDERICK DOUGLASS, AUGUST FIRST, AND THE MEMORY OF THE 
EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION  
Expansion is the essential quality of an idea. 
—Frederick Douglass, Medina, New York, 3 August 1869. 
INTRODUCTION 
 Revisiting an artifact of public discourse is a chance to forge a new relationship 
with the dead and their words.  The mode of expressing such words largely determines 
how this new relationship will be interpreted within a new scene.  As Walter Ong has 
suggested, the form of language—speech or print—invites a different response from a 
listening audience.  When language travels through the sound of a voice rather than the 
silence of print, he claimed, words “merge with a total situation to convey meaning.”1  
Untethered from the confines of the page, a written text may be verbalized, inviting a 
new situational weaving amid other messages that affirm or altering its original 
character.  This analysis suggests one way of understanding the public memory imbued 
in ceremonial repetition is the linguistic juxtaposition between a text repeated and its 
rhetorical counterpart in shared remembrance.  Or, in Lawrence Prelli’s summary, a 
memory of discourse emerges from the repetition of a text and rhetorical discourse that 
“shape[s] what we imagine or actually see.”2   
                                                
1 Walter Ong, The Presence of the Word:  Some Prolegomena for Cultural and Religious History 
(Minneapolis and Oxford:  University of Minnesota Press, 1967), 116. 
2 Lawrence Prelli, “Rhetorics of Display,” in Prelli (ed), Rhetorics of Display (Columbia:  The University 
of South Carolina Press, 2008), 13. 
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 In order to explain what Ong termed a “total situation” wherein a verbalized text 
emerges within the public imagination, I explore three keynote speeches by Frederick 
Douglass delivered at August First celebrations.  These speeches are important because 
they provide insight as to how a key text of American public discourse—the 
Emancipation Proclamation—was remembered in the decades after its issuance during 
the late nineteenth-century.  More specifically, however, these occasions were 
opportunities to commemorate the Emancipation Proclamation in repetition, and 
reformulate the relationship between past and present, as well as community and text.  
When paired together, how did Douglass’s oratory and recitation of the Emancipation 
Proclamation offer a new vision of the text?  By analyzing these ceremonial speeches, I 
argue that Frederick Douglass’s primary strategy of framing texts as entities in progress 
contributed to the extensional life of the Emancipation Proclamation, and, with varying 
effect, repositioned the text’s relevancy and relationship to his immediate audience.   
 Commemorations of emancipation are as complex and varied as the textual 
artifacts credited with the expansion of American freedom.  Disagreements on the 
appropriate time, place, or object of remembrance created a swirl of calendar dates and 
rhetorical contexts, as evidenced in Douglass’s habit of speaking to multiple audiences 
and different occasions celebrating African American freedom.3  His keynote speeches 
celebrating British West Indian emancipation, however, represent some of the most 
                                                
3 See Douglass’s orations commemorating the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia:  “Our 
Destiny is Largely in Our Own Hands:  An Address Delivered in Washington, D.C., on 16 April 1883”; 
“In Law Free; In Fact, a Slave:  An Address Delivered in Washington, D.C., on 16 April 1888”; “The 
Nation’s Problem:  An Address Delivered in Washington, D.C., on 16 April 1889,” all in The Frederick 
Douglass Papers, Series One:  Speeches, Debates, and Interviews, Volume 5:  1881-1895, eds, John W. 
Blassingame and John R. McKivigan (New Haven:  Yale University Press, 1992), 59-80; 357-373; 403-
426. 
  69 
confrontational and direct appeals to frame the public memory of the Emancipation 
Proclamation in the context of American liberty.  Indeed, celebrations of British West 
Indian emancipation not only persisted in the decades following the Civil War, but also 
took on an added importance by interrogating the promise of freedom in an age of 
declining liberty for African Americans.  Douglass’s keynote speeches illustrate a key 
set of arguments by which audiences were invited to reimagine the 1863 document 
within these moments of repetition.  As I argue in the pages that follow, this context 
produced a remarkable pairing:  the invocation of the Emancipation Proclamation—a 
text without a clear point of closure—and the public philosophy of Frederick 
Douglass—a speaker who eloquently evaluated legal decrees through tangible outcomes 
of performed action. 
 The remainder of this essay unfolds in the following manner.  First, I provide 
readers with an overview of the text in question.  Widely praised by abolitionists upon 
its original issuance, the Emancipation Proclamation remains an enduring artifact that 
carries the burdens of being commonly associated with African American freedom and 
also critiqued for its minimal impact and legalistic prose.  As I demonstrate in later 
sections, the richness of Lincoln’s decree has originated from textual association, not 
internal eloquence.  Second, I provide an overview of the Emancipation Proclamation 
within the norms and practices of August First celebrations throughout the nineteenth-
century.  These festivals offer a particularly inviting scene through which communities 
witnessed the repetition of emancipatory texts and a reconciliation of the meaning of 
such promises within an uncertain circumstance.   
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 Third, I uncover Frederick Douglass’s arguments on emancipation to better 
understand how his keynote speeches continue and sometimes contrast with his 
philosophy of public enactment of textual virtues.  Indeed, Douglass had more 
opportunity than most speakers to influence perceptions of the Emancipation 
Proclamation within proximity of its verbal performance and display.  Such potent 
intimacy between public discourse and ceremonial repetition is rarely accounted for in 
rhetorical studies.  Even Douglass’s best-known speech—“What to the Slave is the 
Fourth of July?”—paired a biting critique of U.S. slave policy in coordinated 
conjunction with a ceremonial reading of the 1776 text, adding additional irony to the 
awkward celebration of American virtues.4  When contrasted with his public philosophy 
of enacting textual virtues, Douglass’s keynote speeches at August First celebrations 
contribute to the extensional constitution of the Emancipation Proclamation through 
public address.  These speeches, while variant across twenty-six years, add a sense of 
how the memory of the Emancipation Proclamation was forged within the context of its 
repetition.  Specifically, I analyze keynote speeches delivered in Elmira, New York in 
1869; Melinda, New York in 1880; and Rochester, New York in 1885.  As I argue lager, 
Douglass’ epideictic rhetoric remembering the Emancipation Proclamation alters the 
agency and effect of the text, eventually drawing the relationship between community 
and text closer as time progresses and the political promises of African American 
freedom become increasingly diminished.   
                                                
4 The recital of the 1776 document is noted in Bernard K. Duffy and Richard D. Besel, “Recollection, 
Regret, and Foreboding in Frederick Douglass’s Fourth of July Orations in 1852 and 1875” Making 
Connections:  Interdisciplinary Approaches to Cultural Diversity 12 (2010):  7. 
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PROCLAIMING AND EXPLAINING EMANCIPATION 
 No text better exemplifies the benefits of extensional constitutive discourse than 
the 1863 Emancipation Proclamation.  The text was confined to written language, 
conditional in scope, and framed as a reasoned war measure.  Yet, through elaborate 
public attention, the document signifies a transformative break from the nation’s 
relationship with slavery, and a movement toward the inclusive citizenship of former 
slaves.  Few documents of American public discourse delivered so little while 
simultaneously being publicly imbued with so much.  Indeed, this dualistic nature of the 
text was immediate from its formal introduction.  The text was heralded upon its arrival 
as a partial—if not profound—success in combating slavery.  As John Hope Franklin 
observed, the text surpassed the scope of Northern state laws and the emancipation of 
slaves in Washington, D.C.  At last the incongruity between the United States’ claim to 
be “the pioneer democracy of the Western World” and its legacy of slavery appeared to 
be partially corrected.5  In Washington, D.C., Franklin noted, public recitals began 
immediately, and were followed by “unrestrained celebration” with “men squealing, 
women fainting, dogs barking, and whites and blacks shaking hands.”6  With one 
rhetorical act nearly three million slaves within Confederate occupied states and cities 
were declared free.  Eric Foner has noted that the text “culminated decades of struggle” 
                                                
5 John Hope Franklin, The Emancipation Proclamation (Wheeling, Illinois:  Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1963 
[1995]), 11-12. 
6 Franklin, The Emancipation Proclamation, 87. 
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and “evoked Christian visions of resurrection and redemption, of an era undoubted 
progress for a nation purged at last of the sin of slavery.”7   
 The external jubilee could not be found within the margins of Lincoln’s decree, 
however.  As an array of historians and public address scholars have noted, the 
Emancipation Proclamation is Lincoln’s rhetorical outlier.  The body of the text is 
largely a repetition of the 22 September preliminary emancipation proclamation, an 
invocation of authority that Lincoln defined as a “necessary war measure for suppressing 
said rebellion,” paired with a detailed list of particular states and counties clarifying 
precisely where emancipation did and did apply.8  Its cautious and conditional style 
made it a Lincoln’s “unhappiest” public document.9  The language is reflective of a more 
nuanced and contextualized political strategy.  As Allen Guelzo has noted, the its 
standing as “a legal document” did not make room for “the way of flourishes.”10  
Defenders of Lincoln argue the text is rhetorically exceptional for being unexceptional.  
Franklin has claimed Lincoln’s strategy was to “forge a document of freedom for the 
slaves within the existing constitutional system and in a manner that would give ever 
grater support to the constitutional system.”11  Eric Foner echoes this sentiment, noting 
the duality of the document and its “exemption of Union-held areas” as evidence of 
Lincoln’s focus on keeping emancipation “legally assailable” while also gaining and 
                                                
7 Eric Foner, Reconstruction:  America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863- 1877 (New York:  Perennial 
Classics, 2002 [1989]), 2. 
8 Abraham Lincoln, “Final Emancipation Proclamation,” in Speeches and Writings, 1859-1865 (New 
York:  The Library of America, 1989), 424-425. 
9 Allen C. Guelzo, Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation (New York, London, Sydney, Toronto:  Simon 
& Schuster, 2004), 1. 
10 Guelzo, Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, 8. 
11 Franklin, The Emancipation Proclamation, 127. 
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retaining the will of Northern constituents who may have “cared little about abolition but 
might support an act essential to military victory.”12    
 Despite, or perhaps because of the text’s stylistic blandness, the Emancipation 
Proclamation has lived only insofar as public commemorations have supported it.  Edna 
Green Medford posits that the text’s significance lies in “the context of aspirations and 
expectations of a heretofore disinherited people.”13  The text could be taken in more than 
one direction:  it could either confirm “our faith that the principles we hold are 
immutable,” or that the text’s tentative approach signals a “disingenuous” aversion to 
our national ideals.14  Though Medford concludes that Lincoln displayed “extraordinary 
legal and political genius” in writing the proclamation, the dual lens of the text persisted 
well after its public announcement, particularly between races:  African Americans 
understood its “revolutionary implications” in the path to freedom, while whites largely 
sought to limit the Proclamation’s scope to “no broader meaning than release from 
bondage.”15  With the Emancipation Proclamation, slavery was struck a mortal blow.  
The reach of this act, as Medford has highlighted, is reached by implication.  Its 
reputation relied, therefore, on rhetoric of remembrance and social projection to 
highlight its significance in the public imagination. 
 In addition to playing a prominent role in freedom rallies and other 
commemorative occasions, artistic interpretations of the text moved immediately upon 
                                                
12 Eric Foner, Reconstruction:  America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877 (New York:  Perennial 
Classics, 1988), 7. 
13 Edna Green Medford, Harold Holzer, Frank J. Williams, The Emancipation Proclamation, Three Views:  
Social, Political, Iconographic (Baton Rouge:  Louisiana State University Press, 2006), 2. 
14 Medford, Holzer, and Williams, The Emancipation Proclamation, 38 and 47. 
15 Medford, Holzer, and Williams, The Emancipation Proclamation, 47-48. 
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its public release.  As Harold Holzer has argued, the illustrated life of the text varied in 
content and arrangement.  Since the Emancipation Proclamation was signed in private, 
the public had no “emancipation moment” to crystalize the event for public 
understanding.16  What resulted were varied incarnations visualizing the proclamation’s 
interaction with public issues, including Lincoln’s role as author, his reputation among 
past presidents, and the enduring meaning of both president and text following Lincoln’s 
unexpected death.  Kirk Savage, moreover, has identified the importance of more 
permanent displays as contributors to the text’s public reputation.  For Savage, the 
“standard image of emancipation” was derived from the abolitionist icon featuring “a 
kneeling black man in chains, his upraised arms imploring ‘Am I not a man and a 
brother?’” 17 Such images prompt the conclusion that the “black slave appears lowly and 
powerless,” usually positioned near to the ground, and in close proximity to the standing 
Christ-figure of Abraham Lincoln.18  Thomas Ball’s Freedman’s Memorial, which was 
unveiled in Washington, D.C. in 1876, epitomizes this tension, and in Savage’s words, 
served to “anchor collective remembering” in perpetual public sight.19   
 Affection for the Emancipation Proclamation emerged with telling consistency.  
Absent a compelling or eloquent internal dynamic, the text lived via accompanying 
symbols that told (or showed) readers, listeners, and viewers a greater sense of its 
character than what it could convey with its own disposition.   Kirt Wilson’s rhetorical 
                                                
16 Medford, Holzer, and Williams, The Emancipation Proclamation, 112. 
17 Kirk Savage, “Molding Emancipation:  John Quincy Adams Ward’s ‘The Freedman’ and the Meaning 
of the Civil War,” Art Institute of Chicago Museum Studies 27 (2001): 32. 
18 Savage, “Molding Emancipation,” 29. 
19 See Kirk Savage, “The Politics of Memory:  Black Emancipation and the Civil War Monument,” in 
John R. Gillis (ed), Commemorations:  The Politics of National Identity (Princeton:  Princeton University 
Press, 1994), 127-149, particularly 130. 
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analysis of the document supports this conclusion.  Wilson posits that the Emancipation 
Proclamation effectively embodies the contradictions of Lincoln and Civil War rhetoric 
generally.  The nectar of the text, Wilson argues, is in its fusion to other forms of 
discourse, not its own properties.  A first reading of the document prompts readers with a 
temporary perception of Lincoln’s “deflection”:  such doubt is erased, however, when 
readers understand the text as an act which “remold[ed] the moment of emancipation 
into an iconic point of rupture that divides the past from the present and the more 
glorious future.”20  To reach this feat, however, the text must gain perspective from 
appropriation.  Lincoln’s Second Inaugural “minus the Proclamation,” Wilson argues, 
“recast the Civil War as divine judgment, but when the Proclamation is added, judgment 
also brings absolution” because “the Proclamation required a Northern victory for its 
realization.”21  The Emancipation Proclamation is a unique political text:  the expression 
of an incomplete idea.  If we posit that the Emancipation Proclamation without the 
Second Inaugural, public statues, or lithographs is incomplete, a new question arises:  
What would reciting the Emancipation Proclamation mean without its encomiast, 
Frederick Douglass?  Before exploring the intricacies of this question, we must first turn 
to the generic properties of August First celebrations, and the public philosophy of 
rhetorical texts evident in Douglass’s preceding oratory. 
 
 
                                                
20 Kirt Wilson, “The Paradox of Lincoln’s Rhetorical Leadership,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 3 (2000):  
22. 
21 Wilson, “The Paradox of Lincoln’s Rhetorical Leadership,” 23. 
  76 
EMANCIPATION, COMMEMORATION, AND AUGUST FIRST 
 The Civil War killed institutional slavery in the United States.22  The death of 
slavery and the birth of African American liberty was not a simultaneous set of 
occurrences.  Once issued, however, the Emancipation Proclamation was quickly 
enveloped into an existing framework of Freedom Day celebrations that had been 
ongoing since the early 1800s.  Commemorating the act of emancipation, like imagining 
its likeness in iconographic memorial or print, was nearly impossible.  Compared to 
Memorial Day or other national holidays constructed around a person’s birth or death, 
there is “no such clear consensus among Afro-Americans as to which [date] should be 
‘the official day,’” notes William Wiggins.23  Gradual and unsteady, the movement 
toward emancipation took shape in a litany of state and city measures throughout the 
early and mid-nineteenth century, some of which became touchstone dates for 
commemoration, while others did not.24   
 Despite variance of calendar observances, most celebrations of black freedom 
were built on form of remembrance through consistency.  The most steadfast component 
                                                
22 Eric Foner, Nothing But Freedom:  Emancipation and Its Legacy (Baton Rouge and London:  Louisiana 
State University Press, 1983), 49. 
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has remained the verbal performance of an abolition text.  Historians of freedom day 
celebrations have posited that this precedent was set following the abolition of the 
Atlantic slave trade in 1808.  Marking the end of the slave trade in New York, for 
example, celebrants gathered to hear appropriate songs and a reading of “the 
congressional act of abolition,” usually with introductory remarks.25  Mitch Katchun has 
noted that since 1808 the traditional commemoration of African American freedom 
included a “benediction, prayers of thanksgiving, the signing of hymns, and reading of 
the act of abolition” prior to a keynote address from a selected orator.26  By the 1840s 
the emancipation of the British West Indies—at the time the more expansive of its 
kind—took precedence over celebrations of state and citywide acts of emancipation.27  
J.R. Kerr-Ritchie has supported this point, noting that the emergence of August First 
celebrations of West Indian emancipation served an important and hereto unseen 
function in the United States:  celebrating the British act allowed participants to both 
“mobilize protest against American slavery,” while blending “the accomplished 
emancipation to the future emancipation” as a “link” that would result in the necessary 
expansion of liberty to American slaves.28   
 American abolitionists took note of British emancipation for good reason:  it was, 
in Eric Foner’s words, “the first act of manumission by a major colonial power in the 
New World,” and a larger component of arguments for “the benefits of immediate 
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emancipation in the American south.”29  The act was a “quintessentially English” 
exercise:  “respect for order, legal processes, and the rights of property.”30  Landowners 
maintained land rights and were compensated some twenty million pounds in the 
liberation process.31  Despite instantaneous liberation of some 700,000 slaves, obligation 
to the emancipated ceased with the act itself:  “No one,” Foner observed, “proposed 
compensating the slaves for their years of unrequited toil.”32  Frederick Douglass’s 
relationship with the transitional act would be complicated over years of British post-
emancipation policy.  Like his abolitionist counterparts, his primary point of interest lay 
with understanding and remembering the act itself.33  Such remembrance generated what 
William B. Gravely has called a transition in the “double consciousness,” or “dialectical 
experience—black and American” that constituted African American identity.”34  
Orators of August First commemorations, Garvey has noted, shifted their emphasis on 
the constitutive of communal identity. 
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 The speakers paid less attention to the people’s beginnings and made fewer references to an 
 African  past.  They concentrated instead on how American slavery originated and on the struggle 
 for freedom in America.  They demonstrated that as a people they were committed to the 
 liberation of blacks in slavery.  In the process they affirmed that they had American as well as 
 African roots, that the full meaning of the black saga, encompassing both sides of the dialectic, 
 summed up the cultural transformation of African into ‘colored Americans.’35 
 
Some August First celebrations forged a concern with black liberation and the American 
experience by reciting the Declaration of Independence, arguably the original document 
of emancipation.36  By the 1850s, celebrations of August First were widespread, 
stretching from the American northeast to Indiana, Minnesota, California, as well as 
“Canada, Liberia, and in the West Indian islands themselves.”37  Public remembrance 
met public education, as commemorations built around keynote speeches “were 
important educational and mobilizational vehicles for communicating with other blacks 
and with the broader society.”38 
 Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation was inserted into an ongoing practice of 
commemorating freedom, and the arrival of the new text quickly took center stage in 
collective abolitionist remembrance.  The form of remembrance remained largely the 
same as attention turned to remembering American emancipation, with the singing of 
hymns and “reading of a freedom document” remaining steadfast components of 
epideictic display.  “Since [American] Emancipation” in 1863, Wiggins has noted, 
participants “made a reading of the Emancipation Proclamation a favorite ritual,” with 
readers taking immense pride in the honor.39  The act of repetition is both temporal and 
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“politicizing”:  performers remind observers “that they are legal, full-fledged citizens,” 
complete with “all the rights and privileges that accompany that status.”40   It is too 
historically simplistic, however, to suggest that the emergence of the 1863 Emancipation 
Proclamation subsumed reverence for August First remembrances.  Scholarship on 
emancipation celebrations unfortunately paints such a picture.  Historical studies by 
Kerr-Ritchie, Kachun, and Wiggins discuss August First celebrations as a precursor to 
remembering the 1863 text, and fail to acknowledge the rhetorical complexities of how 
the two celebrations later merged.  Yet, remembrance continued well into the 1880s, 
nearly fifty years after the dissolution of slavery in the Upper and Lower Antilles, and 
over thirty years after the 1 January holiday of American emancipation.  Still more 
pertinent, however, was the way in which adherence to the day persisted while 
adherence to the text commemorating August First was altered:  following 1863 
participants remembered West Indian abolition by reading the American Emancipation 
Proclamation.  The rhetorical context in which the Emancipation Proclamation was 
reborn was, by any standard, remarkable for its intricacy.   
 Tentative in language and ambiguous in virtue, the Emancipation Proclamation 
was continuously revived in public recitation throughout multiple occasions and 
commemorations, some of which remembered a separate measure (West Indian 
Emancipation) on a different calendar date (August 1st or January 1st).  The keynote 
speeches by Frederick Douglass offer insight as to how the Emancipation Proclamation 
was remembered within the complex context of being repeated on the holiday of a 
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separate act.  Such overlapping texture provides ample opportunity to measure the 
extensional reach of the Emancipation Proclamation as it was pushed beyond its original 
moment and constrained in the political context of the late-nineteenth century, an era in 
which political “failures of Reconstruction began to bleed into disenchantment with 
Lincoln and the Proclamation.”41  The critical question that remains:  how did 
Douglass’s discourse position the relationship between a sense of communal identity and 
the memory of the Emancipation Proclamation?  How did these speeches delivered 
within the realm of repetition invite a shared meaning of a text that, as we have 
witnessed, requires rhetorical accompaniment to be fully realized?   
FREDERICK DOUGLASS AND THE POTENTIAL OF TEXTS 
 No voice was more influential in advocating both the rights of African 
Americans prior to the Civil War and the meaning of emancipation in the years that 
followed than Frederick Douglass.42  With a speaking career spanning nearly fifty years, 
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Douglass’s reputation as the African American “jeremiah” was well deserved.43  Omedi 
Ochieng, among others, has noted Douglass’s transformation of public advocacy.  
Though once closely affiliated with William Lloyd Garrison’s framework viewing 
abolitionism as a contest between a corrupt Constitution and the moral righteousness of 
abolitionism, Douglass shifted perspective in the late 1840s and early 1850s to include 
political involvement in part of anti-slavery campaigns.  Garrison famously proclaimed 
the Constitution an “agreement with hell.”44  As his public career advanced, Douglass 
endorsed political action and proposed the Constitution to be “essentially contested,” not 
inherently corrupt:  winning the fight against slavery necessitated that abolitionists 
“reclaim the institutions that they ceded to slaveholders.”45  For Douglass, reclamation 
of America’s founding essence was a battle of interpretation. 
 One underpinning philosophy of Douglass’s interpretation of American history 
was a sense of Enlightenment progress.  Ronald Sunderstrom has called this a belief in 
the “inevitability of Western Christendom’s advance toward justice and human 
brotherhood,” a belief that would be tested in light of American regression on civil rights 
in the late-nineteenth century.46  Douglass’s appealed to assimilation and amalgamation 
of an American culture that embraced differences beyond “cultural hierarchies,” and was 
evaluated, according to Angela Ray, based on the individual’s experience.47  His 
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conception of a millennial America held special prestige, though its “strength and 
potential,” Ray clarifies, varied according to “the mental progress of U.S. citizens 
toward an ideal in which racial or ethnic or religious differences ceased to be used as 
bases for social stratification.”48  Progress was inevitable, but the likelihood of attaining 
such progress was dependent on actions taken by citizens and leaders.  Confronting this 
ideal of Enlightenment through the acceptance of African Americans into white culture 
was frustrating work, particularly in the epoch following the Civil War and 
Reconstruction.   
 Part of Douglass’s public appeal was his “symbolic personality” as a “living 
monument” of the times—an orator abolitionist and former slave.49  Such an identity 
helped his efforts to rhetorically refashion the perception of the Civil War and the 
political development to follow.50  Douglass understood the malleable nature of 
collective memory and its central role in placing ideas in practice.   Part of his 
reconciliation toward the U.S. Constitution, for example, was his belief that key 
provisions of the document were “a source of antislavery principles,” while the text’s 
place in history had “made it proslavery in practice.”51  Highlighting the tension between 
ideals and ironic practice was a forte of Douglass’s rhetoric.  Emancipation Day 
ceremonies, in kind, occupied a special place in his estimation.  Here was a time when 
blacks could, in the words of David Blight, “claim a new and secure social identity” 
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while exploring “an ‘epoch’ full of lessons and responsibilities about the meaning of 
historical memory.”52  As Blight further explains, the last third of Douglass’s life was an 
effort to preserve a past age, and an effort against the conventional presumption that 
“reunion trumped race”:  by “preserving the memory of the Civil War” and confronting 
“Black invisibility in America’s cultural memory,” Douglass presented Americans—
black and white—with a vision born through commemoration of the war.53  As the 
following analysis demonstrates, part of Douglass’s later strategy to correct the racist 
cultural presumptions of the time was to reimagine the emancipation text, the agency 
and meaning of its promise, and its relation to the black citizens it was meant to affect.   
 As I discussed in chapter two, the communal choice to re-introduce texts into an 
epideictic setting reflects a communal vision by which to memorialize public discourse.  
Repeating the proclamation encourages a public memory derived from mutation, or what 
Vivian has called “a repetition that generates memory precisely through a series of 
mnemonic differences and transformations.”54  The Emancipation Proclamation does not 
change in content.  Repeated anew each time, it is instead nestled within an array of 
situational weavings constraining and expanding its applicability and scope within each 
given moment.  To account for every iteration or reference of the text in the 
Reconstruction age would be impossible.  Thanks go the archival record, however, we 
know how the most revered speaker for African American rights crystalized the text in 
his commemorative keynote speeches.  Emphasizing the discourse around repetition 
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does not, I argue, leave critics in the lurch in terms of accounting for what Michael Leff 
called “larger discursive developments” that bring a text into being as “a social 
product—as something constructed through a process that submits to and appropriates 
the authority of the other.”55  “Specific textual practices,” Leff elaborated, “should tell us 
something about how a key symbol of national identity could be interpreted, 
reinterpreted, and assimilated into the changing social and cultural milieu.”56  We cannot 
know for certain how audience members perceived the Emancipation Proclamation upon 
hearing it recited on August First celebrations.  A rhetorical analysis of Douglass’s 
keynote speeches, however, will illustrate how audiences were invited to re-imagine 
their relationship to the past, and the significance of Lincoln’s words.   
 The framework by which Douglass’s speeches are examined is understandably 
narrow.  Our primary focus resides with how the Emancipation Proclamation is 
interpreted through Douglass’s rhetoric, and thereby privileges instances wherein the 
text is emphasized through his rhetorical invention and disposition.  Douglass’s 
commemorations of the Emancipation Proclamation were deliberate attempts to 
refashion the text as public memory.  Specifically, Douglass focused on attributing a 
sense of agency to the text in two important ways:  how the proclamation came to being, 
and what affect it has on the listening audience.  When Douglass speaks of the 
emancipation edict, it is to explain where it came from and what it is doing.  These 
themes often merge in the course of his speech.  A text like the Emancipation 
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Proclamation emerges from a particular point of agency, but is evaluated as a single 
point in a larger process informed by an Enlightenment sensibility of progress, which, in 
turn, is contemplated through the application of principles in political practice. 
 To assist my reading of Douglass’s August First rhetoric, I employ the critical 
framework in Kenneth Burke’s theory of dramatism, and his presumption that a 
speaker’s language will reveal the relationship between ideas that determine their 
“motivational assumptions.”57  Burke’s perspective becomes a helpful way to explain the 
memory of the Emancipation Proclamation in Douglass’s keynote speeches since the 
question of agency, or how the text came into being, affects the memory of the text in 
the present.  As Burke writes, the basic components of a speaker or writer’s task are:  
“Act, Scene, Agent, Agency, Purpose”:  “the act (names what took place, in thought or 
deed), and another that names the scene (the background of the act, the situation in 
which it occurred); also, you must indicate what person or kind of person (agent) 
performed the act, what means or instruments he used (agency), and the purpose.58  
Burke’s conception of dramatistic ratios offers insight to how statements reveal an 
explanation of rhetorical positions.  Tracing a rhetor’s emphasis on one or more aspects 
of dramatism as influencing the other, Burke posited, gave critics a useful method by 
which to understand the symbolic charge of public discourse.  “The ratios,” Burke 
stated, “are principles of determination.”59  Use of different ratios can convey different 
attitudes toward the ideas and objects under consideration.  Using Burke’s framework of 
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dramatistic ratios helps us answer the question of what the Emancipation Proclamation is 
doing in August First readings, and how Douglass’s keynote speeches extensionally 
constitute its being in the world.  As Marie Hochmuth famously noted, in Burke’s vision 
of ratios, “if a situation is said to be of a certain nature, a corresponding attitude toward 
it is implied.”60   
 As I explain in the following analysis, Douglass’s always conceived of the 
Emancipation Proclamation as a textual process, not a textual event.  In contrast to his 
earlier addresses, his later August First speeches highlight an increased emphasis on the 
agency through which the proclamation came to be.  Following my analysis of these 
speeches, I conclude by drawing implications of Douglass’s rhetoric in terms of its 
participation within a community of memory, the text’s extensional identity, and the 
relationship between repetition and ceremonial virtue.     
REIMAGINING THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION 
 Prior to the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation in 1863, August First 
celebrations gave Douglass the opportunity to contrast British and American laws on 
slavery, and frame the act of West Indian emancipation as the advancement of a global 
struggle toward enlightened freedom.  Speaking to a celebration in 1857, Douglass 
borrowed the religious language of John Winthrop by likening the British emancipation 
decree to “a city set upon a hill,” and a “stunning and killing condemnation” of slavery 
that was “the most interesting and sublime event of the nineteenth-century.”61  The act in 
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question, however, was not a national feat.  Instead, Douglass fostered two dominant 
ratios:  purpose-act and agent-act.  The movement toward emancipation was, Douglass 
explained, a “spiritual triumph,” and “one of those glorious emanations of Christianity, 
which, like the sun in the Heavens, takes no cognizance of national lines or geographical 
boundaries, but pours its golden floods of living light upon all.”62  God worked through 
the people to bring freedom to the enslaved.  It was the “great Rule of the Universe, the 
God and Father of all men,” who “roused the British conscience by his truth, moved the 
British heart, and West India Emancipation was the result.”63  Providentially endowed, 
the spiritual energy of emancipation was assisted by both members of the British 
government as well as “the slaves themselves,” who gave protest to their condition and, 
in turn, “assisted in bringing about that state of public opinion which finally resulted in 
their emancipation.”64  This dual perspective of purpose and agent cooperation toward 
the act was repeated in a similar appeal in an 1858 speech delivered in Poughkeepsie, 
New York.65  These preliminary remarks preceding later August First orations highlight 
Douglass’s rhetorical framing of the British proclamation’s status as derivative of both 
purpose and agent actions upon the advance of freedom.  Key events are not officially 
derived, in Douglass’s remembrance.  They grow from divine and political action alike. 
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 Like other abolitionists of the antebellum era, Douglass also used his early 
August First orations to draw a contrast between American and British actions against 
slavery.  Speaking in 1858, he framed the calendar of freedom’s advance by 
complimenting the British and deriding failed attempts in the United States.  “The 
celebration,” he stated, separating himself from his American audience, “comes 
opportunely just after your National Anniversary.  It laps on and supplies a deficiency, in 
the exercises of that day.  It takes up the principles of the American Revolution, where 
you drop them, and bears on them onward to high and more beneficent applications.”66  
Returning to an agent-act ratio, Douglass reminds listeners that the exalted achievement 
of British emancipation was both “glorious” and emergent from “small things,” such as 
the “patient labors of that purest and most clear-sighted of all the anti-slavery men” who 
directed the campaign for abolition.67  Individual effort by the likes of Granville Sharpe 
and other English abolitionists support Douglass’s claim that emancipation derived from 
public energy.  This prompt lays the groundwork for his closing appeal:  the American 
advancement modeled after the British achievement.  The people should act, Douglass 
concluded, “with increasing determination to spend and be spent, to live and die, to fall 
or to flourish in breaking the fetters form the limbs, not of eight hundred thousand slaves 
of the British West Indies, but of Four Millions of slaves in the United States of 
America.”68  Douglass’s August First orations prior to the Emancipation Proclamation 
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presented audiences with a logic that accomplishment of freedom emerged from a 
combination of providential and political activity.   
 In addition to relevant ratios evident in prior speeches, a second component of 
Douglass’ rhetoric is important to note before we explore his late nineteenth-century 
August First speeches.  If official texts were derived from some combination of mystic 
energy and political protest, their promises as public virtues were perpetually up for 
grabs.  Indeed, as his writings and speeches make clear, Douglass endorsed the view that 
remembering texts was a continual process of evaluating how they have made a 
difference in people’s lives as word made flesh.  In his autobiography, Life and Times of 
Frederick Douglass, he confronts the view that Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation 
was a weak public statement against slavery.  Though “confined” and “inspired by the 
low motive of military necessity,” Douglass finds the life of the text in its application, 
not its original form:  “For my own part, I took the proclamation, first and last, for a little 
more than it purported, and saw in its spirit a life and power far beyond its letter.”69  The 
same logic that saw promise in the Constitution despite its misapplication by advocates 
of slavery was mutually applicable to a new text, or, in Douglass’s conception, a new 
promise.   
 The question remained as to whether the public and those in political power 
would make good on the text’s potential.  Assigning the Proclamation as an always-yet-
to-be-enacted potential allowed Douglass to frame individual issues in light of 
materializing ideals.  For instance, in a speech delivered 6 February 1863—just two 
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months after the edict was declared law—Douglass defined the admittance of black 
soldiers to the union army as a way to either sustain or denigrate the meaning of the text.  
Lincoln’s proclamation was the “first principle” of truth and an achievement for 
humankind, Douglass wrote, using familiar tones he previously ascribed to the West 
Indian emancipation, but the true power of the text lay in replacing the dissenting view 
that the text was merely “an ink and paper proclamation.”  Douglass’s response to this 
point becomes a key element to interpreting his later August First speeches, and warrants 
greater elaboration here.   
 The objector might go a step further, and assert that there was a time when this Proclamation was 
 only a thought, a sentiment, an idea—a hope of some radical Abolitionist—for such it truly was.  
 But what of it?  The world has never advanced a single inch in the right direction, when the 
 movement could not be traced to some such small beginning.  The bill abolishing Slavery, and 
 ringing freedom  to eight hundred thousand people in the West Indies, was a paper bill.  The 
 Reform bill, that broke up the rotten borough system in England, was a paper bill.  The act of 
 Catholic Emancipation was a paper act; and so was the bill repealing the Corn Laws.  Greater 
 than all, our own Declaration of Independence was at one time but ink on paper.  The freedom of 
 the American colonies dates from no particular battle during the war.  No man can tell upon what 
 particular day we won our national independence.  But the birth of our freedom is fixed on the 
 day of the going forth of the Declaration of Independence.  In like manner after coming 
 generations will celebrate the first of January as the day which brought liberty and manhood to 
 the American slaves.  How shall this be done?  I answer:  That the paper Proclamation must now 
 be made iron, lead, and fire, by the prompt employment of the negro’s arm in the contest.  I hold 
 that the Proclamation, good as it is, will be worthless—a miserable mockery—unless the nation 
 shall so far conquer its prejudice as to welcome into the army full-grown black men to help fight 
 the battles of the republic.70  
 
For Douglass, the Emancipation Proclamation, or any text of public importance, is a 
sentiment in process.  The rhetorical positioning and remembrance of the text, then, was 
a crucial part of measuring how well the idea lived in the world of human interests and 
                                                
70 Frederick Douglass, “The Proclamation And a Negro Army:  An Address Delivered in New York, New 
York, on 6 February 1863,” in The Frederick Douglass Papers, Series One:  Speeches, Debates, and 
Interviews Volume 3:  1855-1863, ed, John W. Blassingame (New Haven and London:  Yale University 
Press, 1985), 563-564, emphasis mine. 
  92 
issues, which, depending on the time of reflection, could be accepted or deflected 
through an ideological commitment to the expanding sphere of human liberty. 
 By the time Douglass addressed crowds in the later half of the nineteenth-
century, justifying the connection between the Civil War and political issues of civil 
rights was increasingly difficult.  During the last third of his life, Blight wrote, 
Douglass’s public leadership was defined by “his quest to preserve the memory of the 
Civil War as he believed blacks and the nation should remember it.”71  Emancipation 
holidays, in particular, were times of “national celebration in which all blacks, the low 
and the mighty, could claim a new a secure social identity,” a feat greatly at odds with a 
nation “indifferent or hostile to that legacy.”72  As Martha Watson and Thomas 
Burkholder have noted, the Republican Party in particular seemed “to lose interest in 
African Americans after Reconstruction.”73 Following the withdrawal of federal troops 
in 1877, Jackson Lears has claimed, the United States entered a “new phase of racial 
politics,” namely the transition wherein “Emancipation dissolved in the discourse of 
reunion.”74  The slow de-evolution of legal accomplishments and disappointment to 
previous progress were accentuated in the 1883 invalidation of the Civil Rights act of 
1875 by the Supreme Court, effectively stripping the potency and enforcement of the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments in particular states.75   
                                                
71 Blight, Beyond the Battlefield, 94. 
72 Blight, Beyond the Battlefield, 94. 
73 Martha Watson and Thomas Burkholder, “The Gilded Age and the New America,” in Rhetoric of 
Nineteenth Century Reform, eds, Watson and Burkholder (East Lansing:  Michigan State University Press, 
2008), xviii. 
74 Jackson Lears, Rebirth of a Nation:  The Making of Modern America, 1877-1920 (New York:  Harper 
Collins, 2009), 96 and 25-26. 
75 Martha Watson and Thomas Burkholder, “The Gilded Age and the New America,” xviii. 
  93 
 Douglass’s task was immense.  Assigned with remembering the American 
Emancipation Proclamation at a point of diminishing progress on Civil Rights within the 
context—and perceived importance—of the British West Indian emancipation gave rise 
to noticeable tension.  However, through his keynote addresses, we begin to understand 
how his language approached this uneasy context by extend and constrain the words 
brought into being in the present.  Letters and words lived on paper, Douglass would 
suggest, but that paper can be made firm and productive when applied to the political 
questions of the day, regardless of their difficulty.    
Medina, New York—1869 
 The 1869 keynote address in Medina, New York illustrates the general themes of 
Douglass’s commemorative rhetoric of August First.  This text draws on the memory of 
the Emancipation Proclamation and the West Indian emancipation edict in a way that 
leaves the extensional character of each in uneasy confusion, however.  In a rare change, 
Douglass advocates leaving August First celebrations behind as a means of protesting 
the recent controversy of involving British appeals for compensation of ships made for 
the Confederacy that were destroyed during the Civil War.  Upsetting the conventional 
memorialization of the date, and discouraged by the recent turn of the British 
government, Douglass remembers both primary texts of the day in a way that fails to 
provide a constitutive vision of collective understanding.  Cultural values of his audience 
and the virtues evident from the Emancipation Proclamation failed to connect. 
 Douglass begins his address with the deductive reasoning that “great events” are 
worthy of public celebration, but only to the degree they have “changed and improved 
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the conditions of men” through effect.76  Previewing his second premise, Douglass 
suggests that events can be “transient or permanent, general or special, partly according 
to the character of the events themselves, and partly to the sensibility and constancy of 
the people affected by them.”77  To commemorate or not to commemorate is determined 
by both what happened in the past and what remains in the present.  To complete the 
necessary conclusion, Douglass categorizes August First as a “transient” day, a fall from 
its previous position.  “The celebration of the day,” he stated, used to offer American 
abolitionists the chance to contrast “the noble example of Britain with the mean example 
of America,” but now the tides have shifted:  “neither the event, nor the example serves 
such useful purpose.”78  The present defines the past.  British emancipation was 
“sublime,” though “dwarfed in comparison with emancipation in our own country,” 
Douglass states.79  England’s fall form antislavery grace is regretful, Douglass further 
notes, but clearly evident in the present controversy outlined by Senator Charles Sumner 
the previous April.   The controversy in question emerged from requested compensation 
for money lost to American merchant fleet damaged by British-made Confederate ships, 
and England’s reluctance to submit such payment.80  Britain has failed to live up to the 
virtues of its past act, and by proxy, the ground on which they commemorate has shifted:  
what was once a decree that provided the “hope of our slave-holding rebels” has brought 
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into sharp relief a divide between “English practice and English professions.”81  Filtered 
through the moment and a commitment to remembering the moral sentiment of the Civil 
War, Douglass chooses to distance—not unite—the emancipation efforts of the two 
countries, stating, “It was no fault of that Government that the slave-holders of America 
lost their hold upon the throats of four millions slaves, and that those millions are now 
rejoicing in the freedom from chains.” 82   
 Previous commemoration texts credited England with giving America its 
abolitionist movement.  Here, however, Douglass again emphasizes the purpose-act 
ratio, presuming that the abolition of slavery was a cosmic event, “one of those great 
oscillations of human thought” which spread through both England and the world.83  
Though Douglass supports his previous agent-act view that popular will forged 
emancipation, he claims a worldwide phenomenon wherein “people awoke” and 
overturned tyranny of all kinds.84  Though muted in precise reference, the American 
proclamation is endeared with a new, privileged position in this speech.  Americans may 
resume celebrating August First, Douglass stated, when the country “shall put herself in 
harmony” with abolitionists and “the emancipation of 1834”; until then, “I commend to 
you not the first of August, but the first of January, not 1834, but 1863, not West India 
emancipation, but emancipation in the United States for commemoration.”85   
 In his respective speeches to 1857 and 1858 commemorations of British 
emancipation, Douglass positioned the act in the British Caribbean emerging from the 
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context of active, even disruptive, efforts by abolitionists and slaves.  In his 1869 
critique of the country—and the holiday—however, the agency of the act has been 
altered both for the memory of English and American emancipation:  “Whence came the 
abolition of Slavery?  The abolitionist says Garrison.  The theologian says, God.  The 
politician says, Lincoln.  The statesman says, the war.”86  Each of these are rejected by 
Douglass’s insistence that slavery fell by “the hand of its own progeny,” a system that 
self-destructed.87  Such remembrance of the Emancipation Proclamation offers an 
ambiguous relationship between a text repeated and a listening audience.  Though 
revived in memory, the connection between public involvement and perceivable change 
is unstated.   
 By the conclusion of the speech, Douglass appeals to close adherence to ratifying 
the Fifteenth Amendment, and a greater acknowledgment that “we have not yet been 
fully admitted to the glorious temple of American liberty.”88  This speech provides 
listeners, with an uneven image of both the West Indian Emancipation and the 
Emancipation Proclamation.  The text is remembered as both a preferred point of 
freedom’s advancement in stark contrast to the sins of Britain, while at the same time the 
result of an ambiguous global movement seemingly kissed with the blessing of cosmic 
happenstance, not organized in public agitation.  The Emancipation Proclamation is 
remembered between two poles, at once a source of rightful celebration, though not yet 
fulfilled within the context of social equality.  As time continued, however, Douglass’ 
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rhetoric at August First celebrations—and other moments of ceremonial repetition—
underwent transformation, and with time, new relationships emerged between abolition 
texts and their extensional meaning within the moment of repetition.  
Elmira, New York—1880 
 The final two August First speeches in this analysis signal a transition in 
Douglass’s strategies of remembering the Emancipation Proclamation.  Douglass alters 
his remembrance of the text as a document not only living in the present, but born from 
context of active citizen involvement.  These speeches demonstrate Douglass’s 
conception of the text as process and his memory of the Emancipation Proclamation 
constitute an image of the 1863 edict that complements a more productive fusion 
between the words repeated in epideictic reverence to the communal identity and 
unfulfilled needs of the present. 
 In his 1880 address commemorating the West Indian emancipation, Douglass 
once again unites the memories of American and British abolition acts and the preceding 
public movements that put them into effect.   Complimenting what he defined as “pre-
eminently the colored man’s day,” Douglass gives lop-sided attention in his speech to 
the upcoming presidential election and his endorsement of the Republican Party and 
James Garfield.89  Prior to his partisan appeals, however, Douglass invests considerable 
detail to the history of emancipation between Britain and the United States.  In the time 
since the Elmira address, he has come to terms with the complex history of Great 
Britain, and accepts the notion that there “were two Englands” during the Civil War, “as 
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there were two Americas, and that one was true to liberty while the other was true to 
slavery.”90  In recounting memories of these two texts, however, Douglass makes more 
substantial deviations from his prior engagement with August First and the memory of 
the Emancipation Proclamation. 
 First, Douglass closely recounts the path to achieving American emancipation by 
directing appeals away from a cosmic agency and instead fuses his remembrance of the 
texts with the involvement of black citizens.  Returning to a greater focus on an agent-
act ratio, Douglass emphasizes the human element that directed the expansion of 
freedom.   West India emancipation was “transformative” and saw “a bondage of ages 
ended,” Douglass maintains, sharing that “human liberty excludes all idea of home and 
abroad.  It is universal and disdains localization.”91  The essential component of the 
occasion, Douglass clarifies, is both the “matter of it” and the “manner of it”:  British 
emancipation fell untraditionally not by the sword, but “by the word—not by brute force 
of numbers, but by the still small voice of truth,” and “peaceful agitation.”92  Invoking 
the names of British abolitionists, Douglass offers grateful thanks for “the exercises of 
peaceful human power” that enacted difference.  The power of public advocacy 
exemplified by the British, Douglass claims, adds perspective to what may be attained 
“without the aid of armies on the earth or of angles in the sky.”93  “It shows,” he states 
more clearly, “that men have in their own hands the means of putting all their moral and 
political enemies under their feet, and making this world a good and pleasant place for 
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mankind if they will but use them.”94  The point of origin of British West Indian 
Emancipation is essential to black citizens, he states further.  “Let not Americans, 
especially no colored Americans withhold a generous recognition of this glorious 
achievement,” he continues, drawing a clear causal claim from British emancipation to 
American success insomuch as the prior event was utilized as “a tremendous lever in the 
hands of American Abolitionists.”95  As a causal claim, it was the activists, not the act 
itself that spurs the act worthy of remembrance today.  The origin of both texts, finally, 
is finessed in Douglass’s logic from the “peaceful agitation” of abolitionists that changed 
the face of British colonies to the active involvement of American abolitionists to alter 
the landscape of their freedom.   
 British freedom was a useful tool in the hands of American abolitionists.  At 
every turn, Douglass traces the history between British and American Emancipation by 
beginning with the effect, not of one text on the other, but of one campaign’s influence 
on the other.  For example, he elaborates that England is “the mother too of our abolition 
movement,” though “her Emancipation came in peace and ours in war; though hers cost 
treasure and ours blood, though hers was the result of a sacred preference, and ours 
resulted in part from necessity, the motive and mainspring of the respective measures 
were the same in both.”96  The common origin is abolitionism.  In one sense, he 
continues, “England is responsible for our civil war.  The abolition of slavery in the 
West Indies gave life and vigor to the abolition movement in America.”97  In more 
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explicit commemorative fashion, the thing remembered and worshiped is not the 
memory of a text, but the memory of the audience themselves.   
 While this mode of remembrance invests British abolitionism with credit for 
giving American abolitionists a functional case for swaying the public, it also relegates 
the Emancipation Proclamation to relative uncertainty.  Though he is quick to credit 
British emancipation with prompting effective abolitionism in America, Douglass is 
equally quick to disregard any pretense of finality.  “We celebrate this day too for the 
very good reason that we have no other to celebrate.  English Emancipation has one 
advantage over American Emancipation.  Hers has a definitive anniversary.  Ours has 
none.  Like our slave, the freedom of the negro has no birth-day.  No man can tell the 
day of the month, or the month of the year, upon which slavery was abolished in the 
United States.”98  In recounting the progress toward freedom, Douglass traces the key 
events of the Civil War, finally coming upon “the first of January 1863” wherein “we 
had the proclamation itself, and still the end was not yet.  Slavery was hurting and dying 
but it was not dead, and no man can tell just what its foul spirit departed from our land, if 
indeed it has yet departed, and hence we do not know what do we may properly 
celebrate as coupled with this great American event.”99  Neither Douglass nor his 
listeners can know the status of the Emancipation Proclamation because of its 
indeterminate effectiveness:  “How stands the case with the recently emancipated 
millions of colored people in our own country?”100  The answer reveals the life of the 
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text.  “By law, by the constitution of the United States, slavery has no existence in our 
country.  The legal form has been abolished,” he continues, dissociating legal title with 
actual events:  black citizens live a “mockery” of free life, reflective of the tension and 
historically unfriendly conditions of emancipation, specifically, the fact that liberty for 
the African American came “not by moral choice, but my military necessity.”101 
 Douglass’s 1880 keynote speech leaves the extensional character of the 
Emancipation Proclamation in flux.  While his memory of the occasion provides a world 
wherein the agitating citizen and abolitionist can spur transformative change, the 
Emancipation Proclamation’s lasting impact, or discernable effect remains ineffective:  it 
neither initiated freedom (the actions as a result of British emancipation did that), nor 
has been implemented to guarantee rights (black citizenship is a mockery).  The agency 
of future change will arise, Douglass maintains, with the need to “resolutely struggle on 
in the belief that we by patience, industry, and uprightness, and economy may hasten 
that better day.”102  A change—or the enactment of the principles promised in 
emancipation—will arise from within, not without.  Imbuing his audience with the 
power to reach attainable change, Douglass transitions to his long explanation of the 
presidential election, emphasizing the relevancy of their collective agency, stating, 
“[Y]ou are fifteen thousand in number, and your vote may turn the scale one way or the 
other, and say whether this country shall be ruled by a party of liberal ideas, by justice 
and fair play, or by a party especially distinguished by its devotion to slavery, rebellion 
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and bitter prejudice against the race which you belong.”103  It is the “political relation” 
that reigns supreme in the question of liberation, Douglass expounds, and no other 
decision requires more special attention.  Douglass’s Elmira speech reinforces his 
position on texts as an evolving process, though leaves the relationship between 
audience members and the particular text in question uncertain.   
Rochester, New York—1885 
 Twenty years after Appomattox, Douglass’s judgment on African American 
liberties and the meaning of emancipation altered considerably.  Between his remarks in 
Elmira and his 1885 address in Rochester, the Supreme Court officially rebuked the 
Civil Rights Act of 1875, and a greater minimizing of race seemed to be underway in the 
name of sectional reunion.  Though this speech finds Douglass continuing to focus on 
the emancipation’s emergence in the United States and England, and its meaning within 
the context of the African American’s struggle in the present, this address embodies an 
additional change to his previous comments and the relationship between audience, 
agency, and the extensional possibilities of a text remembered. 
 The Rochester address begins with similar appeals and style as the Elmira speech 
five years earlier:  Douglass proclaims the importance of the day and the contribution of 
both emancipation texts to the larger effort of “the moral and material progress of 
mankind.”104  Contrary to his previous orations, however, Douglass defines the 
Emancipation Proclamation in greater clarity than his previous texts allowed, noting its 
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national importance despite its status as “the exercise of…war powers under the 
constitution” of the United States.105  This early demarcation of the text seems to narrow 
its functional scope, and signals an early memory of the text akin to Lincoln’s original 
language of limited application and legalese.  Regardless, the date and the celebration 
are fitting, Douglass continues, due to the interconnectedness of the two countries, 
whose efforts are combined in the calendar of human progress:  “It was the sunny month 
of August that brought emancipation” to slaves in the British West Indies, and “the 
month of September that brought the same class of sufferers in the United States the first 
joyous note or intimation of President Lincoln’s famous emancipation proclamation.106  
To this introduction, Douglass has positioned the text repeated as official in nature, and, 
in-step with the conventions of Emancipation Day celebrations, attributed credit to 
Abraham Lincoln, rather than causally derived from the preceding British emancipation.  
The design of this speech, however, goes further in positioning the memory of text in 
question as a memory of accomplishment and precursor for future achievements. 
 This point is addressed most clearly following Douglass’s argument that 
emancipation is universal in principle, not nationality, and “the common right of all 
nations, kindred, tongues and people.”107  American Emancipation is again remembered 
as superior to its British counterpart.  The causal connection once forged between British 
abolitionists and the emergence of emancipation in America described in his Elmira 
address is substantially clearer and more precise.  First, Douglass reframes the order in 
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which his audience is invited to understand emancipation originating as something 
greater than text alone.  The presence of a text is subverted in favor of the slower process 
from which it emerged.  He intones to listeners to consider an updated conception of 
public texts as subject to public processes: 
 acts of congress and acts of parliament are but signs, and are no less than the things they signify.  
 They move only as they are moved upon by superior force.  The power behind the throne is ever 
 greater than the throne itself.  Take the obedient hands of the watch.  They tell us the time of day, 
 but they tell us nothing of the moving power behind them.  The action of the English government 
 and that of our own, in respect to the abolition of slavery, was due to the creation of a purer 
 moral sentiment in both countries than had ever prevailed.108 
 
Once Douglass establishes a cause of emancipation is “ever greater than the occasion,” 
and that “the thing explained is greater than the explanation,” he has woven a 
relationship between text and agency assigned to popular will:  governments may have 
acted to abolish slavery, but such achievements only grew from the “moral sentiment” 
directing political action.  
 This relationship is not only based on popular will alone, however.  Douglass 
acknowledges the role of British West Indian emancipation in the creation of American 
liberation of slaves, but goes further to define the 1863 act as more than a war measure; 
he reconstitutes the source by which the measure was introduced.  Those who are 
“superficial and thoughtless” would suggest “abolition of slavery was due to the war 
only.”109  The true source of the Emancipation Proclamation—war measure or not—was 
the execution of the “moral and human judgment of the nation,” an application of 
principle which had “gotten itself inwrought and established in the public mind and 
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heart.”110  Lincoln’s emancipation can be his own, Douglass claims, but his “act of war 
was the flower,” which only grew up from “soil, root, and sap” laid by the “labors of the 
earlier abolition men and women, who, with voice and pen, unmasked the hell-black 
horrors of slavery,” shocked public opinion, and created the context wherein the nation 
was faced with “abolition or dismemberment.”111  Lincoln is the central figure of an 
agent-act ratio.  The hidden nectar of history, Douglass reminds his listeners, is the 
presence of two preceding ratios:  the agency-scene ratio comprising abolitionists who 
directed the public sentiment of emancipation, and thereby building the framework 
which enabled Lincoln’s act to originate.  This, Douglass intones, was the agency of the 
agitators, or the “power behind the throne” applicable to both counties (The United 
States and England), and either text (West Indian Emancipation and the Emancipation 
Proclamation).112   
 Douglass’s rhetorical position offers a remarkable relationship between public 
activism and the life of the text.  The Emancipation Proclamation was limited, 
conditional, and ultimately recognized for its effectiveness.  To focus on the supposed 
effects of this decree would be to force a relationship between audience and text 
unsupported by circumstance, experience, and future prospects.  The Emancipation 
Proclamation’s origin, however, remains a rich new point of focus.  Lincoln wrote the 
words, while agents of the public sentiment created the context around which an act of 
war became a necessity.  For Emancipation to be born a reality, Douglass reasons, it had 
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to be born of “the moral conviction implanted in the national mind and heart by abolition 
speakers and writers.”  By this logic, he continues, the text, is more than just a war 
measure:  if its purpose was to end the war, it would cease to be effective upon the war’s 
completion.113  Alternatively, the Emancipation Proclamation was born from public 
support.  Its existence in the present, however, is sorely lacking—liberty is “delusive, 
transient, and worthless”—but its existence is also not reducible to a single instant.114  
To know the virtues of emancipation and the document that is represented in the day, 
Douglass continues, is to know emancipation exists beyond “an isolated movement” as 
“part of that eternal and universal conflict everywhere in progress between human 
justice, enlightenment, and goodness on the one hand, and human pride, selfishness, 
injustice, and tyrannical power on the other,” and that will continue “forever” until man 
can “become subject to his higher and better nature.”115   
 Douglass concludes his address in Rochester by reminding listeners that events 
that created the context through which emancipation emerged are close at hand:  “the 
past is not dead, and cannot die,” further stating, “we are walking, to-day, by the light of 
lamps trimmed and furnished us by those who have gone before us, and should stumble 
worse than we do now, but for those lamps.”116  Though blacks are “still on trial,” 
Douglass reminds listeners, the example of the antislavery movement stands as reason to 
hope:  “Something must come after freedom.”117  The pressures and constraints 
approaching blacks in 1885, Douglass concludes, are exceptionally challenging:  the 
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emancipated class “was, and is” faced with conditions “so unfavorable to success,” and 
yet must continue to “strive to decrease that distance” that separates race quality in post-
Reconstruction America.118  Instead of testing its effectiveness in a time of rescinding 
civil rights, or attempting to draw a forced relationship between the legalistic words of 
the text and its resulting impact on advancing human freedom, Douglass positions the 
Emancipation Proclamation in the middle of the audience’s cultural narrative:  the text is 
both the result of agitation efforts and the model of what can be possible again in an age 
that requires reform for the promise of equality to live.   
 Though his 1885 address to citizens in Rochester came nearly forty years after he 
began speaking to August First commemorations, Frederick Douglass’s speech 
accomplishes something significant in the context of ceremonial repetition and the 
exchange between the text repeated and the accompanying discourse.  He reimagined the 
Emancipation Proclamation as belonging to no one individual, but as originating from 
the active public scene in which it was born.  In Kenneth Burke’s sense of rhetorical 
theory agents direct the scene, and through their efforts, the scene directed the act.  
Memory of the Emancipation Proclamation—directing and constraining the new life of 
the text in ceremonial repetition—is consubstantial with the communal memory of 
protest, agitation, and public involvement.  Douglass appealed to active citizenship, and 
imbued them with the agency of such influence.  With this, Douglass turns this example 
to the needs of the present, namely, an unfulfilled commitment to freedom and the 
challenges of citizenship that require attention from the African American themselves.  
                                                
118 Douglass, “Great Britain’s Example is High, Noble, and Grand,” 208. 
  108 
This step not only inscribes a broader spectrum of voices to the memory of the 
document, but in so doing it helps to bring Lincoln’s legalistic prose in the epideictic 
presence of shared remembrance:  past actions, like ours, can revive the eternal process 
of making real the virtues of the text for the cause of human liberty.  Douglass’s 
achievement can be summarized in a strange yet effective argument:  By reducing the 
Emancipation Proclamation to nothing but a “sign” that was required to be signified, he 
deepened the relation between public and text, and added substance to its meaning.  To 
rescue the Emancipation Proclamation from obscurity meant to minimize its iconic 
status against the wave of public participation. 
CONCLUSION 
 What does Frederick Douglass’s rhetoric of August First celebrations tell us 
about ceremonial repetition?  Three conclusions are essential.  First, Douglass’s keynote 
speeches reinforce the importance of public address as a vital source of extensional 
constitutive meaning of texts remembered.  The character of the Emancipation 
Proclamation, though repeated in seemingly rote fashion, was imbued with different 
rhetorical strategies across three separate locations.  Douglass’s early purpose-act ratio 
in the Melinda speech is eventually replaced with an agent-act ratio, replacing Lincoln 
with abolitionist protesters.  Finally, his 1885 address in Rochester offers the unique 
agency-act ratio as the dominant means of commemorating Lincoln’s text.  Such a 
transition means that Douglass evolved in his memorialization of the text, first 
attributing the text to a mystical source, then to a sense of materialism, and finally, a 
pragmatic philosophy that invests the text’s origin and consequence with the actions of 
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public participants.119  It is this final ratio of remembering the Emancipation 
Proclamation that allows for the fluid understanding of the text as not only an evolving 
substance of public ideas, but as the result of an evolving substance of public ideas. 
 Second, analysis of the extensional constitutive of the Emancipation 
Proclamation in Frederick Douglass’s August First orations offers a departure on the 
conventional understanding of how the Emancipation Proclamation is remembered.  
Placed in the context of celebrating the international history of emancipation, the 1863 
proclamation inherits a broader history, and, by comparison with the British 
emancipation, either gains or loses reputation based on the contemporary political 
standing of African American liberty.  By continuing the habit of repetition outside the 
designated date of remembrance, the terrain is already prepared to invite a comparison or 
to formulate a history between the two countries that may not be evident when focusing 
on a January 1st celebration alone.  Even more, lodging the 1863 text within August First 
shifts attention away from the traditional source of remembrance:  Abraham Lincoln.  In 
her overview of nineteenth-century emancipation celebrations, Leslie A. Schwalm 
describes how the Emancipation Proclamation was not only a “persistent” element of 
commemoration, but that reading the text was almost always a means to of “portraying 
                                                
119 The public philosophies and their corresponding points of the pentad are covered in Burke, A Grammar 
of Motives, 127-317; as well as Bernard L. Brock, “Rhetorical Criticism:  A Burkeian Approach,” in 
Rhetorical Criticism:  A Twentieth Century Perspective, 2nd Edition, eds, Bernard L. Brock and Robert L. 
Scott (Detroit:  Wayne State University Press, 1980):  349-360. 
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Lincoln as a great emancipator.”120  Analysis of Douglass’s August First oratory offers a 
different history of the text, and a different application of its memory.121 
 Third, analysis of the invocations of texts within moments of ceremonial 
repetition highlights—in this case—the greater potential of texts as memories contrasted 
with their original form.  Lincoln’s decree is a unique case for understanding the creative 
possibilities of ceremonial repetition simply because publics inheriting the words of the 
Emancipation Proclamation are left with such little intrinsic content.  As Harold Holzer 
has recently argued, one reason why commemorative prints celebrating the 1863 text 
were slow to emerge was because the text “fail[ed] to inspire such depictions.”122  The 
public virtues Lincoln chose to exclude—either by prudent political decision or 
reasonable hesitation—could not be rescued in memory from repetition alone, but could 
be molded in public appeals attuned to a listening audience ready to experience and 
consider the text anew.  Though divergent in form and content across multiple occasions, 
Douglass’s keynote speeches provide a tentative way in which to understand the 
connection between ceremonial repetition and the epideictic emphasis on public virtue.  
                                                
120 Leslie A. Schwalm, “ ‘Agonizing Groans of Mothers’ and Slave-Scarred Veterans’:  The 
Commemoration of Slavery and Emancipation,” American Nineteenth Century History 9 (September 
2008), 293. 
121 For a contrasting memory of the text, consider Douglass’s remarks during a commemoration of 
twentieth anniversary of the Emancipation Proclamation in 1883.  Douglass defines the proclamation as 
that text “by Abraham Lincoln; a proclamation which made the name of its author immortal and glorious 
throughout the civilized world.  That great act of his marked an epoch in the life of the whole American 
nation.”  Lincoln, “the great statesman by whom he was supported,” helped the government “become 
consistent, logical and strong, for from this hour slavery was doomed, liberty made certain and the Union 
established.”  See:  Frederick Douglass, “Freedom Has Brought Duties:  An Address Delivered in 
Washington, D.C., on 1 January 1883,” in The Frederick Douglass Papers, Series One:  Speeches, 
Debates, and Interviews, Volume 5:  1881-1895, eds. John W. Blassingame and John R. McKivigan (New 
Haven and London:  Yale University Press, 1992), 56-57. 
122 Harold Holzer, Emancipating Lincoln:  The Proclamation in Text, Context, and Memory (Cambridge:  
Harvard University Press, 2012), 135. 
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By inviting his audience to see themselves as part of the agency by which a text was 
born, he also invites a renewed appreciation for the virtues within the text repeated.  
Repetition is not ceremonial ornamentation, but is instead a way of knowing the model 
for the community to replicate through action, maintaining Hauser’s observation that 
audiences interact with notions of public morality through “mimesis of deeds 
unfathomable were they not publicly exhibited and validated.”123  By reinscribing the 
virtue that bred the text—public involvement—listeners can encounter a text with a 
newfound appreciation of its ethical quality not originally intended by the author. 
Douglass’s rhetoric illustrates an effective way public address can mingle with 
ceremonial repetition, and provide a framework wherein texts “merge with a total 
situation to convey meaning.”124  Re-reading the text in this way provides valuable 
insight into how audiences were invited to reimagine their engagement with the living 
legacy of public discourse.   
 
                                                
123 Hauser, “Aristotle on Epideictic:  The Formation of Public Morality” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 29, 
number 1 (Winter 1999), 19. 
124 Walter Ong, The Presence of the Word, 116. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
REPETITION, “REBEL FLAGS,” AND THE UNION IMAGE OF WASHINGTON’S 
FAREWELL ADDRESS 
The dialectic of word and image seems to be a constant in the fabric of signs that a culture weaves around 
itself.  What varies is the precise nature of the weave, the relation of warp and woof. 
—W. J. T. Mitchell.1 
 INTRODUCTION:  IMAGES, LIFE, AND DEATH 
 
 Rhetoric can mean the difference between life and death.  In his book The Edge 
of Meaning, James Boyd White reminds listeners that speech can alter perceptions of 
mortality:  the dead “are only dead if we fail to give them life.”2  Rhetorical life and 
physical life are distinct.  However, as recent contributions to public address scholarship 
from James Jasinski and Jennifer Merceica remind us, the constitutive character of 
speech travels in more than one direction, and the life of reading is an expansive process.  
Authors create relationships through public texts.  Audiences, Jasinski states, 
“appropriate, articulate, circulate, and/or subvert these textual forms in ways that release 
and transform their potential constitutive energy.”3  Studying what Jasinksi and 
                                                
1. W. J. T. Mitchell, Iconology:  Image, Text, Ideology (Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press, 1986), 
43. 
2 James Boyd White, The Edge of Meaning (Chicago and London:  The University of Chicago Press, 
2001), xiv. 
3 James Jasinski, “A Constitutive Framework for Rhetorical Historiography:  Toward an Understanding of 
the Discursive (Re)constitution of ‘Constitution’ in The Federalist Papers” in Kathleen Turner (ed), Doing 
Rhetorical History:  Concepts and Cases (Tuscaloosa and London:  The University of Alabama Press, 
1998), 75. 
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Merceica have called the “extensional” character of rhetoric means accounting for a 
text’s life, or how later publics make the dead—and their discourse—live again.4 
 As I have argued thus far, ceremonial repetition is an ideal beginning point to 
study the extensional constitutive life of public address.  The previous chapter uncovered 
how the prescribed epideictic meaning of a text repeated can be constrained and 
characterized by public address.  Memorializing the Emancipation Proclamation was a 
fluid process for Frederick Douglass, and one that positioned the text in relation to a 
range of different relations to the community of listening audiences.  Speech is perhaps 
the most fundamental form by which scholars can study the extensional lives of public 
texts.  Yet, scholars and practitioners of rhetoric have yearned to understand the role of 
sight and vision as means to engage the imaginations of audiences.  Ekphrasis, Webb 
reminds us, resides in the “the interaction between language, memory[,] and 
imagination.”5  Citing Thucydides’ historical writings, Webb hypothesizes the 
relationship ekphrasis creates between text and audience:  “the text opens up to the 
reader’s imagination:  the words on the page dissolve into images as they impact upon 
the mind.”6  Ceremonial repetition is an ideal environment to explore the connection 
between speech and imagination even further. 
 Webb’s description of ekphrasis reads like a mystical phenomenon:  ideas 
anchored to text wrestle gravity’s weight, enter the consciousness, and become translated 
                                                
4 See:  James Jasinski, “A Constitutive Framework for Rhetorical Historiography,” and also James Jasinski 
and Jennifer Mercieca, “Analyzing Constitutive Rhetorics:  The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions and 
the ‘Principles of ‘98’” in Shawn J. Parry-Giles and J. Michael Hogan (eds), The Handbook of Rhetoric 
and Public Address (West Sussex, UK:  Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2010), 313-342. 
5 Ruth Webb, Ekphrasis, Imagination and Persuasion in Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Practice 
(Farnham, Surrey [England]:  Ashgate, 2009), 195. 
6 Webb, Ekphrasis, Imagination and Persuasion, 195. 
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into an image.  Images, memory, and rhetoric are fundamentally intertwined.  Aristotle’s 
oft-quoted terms topoi and loci refer to “subject matter of dialectic” and “the places in 
which they were stored,” linking memory to the production of images.7  Imagining 
public address is possible, moreover, in the sense that a text becomes literally re-
imagined before the viewer’s eyes through representative symbolism.  Such expressive 
illustrations accompany the form of rhetorical invention eloquently defined by Francis 
Bacon as the effort to “draw forth or call before us that which may be pertinent to the 
purpose which we take into our consideration,” rather than something wholly new.8  For 
Bacon, rhetoric applied “Reason to Imagination for the better moving of the will,” and 
helps us understand how the iteration of a text invites a way of witnessing a familiar text 
in a new way.9  Visualization, as Longinus summarized in his work “On the Sublime,” 
arises when you “imagine you are actually seeing the subject of your description, and 
bring it before the eyes of your audience.”10  This study contributes to our understanding 
of how ceremonial repetition maintains and alters the traditional effect of vividly 
generating ideas attributed to ekphrasis:  words repeated merge with literal images of 
communal remembrance.  The public memory of the text is visualized within the context 
of repetition.  Formal recitations of public discourse are one way of imagining a text 
through performance.  Whence illustrated or conveyed visually, audiences have the 
                                                
7 Francis Yates, The Art of Memory, 46; According to Aristotle, memory resides in the same part of the 
soul “to which imagination belongs,” meaning that perceptions of the past do not arise without an 
accompanying image.  Aristotle quoted in Richard Sorabji, Aristotle on Memory, 49. 
8 Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, in Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg (eds), The 
Rhetorical Tradition:  Readings from Classical Times to the Present, Second Edition (Boston and New 
York:  Bedford/St.Martin’s, 2001), 740. 
9 Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, 741. 
10 Longinus [trans. Penelope Murray and T.S. Dorsch], “On the Sublime,” as printed in Classical Literary 
Criticism (New York:  Penguin Books, 2000 [1965]), 133. 
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opportunity to reimagine a text through its formal or informal display.  Countless studies 
and theories of rhetoric, some previewed in the first chapter, describe the power of 
language with bringing a vivid image to an audience’s imagination.  This chapter 
considers a historical example of something different:  the epideictic visualization of 
public address through popular iconology. 
 The intersection between images and the representation of rhetorical texts carries 
a long history.  Thomas Nast’s 1868 print titled “Patience on a Monument” displayed the 
helpless condition of a black Union veteran against the cultural terrorism of post-Civil 
War racism.  The impact of displaying this social condition carries greater effect when 
viewers note that the man is clutching a copy of the Emancipation Proclamation.  In 
sight, the advancement of African American freedom is heretofore unfulfilled.11  Once 
thought instrumental to lifting the man’s condition and striking a blow to national 
slavery, Nast imagines Lincolns’ decree with a monument-sized list of abuses against 
African Americans that crystalizes a new norm of race relations.  Threats and dangers 
have replaced the promise of freedom.  Like the illustrations and monuments mentioned 
in the previous chapter, Nast’s imaging of the text participates in the process of re-
imagining the text by audiences—or illustrators—to embody new constitutive meaning.   
 Nast’s image is a dramatization of a text in the world.  However, visual 
journalism has played a unique role in documenting ceremonial repetition and widening 
the prospective audience witnessing the act—and meaning—of reading.  Unlike the 
deliberative judgment of a text in Nast’s imaging of the Emancipation Proclamation, 
                                                
11 “Patience on a Monument,” by Thomas Nast, printed in Harper’s Weekly, 10 October 1868, p.648. 
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illustrations provided distanced readers with what might be called a visual snapshot of 
repetition in progress.  The 1876 Fourth of July centennial celebration in Philadelphia 
provides a useful example of this practice. Richard Henry Lee’s public reading of the 
Declaration of Independence brought the written text into public form with significant 
symbolic overtures.  Lee, the grandson of Henry Lee—author of the 2 July 1776 
resolution of the Continental Congress that declared the American colonies independent 
states—was an ideal choice to personify the revered document a century later.  His 
rendering of the text exemplified the life of reading within the context of 
commemoration.  The illustration of his iteration, however, exemplified the importance 
of detail in bringing the act of recital into visual form through newspapers of the time 
[See Figure 1 and 2].   
 Readers of two different newspapers—Harper’s Weekly and London Illustrated 
News—were invited into the process of commemorating via the act of witnessing.  Susan 
Sontag’s observation on modern photography is equally applicable to the nineteenth-
century print illustration:  it is one of “the principal devices for experiencing something, 
for giving an appearance of participation.”12  The interaction of Jefferson’s original 
words and the public sentiment of the Reconstruction era is given an additional layer of 
extensional meaning in how the act of reading is publicly imagined in epideictic 
practice.  Yet, the presentation of Lee’s recital   is depicted through two visions of 
remembrance for respective readers.   
 
                                                
12 Susan Sontag, On Photography (New York:  Penguin Books, 1977), 10. 
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FIGURE 1  “The Centennial Fourth—Mr. Richard Henry Lee Reading the Declaration of Independence 
at Philadelphia.”  This image was published in Harper’s Weekly, 22 July 1876.13  Image courtesy of U.S. 
Library of Congress. 
 
 
FIGURE 2  “Richard Henry Lee reading the original document of the Declaration of Independence, on 
the Fourth of July 1876, at Philadelphia.”  This image was published in the London Illustrated News, 29 
July 1876.14  Image courtesy of U.S. Library of Congress. 
                                                
13 Frost, J. B., “The Centennial Fourth—Mr. Richard Henry Lee Reading the Declaration of Independence 
at Philadelphia.”  Wood Engraving. Harper’s Weekly, July 22, 1876.  From Library of Congress Prints and 
Photographs Division. Web. http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2006675556/ (accessed on 1 January 2012). 
14 “Richard Henry Lee reading the original document of the Declaration of Independence, on the Fourth of 
July, 1876, at Philadelphia.” Wood Engraving. London. Illustrated News of London, July 29, 1876. From 
Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division. Web. 
http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2006677412/ (accessed on 1 January 2012). 
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The London Illustrated News portrays a scene that includes a bi-racial audience of the 
text, accented with the decorous American flags to boot, a departure from the scene 
depicted in Harper’s Weekly that is comparatively confined and limited.  What does the 
Declaration of Independence mean after one hundred years?  Two images of the same 
event produce different images remembered for posterity. 
 In the remainder of this chapter, I present readers with a rich historical case study 
to bring greater detail and depth to the importance of visual images and ceremonial 
repetition.  Though the illustrations described above indicate ways of tracing common or 
contested themes between public discourse and its evaluation in sight, the analysis that 
follows suggests the stronger claim that print illustrations—when coupled with 
ceremonial repetition and discernable habits of seeing—can represent the public virtue 
emphasized in ceremonial repetition in a visual representation.  Though this analysis 
brings readers back to the mid-nineteenth century, the object of analysis is a departure 
from the methods of study in chapter three.  Whereas the Emancipation Proclamation is 
largely bereft of eloquence or discernable exaltations of public virtue, the text central to 
this chapter, George Washington’s 1796 Farewell Address, reads like a guide to public 
citizenship.  Unlike the August First celebrations wherein Douglass’s emphasis and 
characterization of the Emancipation Proclamation ebbed and flowed over time, the 
contest over the memory of Washington—and to large degree, his Farewell message—
was pulled in antithetical directions as Confederate and Union sensibilities sought to 
reconcile the meaning of the nation, the man, and the text. 
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THE PRESENCE OF WASHINGTON:  22 FEBRUARY 1862 
 For George Washington’s 1796 Farewell Address, no moment of rhetorical 
history was more enlivening than 22 February 1862.  In the U.S. capital the occasion 
mirrored a presidential inauguration, with both houses of Congress, the Supreme Court, 
various heads of departments, and military personnel cloistered in the House gallery to 
hear Secretary of the Senate John Forney’s recursive revival of George Washington’s 
1796 Farewell Address.15  Attention to Washington’s text wasn’t limited to Congress. 
Outside the pomp of this textual remembrance, recitals of Washington’s revered text 
commenced in a multitude of public gatherings throughout the Northern urban 
landscape.  In the Confederate capital of Richmond, moreover, February 22nd was a day 
of both remembrance of Washington and inauguration of nationalism.  Jefferson Davis 
and members of a new congress of the Confederate States of America took respective 
oaths beneath the gaze of the first Founding Father frozen in monumental bronze.  
Davis’s second inaugural speech likened the birth of Washington to the birth of a 
permanent Southern government:  “The date, the memory, and the purpose seem fitly 
associated,” David mused.16  After ten months of American Civil War the politics of 
commemoration reflected an endurance of what David Potter called the “riddle of 
pluribus or unum,” and the memory of Washington—as advocate of republican union 
and original revolutionary rebel—remained in flux under the pull of bilocation.17   
                                                
15 “Joint Sessions” of Congress are rare.  See:  The Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives, 
“Joint Meetings, Joint Session, and Inaugurations.” 
[http://clerk.house.gov/art_history/house_history/Joint_Meetings/jointAll.html] on 1 September 2010. 
16 Jefferson Davis, “Inaugural Address as Elected President, February 22, 1862,” in Jefferson Davis:  The 
Essential Writings, ed, William J. Cooper, Jr. (New York:  The Modern Library, 2004), 224. 
17 David Potter, The Impending Crisis, 1848-1861, 484.  
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 The ceremony in Richmond embraced symbolic continuity.18   In the city of his 
namesake, however, remembrance of Washington attempted to reconcile the contest of 
national identity with contrasting icons symbolic of a nation torn apart.  This rhetoric 
was both seen and heard.  Following the Chaplain’s prayer and Secretary Forney’s 
enlivening of the Farewell Address, the event closed with a presentation of “[f]lags 
captured from the Rebels to those in attendance.”19  Two weeks later Harper’s Weekly, 
an illustrated newspaper sympathetic to the Union cause reported the private event to the 
public in its traditional combination of political reporting and illustration.20  The story 
discussed the ceremonial repetition in detail, including the guests in attendance to the 
reading, and the closing cheers delivered to Union General George B. McClellan.  Upon 
leaving the Old House of Representatives, audience members perused the display of 
confiscated flags.  By sight, however, readers were introduced to the event through an 
illustration of flags derived from a sketch by Alfred R. Waud printed in Harper’s Weekly 
as “Rebel Flags in the Old House of Representatives in Washington”  [See Figures 3 and 
4].21  Such practices of declamation and display seem peculiar and historically remote 
                                                
18 Confederate efforts to forge continuity between the Founding Father and the new nation were 
substantial.  In addition to a speech by Jefferson Davis that explicitly tied the new nation to Washington’s 
birthday, Washington’s image was extended to the currency of the Southern republic, and also represented 
on the official emblem of the Confederate States of America.  See:  “Jefferson Davis’s Second Inaugural 
Address,” and George H. Shirk, “The Great Seal of the Confederacy.”  Chronicles of Oklahoma 
(Oklahoma Historical Society) 30 (1952):  309.  Accessed from 
[http://digital.library.okstate.edu/Chronicles/v030/v030p309pdf] on 10 April 2010. 
19 “Congress Washington's Birthday Celebration, Thursday, February 20, 1862” (Printed Order).  
Available through Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress, Series 1. General Correspondence, 
1833-1916 (Washington, D.C.:  American Memory Project [2000-2002]), http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/P?mal:2:./temp/~ammem_AxLG:: [accessed 1 September 2010]. 
20 Frank Luther Mott, A History of American Magazines:  1850-1865 (Cambridge, Massachusetts:  
Harvard University Press, 1938), 474.   
21 It is unclear how much authorial control Waud had in the design of “Rebel Flags.”  Though he is 
credited with providing the “sketch” for Harper’s Weekly, his work during the Civil War is also generally 
  121 
against contemporary norms of remembrance.  Yet, performances of the text speak to a 
larger effort to affirm ties between Washington and the Union cause, rebuke the 
legitimacy of the Confederacy, and fuse the memory of Washington’s Farewell Address 
with the symbolism of the American flag. 
 No moment during the Civil War—or perhaps even the nineteenth-century—
matched the amount of coordinated effort to preserving both an attachment to 
Washington and a national identity.  Events of 22 February 1862 accent the dueling 
frames of remembrance and also invite analysis on multiple rhetorical texts across 
different arguments, locals, and constituted publics.  To clarify the scope of this study, I 
focus on the interaction between ceremonial repetition and the accompanying image of 
confiscated flags distributed to the public.  The Harper’s Weekly image and the 
widespread nature of repetition invite a shared focus:  the illustration of confiscated flags 
publically displayed an image of remembrance representative of the common act of 
repetition.  Indeed, no photograph or daguerreotype of the moment exists.  As observers 
in the present we are in the same position as the reading public of 1862:  the Harper’s 
Weekly image constitutes the moment [See Figure 3 and 4].  The image doesn’t merely 
show the reality of the ceremony, but helps to “create” reality within a political 
context.22  The complexity of Civil War rhetoric is well represented in public address 
                                                                                                                                           
described as “providing the picture for the engravers’ tools.”  The extent to which his original sketch 
“Captured Flags in the O” and the final copy of “Rebel Flags” are by the same author remains uncertain.  
See:  Frederic E. Ray, Alfred R. Waud:  Civil War Artist (New York:  The Viking Press, 1974), 33 and 52. 
22 Kevin Michael DeLuca and Anne Teresa Demo suggest that the vital function of images is to constitute 
the dominant perceptions that organize perspectives of a debate.  See:  “Imaging Nature:  Watkins, 
Yosemite, and the Birth of Environmentalism.” Critical Studies in Media Communication 17 (2000): 242. 
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studies.23   Less clear is our understanding of how arguments of nationality took form in 
popular texts such as newsprint and widespread ceremonies of repetition.24  This 
investigation contributes a greater understanding of Civil War rhetoric by showing how 
ways of arguing for Union nationalism translated into commemorative ways of seeing 
Union nationalism in formal and popular texts alike.   
 Conventional wisdom credits Lincoln with rhetorically preserving the Union 
throughout the war by arguing for its permanence, as reflected in his reading of 
America’s founding era.25  Yet the variety of messages reinforcing this view of national 
identity has remained largely elusive for rhetorical scholars.26  How was the idea of 
                                                
23 For Lincoln’s Civil War public address in particular, one might consider the following:  Marie 
Hochmuth Nichols, “Lincoln’s First Inaugural,” in Methods of Rhetorical Criticism, a Twentieth Century 
Perspective, 2nd Edition (eds), Bernard Brock and Robert L. Scott (Detroit, Michigan:  Wayne State 
University Press, 1980), 73-114; Kirt Wilson, “The Paradox of Lincoln's Freedom Legacy:  The 
Emancipation Proclamation and the Meaning of Rhetorical Leadership.” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 3 
(2000): 15-32; Garry Wills, Lincoln at Gettysburg:  The Words That Remade America (New York:  Simon 
& Schuster), 1992 as well as Edwin Black, “Gettysburg and Silence.” Quarterly Journal of Speech (1994), 
21-36; Several analyses on the second inaugural can be found in a special issue of Communication Reports 
(Winter 1988).  See:  David Zarefsky, “Approaching Lincoln’s Second Inaugural Address,” 9-13; James 
Arnt Aune, “Lincoln and the American Sublime,” 14-19; Ronald H. Carpenter, “In Not-So-Trivial Pursuit 
of Rhetorical Wedges,” 20-25; Michael Leff, “Dimensions of Temporality in Lincoln’s Second 
Inaugural,” 26-31; Martha Solomon, “‘With Firmness in the Right’:  The Creation of Moral Hegemony in 
Lincoln’s Second Inaugural,” 32-37.  
24 François Furstenberg mentions the reading of the Farewell Address in 1862 but does not describe the 
presentation of flags as central to the commemoration.  See:  “Washington’s Farewell Address” in A New 
Literary History of America, eds, Greil Marcus and Werner Sollors  (Cambridge:  Harvard University 
Press, 2009), 122-126.  Essential scholarship on the politics of print messages includes:  Lester Olson, 
Benjamin Franklin’s Vision of American Community:  A Study in Rhetorical Iconology (Columbia, South 
Carolina:  The University of South Carolina Press), 2004; Stephen H. Browne, “‘Like Gorey Spectres’:  
Representing Evil in Theodore Weld’s American Slavery As It Is,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 80 (1994):  
277-292. 
25 Garry Wills, Lincoln at Gettysburg:  The Words That Remade America (New York:  Simon and 
Schuster), 1992; George Forgie, Patricide in the House Divided:  A Psychological Interpretation of 
Lincoln and His Age (New York:  Norton), 1979; for insight to the permanent Union thesis prior to 
Lincoln’s presidency, see:  Major Wilson, Space, Time, and Freedom:  The Quest for Nationality and the 
Irrepressible Conflict, 1815-1861 (Westport, CT:  Greenwood Press), 1974. 
26 For visual studies on the Civil War, see:  Judith Bookbinder and Shelia Gallagher (eds), First Hand:  
Civil War Era Drawings from the Becker Collection, (Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press), 2009; 
Mark E. Neely Jr. and Harold Holzer, The Union Image:  Popular Prints of the Civil War North (Chapel 
Hill, North Carolina:  The University of North Carolina Press), 2000; Kevin G. Barnhurst and John 
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Union commemorated—and visualized—in public display?  In the following essay, I 
argue that the context of contested identities and intersecting relations of speech and icon 
around Washington’s 130th birthday broadens our understanding as to how the military 
and rhetorical contest between Unionist and Confederate ideologies took form in popular 
texts and commemorations.  Through an analysis of public recitations of the Farewell 
Address and the visual illustration of flags in Harper’s Weekly, I suggest that part of the 
process of affirming Unionism in early 1862 was to visualize the public memory of 
Washington’s Farewell Address in an emblematic display of Civil War flags, an 
intersection of text and icon.27  “Rebel Flags” represents a visual artifact that unites the 
two most contested symbols of early Civil War rhetoric:  the memory of Washington and 
national banners.  More than a bridge between common topics, the illustration is a 
nineteenth-century artifact of what W. J. T. Mitchell has called an “imagetext,” or a 
“suturing” of discourse and icon.28  In the pages that follow, I elaborate on the 
implications of “Rebel Flags” as a ceremonial window commemorating the Farewell 
Address.  The image is significant for its hybrid quality:  the same logic of perpetual 
Unionism that permeated the memory of the Farewell Address and its widespread 
repetition in early 1862 seeps into the symbolic representation of flags in print form.  
                                                                                                                                           
Nerone, “Civic Picturing vs. Realist Photojournalism:  The Regime of Illustrated News, 1856-1901,” 
Design Issues 16 (Spring 2000):  65 
27 François Furstenberg mentions the original reading of the “Farewell Address” in 1862 but not the 
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Literary History of America, edited by Greil Marcus and Werner Sollors (Cambridge:  Harvard University 
Press, 2009), 122-126.  Previous scholarship on the politics of print messages include:  Lester Olson, 
Benjamin Franklin’s Vision of American Community:  A Study in Rhetorical Iconology (Columbia, South 
Carolina:  The University of South Carolina Press), 2004; Stephen H. Browne, “‘Like Gorey Spectres’:  
Representing Evil in Theodore Weld’s American Slavery As It Is,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 80 (1994):  
277-292. 
28 W. J. T. Mitchell, Picture Theory:  Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation (Chicago and London:  
The University of Chicago Press, 1994), 94. 
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Taken together, we see “Rebel Flags” not only as a display of contested emblems that 
visualizes Washington’s birthday, but more importantly as a visual mirror of the public 
memory of his Farewell Address.  
 To underscore the importance of the occasion, the illustration, and the 
implications of my above observations, I address the following points.  First, I provide 
readers with a broader sense of the Farewell Address and its contested history prior to 
the 1862 readings.  Second, I provide observations on the interrelations of discourse and 
icons, particularly the presumptions of Mitchell’s imagetext. Third, I address the 
distinctive public memory that predominated public and political messages regarding 
Washington’s farewell.   Next, I review the visual symbolism of flags during the Civil 
War, noting the enthymematic potentials of representing emblems in newsprint, and the 
journalistic norms of display that informed such practices.  Finally, I connect the 
memorializing of Washington throughout the public writ large to the aesthetic 
representation of flags in the Harper’s Weekly, arguing that a symbolic convergence of 
the Farewell Address and “Rebel Flags” is an imagetext that visualizes the ideology of 
perpetual Unionism in popular print while contributing to the extensional life for the 
Farewell Address in visual form.   
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FIGURE 3 “The Captured Flags in the O.”  This sketch was drawn by Alfred Randolph Waud, 1862.29 
 
FIGURE 4 “Rebel Flags In The Old House Of Representatives In Washington.”  The illustration of flags 
was printed with news of the commemorative reading of the Farwell Address in 1862.  The engraving was 
printed in Harper’s Weekly, 8 March 1862.  Image courtesy of harpersweek.com. 
 
                                                
29 Image courtesy of U.S. Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division.  Web. 
http://www.loc.gov/pictures/resource/ppmsca.21241/ (Accessed on 1 February 2013). 
  126 
SPEAKING, SEEING, AND REMEMBERING 
 Sight, memory, and rhetoric have been intrinsically intertwined since antiquity. 
Memory, Aristotle observed, resides in the same part of the soul “to which imagination 
belongs,” meaning that humans do not remember without also producing images.30  
Indeed, the range of scholarship confronting the intersection of speech and images is 
growing.  Lawrence Prelli’s volume Rhetorics of Display highlights the longstanding 
propensity of theorists such as Chaïm Perelman and Kenneth Burke to invoke 
metaphorical language of “presence,” or “terministic screens” to convey argumentative 
strategies through visual terminology.31  Lester Olson’s work on eighteenth-century 
iconology has expanded the modes in which we apply concepts of speech to visual 
artifacts:  Visual and verbal messages share what Olson calls “a commitment to use a 
community’s representational systems in endeavors to enlist the will of an audience.”32  
Our understanding of how words and images converge and affect one another has 
produced scholarship attentive to visual-verbal intersections.  “Rhetorical studies of 
display,” Prelli summarizes, includes “the verbal depiction of the visual and the visual 
depiction of the verbal.”33   
 The precise point at which verbal and visual messages intersect is not 
authoritatively certain.  Verbally capturing a visual experience seems impossible given 
                                                
30 Aristotle, “On Memory and Recollection,” in Aristotle on Memory, 2nd Edition, edited and translated by 
Richard Sorabji (Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press, 2004), 49. 
31 Lawrence Prelli, “Rhetorics of Display,” in Rhetorics of Display, ed, Prelli (Columbia:  The University 
of South Carolina Press, 2006), 7-12; Chäim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tytecha, The New Rhetoric:  
A Treatise on Argumentation (Notre Dame:  Notre Dame, Indiana, 2008 [1969], 116; Kenneth Burke, 
Language as Symbolic Action:  Essays on Life, Literature, and Method (Berkeley and Los Angeles:  The 
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32 Lester C. Olson, “Benjamin Franklin’s Pictorial Representations of the British Colonies in America:  A 
Study in Iconology” Quarterly Journal of Speech 73 (1987): 18. 
33 Prelli, “Rhetorics of Display,” 12. 
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the basic division of human senses.  At certain junctures, W. J. T. Mitchell has claimed, 
the intersection of visual and verbal messages fuse together and constitute meaning from 
one another.  He further stresses that the “fabric of signs” constituting a relation between 
image and speech is not determined with finality:  it is a variant process, depending on 
what he defines as “the precise nature of the weave, the relation of warp and woof.”34  
Mitchell’s foremost contribution to understanding the relational weaving of sight and 
speech resides in his term “imagetext.”  Simply stated, an imagetext occurs within 
“synthetic works (or concepts) that combine image and text.”35  This “narrative suturing 
of verbal and visual” happens, Mitchell claims, insomuch as texts work to “speak for (or 
to) the photographs,” while photos “exemplify, clarify, ground, and document the 
text.”36  Mitchell suggests the distinction between words and pictures is never as 
absolute as we might originally suspect.  Regardless, the imagetext remains a useful tool 
for both analyzing and expanding how visual and verbal texts are woven together.  As 
Robin E. Jensen has summarized, the utility of the imagetext is the overlapping nature in 
which we encounter messages:  a “text is usually accompanied by associative image, 
and, more often than not, text and images are presented together.”37   
 Though pre-dating the combination of image and text found in sophisticated print 
and video advertisements, “Rebel Flags” represents a new relational dimension of 
                                                
34 W.J.T. Mitchell, Iconology, 43. 
35 Mitchell’s use of this term is varied:  “I will employ the typographic convention of the slash to designate 
‘image/text’ as a problematic gap, cleavage, or rupture in representation.  The term ‘imagetext’ designates 
composite, synthetic works (or concepts) that combine image and text.  ‘Image-text’ with a hyphen 
designates relations of the visual and verbal.”  See:  Picture Theory, 89n9 (emphasis in original). 
36 Mitchell, Picture Theory, 94. 
37 Robin E. Jensen, “The Eating Disordered Lifestyle:  Imagetexts and the Performance of Similitude” 
Argumentation & Advocacy 42 (Summer 2005):  4. 
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imagetexts by virtue of the commemorative context from which it emerges.  The key to 
unlocking the importance of this illustration resides in the dual function of print 
journalism to both visualize the news and bring a vision of commemoration before the 
eyes in communal remembrance.  As Ned O’Gorman has noted, Aristotle’s conception 
of phantasia—which included processes of remembering, imagining, visualizing, and 
dreaming—provides an important vitality to the role of mental images in public 
discourse.38  Specifically O’Gorman claims that epideictic occasions are designed to 
provide “images of various and disparate values for public observation and, perhaps, 
deliberation.”39  In other words, discourse brings images into the public consciousness 
through epideictic commemoration.   
 “Rebel Flags,” by slight contrast, supplies to readers a viewpoint of common 
commemoration (repeating the Farewell Address) through the familiar public grammar 
of flags familiar to readers.  The suturing between image and text emerges not only from 
a simultaneous encounter between word and picture, but also from the display of flags 
visually representing commemoration of a text repeated.  The intersection of public 
remembrance and illustrated journalism, in other words, represents the dual function of 
“Rebel Flags” for the ceremonial observances two weeks prior.  The Harper’s Weekly 
rendering of flags in the Old House of Representatives publicized and altered a key 
symbol of nationality within the visual grammar of flags.  To grasp the importance of 
this symbolic arrangement and display, however, we must first account for the unique 
                                                
38 Ned O’Gorman, “Aristotle’s Phantasia in the Rhetoric:  Lexis, Appearance, and the Epideictic Function 
of Discourse.”  Philosophy and Rhetoric 38 (2005):  17 and 21. 
39 O’Gorman, “Aristotle’s Phantasia in the Rhetoric,” 34-35. 
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mode of remembering that “Rebel Flags” visualized.  Instead of depicting a moment 
removed from a reader’s experience, such as a distant battle or political skirmish, “Rebel 
Flags” displayed an event defined by substantial public participation around a common 
object:  Washington’s Farewell Address.  The imagetext is an ideal concept to account 
for the repetition of a text.  The mass iteration(s) of a text—such as the Farewell Address 
in 1862—was an opportunity to reimagine a text as public memory. It is important, 
however, to explore the larger detail of Washington’s text as an enduring document.  
Since both this chapter and the following study include the extensional life of 
Washington’s Farewell Address, a brief summary to its intricacies and resulting 
contestations of meaning is a helpful step preceding analysis. 
THE FAREWELL ADDRESS AS ENDURING TESTAMENT 
 George Washington’s Farewell Address is a powerful document of American 
political discourse, possessing enduring dexterity and applicability beyond its original 
context.  Given broad range of topics covered in the text, the Farewell Address has 
maintained relevance through its application to different debates and issues of national 
principle since first being published in Claypoole’s American Daily Advertiser on 19 
September 1796.  In this brief overview of the document, I highlight public reverence to 
Washington’s 1796 text as a political testament to his historical legacy, briefly explore 
the major themes of the text and resulting debates, and, finally, provide insight to the 
relevancy of Washington’s Farewell Address in the years leading up to the American 
Civil War and the orchestrated commemoration of 1862. 
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 Moses gave the Israelites Deuteronomy; Washington gave the Americans his 
‘Farewell Address.’  Following his death in 1799, this popular equation measured the 
impact of George Washington in the collective American mind.  Insomuch as citizens 
saw their revolutionary struggle as an effort to break free from the “bondage of Great 
Britain,” Washington was appropriately eulogized and admired as the “Moses of 
America.”40  The role of admired leader was nothing new.  Washington’s leadership pre-
dated American independence:  as leader of the Revolutionary Army, Constitutional 
Convention, and the first President, his role was wholly unique in the because he 
“presided over the dismantlement of the old order” and ensured a smooth transition to 
republican government, all the while becoming his “own successor.”41  The Farewell 
Address wasn’t only a conclusion to a presidency, but the finale of twenty years in 
which Washington was standing “at the helm of the ship of state.”42  The original era 
giving birth to American time had ceased.  Washington’s letter declaring his voluntary 
retirement to private life would explain how “The PEOPLE of the United States” should 
carry on. 
 Public reception to the Farewell Address mirrored religious devotion.  George 
Forgie explains the heightened attention resulted from textual intimacy:  here “the father 
was speaking personally.”43  Washington’s paternity was evident in both public and 
private veneration.  Following his death in 1799, one eulogist likened encounters with 
the text to mother’s milk for a child:  Of the Farewell Address, “Let the infant cherub 
                                                
40 Robert P. Hay, “George Washington:  American Moses,” America Quarterly 2 (1969): 781-782. 
41 Schwartz, George Washington:  The Making of an American Symbol (New York:  Free Press, 1987), 45. 
42 Joseph Ellis, Founding Brothers:  The Revolutionary Generation (New York:  Vintage Books, 2000), 
122. 
43 George Forgie, Patricide in the House Divided, 25. 
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suck its honey with his earliest sustenance.”44  Through public reception, the text was 
considered a founding document, nearly equal in importance to the Declaration of 
Independence and the Constitution.45  By writing his ideals for posterity instead of 
delivering a formal speech (as he did on other occasions), Washington participated in the 
eighteenth century tradition of leaving behind a “political testament,” or what Felix 
Gilbert defined as a “guide to those leaders who will come later.”46  Preserved as written 
text, the Farewell Address nonetheless satisfied immediate objectives of Washington’s 
political constraints while simultaneously articulating the essential principles to define 
the country’s future.  Through close reading and attentive observance, the Farewell 
Address became what Furstenburg has called a “civic text,” or a document that taught 
the public “the meaning of citizenship” and “a sense of mutual political obligation.”47   
 As various scholars of public address have demonstrated, Washington drew the 
lessons for future conduct from the controversies that defined his tenure in office. 
Campbell and Jamieson note that “Washington argued that during his tenure dangerous 
alliances had been avoided and the divisive party spirit diminished,” and from these 
lessons emerged “warnings against the spirit of faction and against permanent alliances 
with major European powers.”48  Foreign independence and domestic union are key 
                                                
44 Quoted in François Furstenberg, In the Name of the Father:  Washington’s Legacy, Slavery, and the 
Making of a Nation (New York:  Penguin Press, 2006), 43. 
45 George Forgie, Patricide in the House Divided, 25. 
46 Felix Gilbert, To the Farewell Address:  Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy (Princeton:  Princeton 
University Press, 1961), 100. 
47 Furstenburg, In the Name of the Father, 20. 
48 Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Presidents Creating the Presidency (Chicago:  
University of Chicago Press, 2008), 311; Joseph Ellis adds further detail to this point, summarizing how 
the four years between the major drafts of the Farewell Address held significance for Washington’s public 
career as partisan tones in Congress and the press criticized his presidency, including early American 
foreign policy:  the Proclamation of Neutrality and the Jay Treaty of 1794 and 1795 respectively.  See:  
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themes of political debate.  Indeed, the Farewell Address remained relevant because the 
“maxims of national conduct” were presented without explicit reference to the 
contingent issues facing Washington, giving the text a “testamentary power” across time 
and interpretation.49  Nineteenth and twentieth-century arguments on foreign policy and 
isolationism, for example, hinged on interpreting Washington’s warning of foreign 
alliances, and the question of whether he intended the United States to eventually 
achieve dominance in the world, or if the eighteenth-century warning against 
involvement abroad should be read literally divorced from its time and place.50   
 The myriad arguments woven into the Farewell Address—from public education, 
religion, and foreign alliances—are filtered through what Garry Wills has defined as the 
text’s “master theme” of national unity.51  Through children’s early education and 
political grooming showed attentive respect for the text, the memory and the document 
were eventually contested possessions.  For a short time, political commemoration 
sought to find middle ground between dueling national ideologies through the memory 
of Washington, particularly his Farewell Address.  Famed-orator Edward Everett’s 
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three-year tour on “The Character of Washington” from 1856-1859 paid close attention 
to the original 1796 text:  “Washington in the flesh is taken from us,” Everett repeated 
across multiple occasions, “… but his memory remains, and I say, let us [all national 
regions] hang to his memory.”52  Such motives were equally prevalent as Henry T. 
Tuckerman took initiative to forge a public holiday of the first president’s birthday.  The 
move arose as a means to promote “a unanimity of feeling and of rites, which shall fuse 
and mold into one pervasive emotion the divided hearts of the country.”53  Tuckerman 
and others remembered Washington as a “bond of union, a conciliating memory, and a 
glorious watchword,” who could heal spirits fractured in the tension of antebellum 
politics.54  Despite sectionalism, Michael Kammen has noted, “the Civil War was a 
stimulus to nationalism, both North and South,”55 which resulted in Washington’s image 
and memory often being applied to divergent endgames within single debates.   
 Could a memory of Washington survive the Civil War?  Paul Nagel has argued 
that the Civil War was clear proof that “American had never agreed upon a version of 
Union.”56  Instead, this “act of defiance” held an irreconcilable conflict wherein no “new 
Union” was produced, ushering in a “repudiation of the past,”57 or at least a repudiation 
that the meaning of the past could be applied with the same recognition among citizens.   
While the South generally emphasized Washington’s role as a leader of a revolution, the 
                                                
52 Edward Everett, “The Character of Washington,” excerpt taken from Ronald F. Reid and James F. 
Klumpp (eds), American Rhetorical Discourse, Third Edition (Long Grove, Illinois:  Waveland Press, 
2005), 424. 
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54 Ibid. 
55 Kammen, Mystic Chords of Memory, 88. 
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North emphasized Washington’s role in establishing government and forging national 
unity, which is especially evident, according to Spaulding and Garrity, in the embrace of 
the Farewell Address:  Washington’s parting words mark the transition in American life 
from revolution to “the republican virtues of industriousness, sobriety, and private 
virtue.”58  Insomuch as Northern arguments remembering the Founding Fathers sought 
to, in the words of Michael Kammen, “minimize genuinely revolutionary aspects of the 
American Revolution,”59 Washington’s ‘Farwell Address’ was an invaluable match with 
the politics of the Civil War:  a central Revolutionary figure advocating for political and 
sectional cohesion.60    
 Even as the debate on American Unionism persisted throughout the early and 
mid-nineteenth century, the memory of the Farewell Address remained a contested issue 
of regional possession.  Only 12 years prior to the 1862 commemorations, tensions arose 
on the Senate floor as Henry Clay proposed that the deliberative body appropriate 
Washington’s Farewell Address in its literal form.  As a copy of the Farewell Address 
went up for popular auction, Clay saw it fitting that the Senate intervene on behalf of the 
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relic’s enormous shared national value.  Washington’s preeminence in the national and 
political culture, Clay claimed, necessitated that the Senate, with its most fundamental 
instinct, act on its “feeling of attachment to [this] object[s], associated with the memory 
of those we venerate,” and bring discordant hearts together around the father of the 
country.61  Noting the “sounds of disunion and discord” reverberating through Congress, 
Clay saw no other document that would allay sectional tensions than the “truly parental 
advice” etched in Washington’s own hand.62  Clay’s remarks introducing the legislation 
did not mollify Southern Senators.   
 The response to Clay’s proposal is telling.  Senator Henry Foote of Mississippi, 
who would later serve in both Confederate Congresses, endorsed Clay’s resolution, but 
not without rescuing the South from any sense of condemnation in the mind of his 
colleagues.  As Foote quickly refuted, the union of Washington’s words was dear to the 
Southern confederacy and any talk of “agitation” can be traced to the North:  Whatever 
“geographical parties” exist, Foote claimed, they derived from “northern incendiaries 
and their traitorous allies (few in number I should hope) in one or two of the southern 
States.”  The “especial countrymen of Washington, the men of the South,” Foote 
continued, could not be pegged with disinterest in union.  Even more, he concluded, 
such boundless activities in the North indicate that purchasing a manuscript would not 
dampen aggressive activity:  “Political demagogues will still go on scheming and 
scheming, until their mischievous end shall be accomplished.”63   Passing Clay’s 
                                                
61 The Congressional Globe, Tuesday, January 24th, 1850, 226. 
62 Ibid. 
63 The Congressional Globe, Tuesday, January 24th, 1850, 227. 
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proposal was in the interest of the Union insomuch as it denounced the “real and only 
enemies of the Union,” who, Foote suggested, were Northern critics of Southern 
slavery.64  Perhaps the most surprising contribution of the debate on appropriating the 
tangible copy of the Farewell Address is the ambivalence of the future president of the 
Confederacy, Jefferson Davis. Davis understood the attraction of “authority” embodied 
in owning such a document.  He voiced protest, however, by stating his belief that “no 
benefit can result to the country, or to the people generally, from the owning of these 
sheets of manuscript.”65  Indeed, Davis’ lack of sentimental suasion provides compelling 
foreshadowing to the symbolic debate that would unfold in 1862: 
 I must be pardoned for a want of veneration for relics, or for symbols of faith in the faithful; nay 
 more, for saying that a devotion to men which extends to the inanimate objects connected with 
 [t]hem, is an extreme unworthy of our people.  We are utilitarians, and it is not in keeping with 
 what character to be led away by sentiment.66 
 
As multiple studies attest, the Civil War witnessed two divergent themes in the memory 
of George Washington.  While the South remembered Washington’s role as leader of the 
American Revolution, the North emphasized his role establishing a national government 
and his appeals to sectional unity.67   The Farewell Address resides between these two 
visions of Washington:  a revolutionary figure making the case of “the republican virtues 
of industriousness, sobriety, and private virtue,” all of which support the larger case for 
federal Unionism.68  For the commemoration of 1862, however, efforts were made to put 
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the sentiment of Unionism and the words of Washington on the lips of citizens across the 
Northern landscape.  No text was better suited to confront the meaning of division 
hanging over the public consciousness in 1862. 
REMEMBERING THE TEXT 
 The breadth and depth of literature on public memory studies demonstrates that 
rhetoric’s fourth canon is in the midst of a robust revival.69  Contemporary scholars 
define public memory as a “textual practice,” “expressive form” that is embodied in 
material substance, existing “in the world rather than in a person’s head.”70  Memories 
are made public as texts.  As the ongoing commemorative planning and performance of 
George Washington’s Farewell Address indicate, however, rhetorical texts are not only 
the vehicle by which communities remember, but in some circumstances are also a 
reflection of communal memory.  Or as Edward Casey has astutely claimed, “a public 
speech, meant for the moment, gets preserved despite its author’s intentions.”71  Instead 
of maintaining the traditional relationship of memory represented through speech, 
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commemorations in 1862 remind us that in some instances the speech itself is the 
memory of communal reflection.   
 Though recitations of the Farewell Address on Washington’s birthday throughout 
the 1850s, the 1862 commemoration exemplifies the ideological contest for perpetual 
Unionism that informed public remembrance of the text.72  Such sentiments echoed the 
rhetorical contest of the Civil War, represented poignantly in Lincoln’s public discourse.  
For Lincoln and other Northern politicians, knowing the intents of founders like 
Washington was the key strategy to winning the rhetorical contest for the United States.  
In his moving oration at Cooper Institute, Lincoln asked, “Could Washington himself 
speak, would he cast the blame of that sectionalism upon us, who sustain his policy, or 
upon you who repudiate it?”73  The First Inaugural Address further highlights an even 
more explicit rendering of this sentiment as Lincoln maintains that the American Union 
was “much older than the Constitution,” and by such principle, “perpetual.”74  For 
Lincoln and advocates of permanent Unionism, the Confederacy was illegal, not 
sovereign.  Followers of this mindset dared not even legitimate secession by name:  
according to Wills, Lincoln held that “[t]he states had not seceded since they could 
not.”75  From its inception as a public petition to its evolution in Congressional debate, 
and its iteration in both Congress and the public writ large, the memory of the Farewell 
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Address was framed as enduring affirmation of Washington’s Union and the irrelevance 
of the so-called Confederacy.   
 The original petition to repeat the Farewell Address for Washington’s birthday in 
1862 was submitted by Philadelphia Mayor Alexander Henry.  Henry’s appeal requested 
that the Congress and the country remember the importance of “Constitution and Union” 
as recognition of the ongoing “Great Rebellion” from the previous year.76  Reverting to 
Washington’s testament was a demonstration for “every loyal American citizen,” Henry 
claimed, a sentiment Congress maintained in its planning of the celebration. 77  In the 
U.S. House, Rep. John Crittenden (Unionist-KY) introduced the measure, claiming it 
“does not relate to politics at all,” but would “kindle the memory of [Washington] into 
the flame of patriotism” and “enable us the better to maintain and defend that great and 
free Government and Union which, under God, he established for us.”78  Senator 
Andrew Johnson (D-TN) voiced support in the Senate for “carrying out their [signers of 
the petition] prayer,” suggesting that reciting the text would allow citizens to “recur to 
those days which gave birth to the republic.”79  The Farewell Address—a final note in 
Washington’s long public career—would be a point of focus when a shared rationality of 
national identity was split at the root. 
 Repeating Washington’s Farewell Address was through and through a 
reaffirmation of perpetual Unionism.  Lincoln’s General Order of 18 February 1862—
                                                
76 The United States National Archives and Records Administration, “Memorial of the Mayor and Other 
Citizens of Philadelphia,” 31 January 1862, http://www.archives.gov/global-
pages/largerimage.html?i=/legislative/features/washington/images/philadelphia-
l.jpg&c=/legislative/features/washington/images/philadelphia.caption.html [Accessed on 10 April 2010]. 
77 Ibid. 
78 U.S. Congress. Congressional Globe. 1862. 37th Congress, 2nd Session, 726-727, and 738.   
79 See:  U.S. Congress. Congressional Globe. 1862. 37th Congress., 2nd Session, 738.   
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which directed that “extracts” of the text be recited at “every military post and at the 
head of the several regiments and corps of the Army”80—demonstrates how selective 
points of emphasis in the text reflect a commitment to national union.  Lincoln’s artful 
edit profiled Washington’s call to “confirm the attachment” of citizens to their country 
and the common interest and indispensability of the Union and its laws, while excising to 
silence mention of “Geographic discriminations,” or Washington’s well-known warning 
of political factions, giving the armed forces a reading of the Farewell Address that 
prized national Union without emphasizing the faults of regional or ideological 
divides.81   Chaplain Thomas Stockton’s prayer preceding the reading of the Farewell 
Address in Congress further crystalized this sentiment, appealing to “our southern 
brethren,” that they “soon lay down the arms which they ought never have taken up, and 
return to the common love which waits to embrace them.”82  Such iterations of the 
Farewell Address recognized the seceded states as acting out of bounds from 
Washington’s council, but not beyond the national community defined in the text:  “The 
Unity of Government which constitutes you one people,” as Washington wrote, was 
                                                
80 General Order No. 16, as printed in The War of the Rebellion:  A Compilation of the Official Records of 
the Union and Confederate Armies, Series 3, Volume 1, printed by the United States War Department 
(Washington, D.C.:  Government Printing Office, 1899), 892-893.  Accessed through “Making of 
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cgi?notisid=ANU4519-0122 [Accessed on 1 September 2010. 
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82 U.S. Congress. Congressional Globe. 1862. 37th Congress, 58.  
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invoked as a national ethos that was perpetually—even stubbornly—“dear to you” in 
remembrance.83   
 What began as a petition from Philadelphia citizens quickly morphed into a 
Congressional plan for remembrance, presidential war orders, and widespread 
participation.  Orders to convene mass observances of the Farewell Address reflect the 
practice of what William Riker calls “heresthetic,” or the “art of setting up situations” to 
support a significant purpose.84  To urge public remembrance of the Farewell Address in 
1862, Lincoln issued public orders through the nation’s newspapers.  In one order, 
Lincoln encouraged recital of the Farewell Address, “or a suitable part of it,” in both 
military and public settings.85  A subsequent proclamation called on citizens to 
“assemble in their customary places of meeting for public solemnities,” the principle 
feature which was the reading of the Farewell Address.  These recommendations met 
public results.  Multiple meetings (often within the same city) took form in an array of 
sites, such as city halls, churches, synagogues, and hospitals.  Citizens in Baltimore, 
Boston, Philadelphia, Providence, New York City, and San Francisco—just to name the 
major metropolitan areas—congregated to hear Washington’s text as the “principal 
                                                
83 George Washington, “Farewell Address,” in George Washington:  Writings, ed., John Rhodehamel 
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1862, pg 1; Plans to follow “the President’s proclamation” in time for observances of Washington’s 
Birthday were noted with detail in The Boston Herald, “Affairs About Home:  The Observance of 
Washington’s Birthday,” 22 February 1862, pg 4 [All Accessed through ProQuest Civil War Era]. 
  142 
feature” of remembrance.86  The value of the text was readily apparent and reflective of 
the Union’s permanence in the public imagination.  The San Francisco Bulletin claimed 
that reading the address meant a commitment to the “triumph of loyalty over treason … 
of the Constitution over insurrection,” as it urged readers to find guidance in the 
sacrosanct text:  “It reads like a magnificent chapter of prophecy.”87  Writing in 
hindsight, the New York Herald observed that commemoration of Washington’s birthday 
in 1862 was celebrated “as it was never before and as it never will be again”:  the day 
was one of “fighting for the ‘old Union’ inherited from ‘the Father of His Country,’” and 
“a day of jubilee in honor of recent glorious victories over a gigantic sectional 
rebellion.”88  Baltimore’s newspaper The Sun elaborated on the effect of remembrance, 
noting that “the memory of Washington still glows with effulgence on the alter of every 
patriot heart from the St. Lawrence to the Rio Grande, and from the Atlantic across plain 
and mountain to the peaceful shores of the Pacific.”89  Across the Northern landscape, 
the Farewell Address became a purposeful—and nearly unavoidable—vehicle for 
affirming the sentiment of American Unionism central to the memory of the text.  In the 
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process, local ceremonies brought Washington’s text into being from its otherwise 
amorphous existence as a written document.90   
 Like scattered religious denominations reciting a common prayer, 
commemorations were separated in space and time, but unified in common words.  
Repeating the Farewell Address was a way to not only access the memory of 
Washington, but to display a commitment to Unionism in the commemorative moment.  
Speaking through the mouths of Northern citizens, the Farewell Address was generically 
morphed from a political adieu to a formal rebuttal of Southern sovereignty.  The 
Farewell Address in 1862 was not neutrally performed in public space, but was a 
functional line to the past “reconstructed on the basis of the present.”91   
 From the public memory of the Farewell Address, I now turn to the 
commemorative imaging of Washington’s birthday in Harper’s Weekly.  Like most 
national newspapers, Harper’s Weekly’s print story focuses almost exclusively on the 
recitation of Washington’s text.  “The galleries were densely crowded,” and Secretary of 
the Senate John Forney revived the Farewell Address “in a clear, loud voice,” the paper 
noted.92  Within the confines of Harper’s Weekly, “Rebel Flags” remains an image 
seemingly disconnected from the content of the adjoining news story.  Placed within the 
larger commemorative context of public recitations that mimicked remembrance in the 
                                                
90 The New Orleans Daily Picayune charged Northern commemorators with ignoring the “appeal to 
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U.S. Congress, however, “Rebel Flags” remains our only visual artifact making the flag 
display public.  The illustration functioned beyond the traditional role of conveying 
information.  Instead, “Rebel Flags” represents a ceremonial frame for the dispersed 
publics of the Farewell Address.  In the remaining part of my analysis, I account for how 
a display of flags became apropos for an otherwise verbal occasion, and consider the 
implications and aesthetic design of “Rebel Flags” as an imagetext for publicly 
remembering—and visually affirming—Washington’s Union.   
A VISION OF COMMEMORATION 
 Flags were the essential mode of communicating public, political, and military 
allegiances throughout the Civil War.  Given the “watershed” moment of flags as 
popular cultural signifiers and the emerging popularity of illustrated journalism, scholars 
have noted the prevalence of a visual grammar of how flags participated in the public 
language of the time.93  The symbolic value of flags was nearly on par with speech itself.  
In an editorial printed in July 1861, Harper’s Weekly offered a translation of the 
American Stars and Stripes:  “Those stars speak to us of laws of equity as fixed as the 
eternal heavens, and those stripes, as they wave in the breeze, tell us of that mysterious 
breath which moves through men and nations that they may be born, not of the flesh, but 
of God.”94  Indeed, the presence of a flag amid split conceptions of nationality became 
the basis of contested and emotional conflict.  Upon removing the national flag at Fort 
Sumter, South Carolina Governor Pickens translated in speech what had been achieved 
                                                
93 Scot Guenter, The American Flag, 1777-1924 (London and Toronto:  Associated University Presses, 
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94 Quoted in Guenter, The American Flag, 1777-1924, 83. 
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in the symbolic swap of emblems:  “[W]e have lowered it [the Stars and Stripes] in 
humility before the Palmetto and Confederate flags.”95  
 Regardless of contested public attitude, flags are not self-evident in meaning.  As 
Robert Hariman and John Lucaites have clarified, emblems exist as “a powerful mode of 
definition and identification” and “iconic appeal.”96  To be realized, however, flags need 
to be “situated within the context of specific social types or signs of vernacular life” 
wherein they resonate as “a performance of the sociality that is ground of politics” and 
the reason for “taking up the banner of allegiance of the country.”97  As representative 
banners of national status, flags become visual arguments of inclusion or exclusion of an 
“imagined community.”98   In an age when flags were sewn by townspeople, blessed by 
clergy, and presented to soldiers upon departing for battle, issues of design and 
representation were compelling modes of visual argument, akin to what Cara Finnegan 
has called “image vernacular” reasoning, or a visual conclusion that is “context bound” 
and inferred through shared public understanding.99  To highlight the vernacular 
reasoning of flags as arguments, consider the example of the Confederate Stars and Bars 
emblem.  The original Stars and Bars design imitated the American flag, reducing both 
stripes—from 13 to three—and the number of stars representing states—from 34 to 
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seven—inside a traditional blue canton.100  Whence removed, Southern stars gave way to 
a new vision of sovereignty, “the death of the old union,” and a maintenance of what the 
New Orleans Commercial Bulletin called the “American character” of the new emblem 
(and country.)101  Through unspoken deduction, national identity was widely interpreted 
through seeing a familiar design in a new flag.  Under these constraints and norms of 
seeing, the Confederate flag was, in the words of Robert Bonner, “visual evidence of 
treason” to Union sensibilities, and a jealously prized mark of valor if captured and 
returned to Union hands.102 
 Possession of another’s flag was both a physical and rhetorical process.  The 
emergence of illustrated journalism and the visual associations of flags during the Civil 
War made for an ideal environment to cultivate a habit of reading events through the 
display of emblems by which citizens could “see what war looked like.”103  The 
“breaking news story was the illustration of war,” as distant events were now available 
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for public witnessing.104  Like the political language of the day, the most prominent 
means through which Harper’s Weekly conveyed public happenings was in the visual 
grammar of flags.105   By 1865, the North American Review called Harper’s Weekly 
“one of the most powerful organs of public opinion” with “vast circulation” built around 
the “excellence of illustrations” and news coverage.106  The enthymematic mode of 
reasoning that allowed citizens to identify national allegiance based on the vexillogic 
design of an emblem was inherited in the journalism norms that drew sizable public 
attention for illustrating distant military and political happenings.  “Rebel Flags” 
participates in the visual understanding of Civil War discourse by acting as a 
commemorative window to how the Farewell Address was displayed to the estimated 
100,000 readers of Harper’s Weekly.107  Absent an accompanying story, images showed 
viewers how to understand developing events outside one’s personal experience and 
provided a “vicarious experience of distant and important, people, places, and events.”108  
Reading about the president-elect raising a flag or the surrender of a Union army to a 
Confederate rival were expressed in terms of the vision of detailed flags in motion, 
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always reflecting the tensions and identities at stake in public events.109  Citizens read 
how various events played out in print columns, and were given images of such events 
through the presentation of contested emblems.  Illustrated prints that defined the norms 
of Civil War journalism carried abundant meaning while exercising the conventions of 
visual symbolism.   
 More than a showcase of visual symbolism, however, the projection of images 
circulated through newsprint helped foster public knowledge.  As Elizabeth Eisenstein 
argued, printed material had a profound impact on uniting disparate individuals:  
“Printed materials encouraged silent adherence to causes who advocates could not be 
located in any one parish and who addressed an invisible public from afar.”110  Reading 
a newspaper, Benedict Anderson posited, was akin to participating in a “mass 
ceremony” before a multitude of identical and anonymous co-participants.111  Moreover, 
unlike stories that invited the reading public to witness a visual scene of remote distance 
and circumstance, “Rebel Flags” visualized a commemorative moment repeated across 
time and space, a moment readers could relate to and, given the widespread nature of 
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public readings, likely did actively take part in 22 February 1862.  The image is both a 
visual bookend to the act of reading the Farewell Address, and a public reference to the 
occasion, creating a “vicarious experience” of sight:  the immediate scene brought before 
the eyes of multitudinous and dispersed viewers.  As television spectacles possess a 
“unique capacity to deploy images as constructors of texts,” and to “crystalize [the] 
meaning” of public events, so too nineteenth century illustrated journalism was the 
means of constituting a public display of distant moments.112  With the Farewell 
Address, publics enacted a way of reading together across space.  With “Rebel Flags,” 
Harper’s Weekly provided a way of seeing the occasion together through the common 
visual grammar of flags, bridging distant commemorative contexts.   
 Categorizing “Rebel Flags” as an imagetext acknowledges the relationship 
between repeating a text and visualizing a common reference between speech and icon.  
In the final section of analysis, I bridge my previous argument on the public memory of 
Washington’s Farewell Address with what I consider the intersecting visual argument of 
perpetual union in “Rebel Flags.”  As the vision of shared commemoration, “Rebel 
Flags” constitutes a common logic between the memory of the Farewell Address and the 
related display of national emblems.  To read one text alone is to lose the woven nature 
of visual and verbal argument. 
VISUALIZING THE FAREWELL ADDRESS  
 Like the commemorative reading of the Farewell Address itself, “Rebel Flags in 
the Old House of Representatives” resides on a plane of visual contrast.  In the context 
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of jealous possession of contested emblems, the image speaks to the Union’s military 
progress.113  The frame of the image amplifies this potential.  Viewers experience only a 
single corner of a large room showing a crowd of formally dressed sailors, soldiers, and 
distinguished guests mingling among fifteen vertically hoisted flags dispersed amid the 
room’s Greek revival columns.  Aside from one flag representing the Stars and Stripes, 
other emblems represent only a sample of the victories displaying the symbolic advance 
of U.S. forces in their contest with the Confederacy.  By numbers alone, the image 
invites the conclusion that Union forces have advanced against Southern rebellion with 
recurring success, turning readers of a newspaper into witnesses of Union progress.  The 
magic of the image, however, resides in more than numerical contrast.   
 Based on the position and detail represented, the American flag is positioned as 
the primary object of the illustration, a surprising point of focus given both the lack of 
explanation in the adjoining story and the seemingly straightforward title highlighting 
“Rebel Flags.”  The U.S. flag is the organizing principle of the illustration, functioning 
as the focal point and defining the plane of clarity and ambiguity:  objects in the 
forefront are depicted in detail, while similar objects positioned away from the flag are 
less defined.  Six hoisted flags in the back right of the image, for instance, stand as limp 
ambiguous fixtures with marginal visual resonance.  Though symbolic of some national 
identity, they are visually drained of recognition.   Aside from the illustration’s title, we 
can only presume they are Confederate flags of some sort, but have little details save the 
minimal appearance of stars to infer their function or significance.  Such ambiguity runs 
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contrary to the prevailing norm of illustrations that, more often than not, displayed what 
Harry Katz called an “accurate” drawing of political events.114  Kevin Barnhurst and 
John Nerone further note a distinction between “sketches” and “fine drawings” 
indicative of Civil War newsprints, the former defined by “irregular shading” and “deep 
shadow[s],” and the latter defined by “precise tonal shading and perspective” and 
“greater detail and surface finish.”115  “Rebel Flags” is distinctive, then, for embodying 
two stylistic norms simultaneously, despite the newspaper’s previous adherence to the 
expectation of clear definition in several previous images of flags, regardless of what 
regional identity, scene, or distance was in question.116  Insofar as the imaging of this 
commemoration is concerned, accuracy was a convention, not a requirement. 
The schema of clarity and ambiguity is further reinforced with the emblems 
between the Stars and Stripes and the flags in the back right corner.  While one flag left 
of the statue resembles a Confederate Stars and Bars, the two unfurled banners to the 
right of the statue remain unclear, being either national flags or regimental Union Jack 
emblems, represented with blue fields and starry cantons.  The larger design of the 
image is pulled together with the flag displaying palmetto trees and stars next to the 
Confederate Stars and Bars.  This emblem, the second largest featured in “Rebel Flags,” 
creates a confusing blend of icons not commonly associated with Confederate icons.  
Based on the timing of the occasion and the recently completed military campaigns, 
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however, this flag most closely represents the Fort Walker flag confiscated from battles 
along Port Royal and other skirmishes along the South Carolina coast in November 
1861.  The inclusion of the Fort Walker flag indicates two important points to clarifying 
the purpose of flags in this space.  First, the flag’s distinctive design—two palmettos, 
stars, stripes, and a single crescent moon—has been altered in illustration.  In a quiet 
change, the illustration depicts the flag’s stars in a cup below instead of an arc above 
other emblems, reversing the arrangement of the original design.117  The depiction of the 
Fort Walker flag continues a more nuanced story of ambiguity defined in this public 
image.  This flag acts as a bridge between the sharp focus around the Stars and Stripes 
that slowly recedes to first pell-mell symbolism, then shadowy forms that wash symbolic 
identity altogether.  Once visual declarations of sovereignty, these flags are displayed as 
limp banners of vague substance.   The inclusion of the Fort Walker flag highlights the 
importance of other banners in its proximity, particularly the American Stars and Stripes.  
Indeed, the answer as to why the Stars and Stripes plays a prominent role here is 
uncovered in the regular transmissions of Navy officers throughout military 
engagements.  Flag Officer Samuel Du Pont’s correspondences to Gideon Welles and 
the Navy Department indicate the symbolic significance of Port Royal and the flags 
associated with its victory.  In a memo dated 8 November 1861, Du Pont informed 
Welles, “The bearer of these dispatches will have the honor to carry with him the 
captured flags,” adding a postscript that the messenger also carries the “first American 
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ensign raised up the soil of South Carolina since the rebellion broke out.”118  An article 
featured in the Richmond Daily Dispatch eleven days later adds further detail on the 
capture of flags noting that “trophies from Port Royal” are now “displayed at the Navy 
Department,” adding:   
One is a South Carolina State flag, another a flag of the rebel Confederacy, and the other the Stars 
and Stripes that was first set upon the soil of South Carolina since the rebellion.  These trophies 
attract a great dead [sic] of attention, coming as they do from South Carolina, the fomenter of all 
our domestic difficulties.  They are more highly prized than if they had been brought from any 
other of the rebel States.119 
 
The prominence of the Stars and Stripes in the Harper’s Weekly illustration mimics the 
vaulted esteem of the flag following the capture of Confederate forts.  This flag is more 
than a center of clarity in the midst of surrounding ambiguity; it is representative of the 
centrality of Union and the symbolic rescue of American nationality in the midst of 
Confederate icons.  Sailors in the illustration carefully support and unfurl the cloth, 
ensuring its does not touch the ground, while visitors across the room attend its display 
from afar.  Men and women turn their heads, a young boy salutes, and, indicating the 
locale in the Old House of Representatives, Carlo Franzoni’s marble statue of Clio the 
Greek muse of history observes the contrast of national icons.  Like the Harper’s Weekly 
image, she sketches the day’s happening—and the centrality of Union—for posterity.120   
                                                
118 Samuel Francis DuPont, “Letter from Samuel Francis DuPont to Gideon Welles, November 8, 1861,” 
in Official Dispatches and Letters of Rear Admiral Du Pont, U.S. Navy, 1846-1848, 1861-1863 
(Wilmington, DE:  Press of Ferris Bros. Printers, 1883), 52.  Retrieved from, 
http://Solomon.cwld.alexanderstreet.com/cgi-bin-asp/philo/cwld/getdoc.pl?S148-D009 [Accessed on 26 
October 2011]. 
119 Richmond Daily Dispatch, “Important from Washington—Two Millions Dollars Worth of Cotton 
Seized at Beufort—South Carolinian Professing Loyalty to the Federal Government,” 19 November 1861.  
Accessed through the online database overseen by the University of Richmond, available at, 
http://dlxs.richmond.edu [Accessed on 25 October 2011]. 
120 The Office of the Clerk, The U.S. House of Representatives, “Art & History:  Splendid Hall,” accessed 
from [http://clerk.house.gov/art_history/art_artifacts/virtual_tours/ 
splendid_hall/index.html] on 15 March 2010. 
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 The combined presence of Union and Confederate icons is reconciled with 
varying degrees of emphasis between clarity and ambiguity.  For audiences conditioned 
to seeing flags as enthymematic icons of identity in physical and print form alike, the 
choice between clarity and obscurity minimizes the embodied presence of the 
Confederate States of America, rendering its flags at best indistinguishable and at worst 
arbitrary.  Confederate nationality in this image is lost in uncertainty.  The meaning of 
American nationality is clear, reclaimed, and, given the visual relationship of stars and 
states in the canton, unchanged since the South’s supposed secession.  This vision of 
national wholeness in the print both previews and extends Lincoln’s thesis on the 
Union’s permanency in visual form.  As a final consideration, this analysis shifts to the 
illustration’s relationship to the act of visualizing the repetition of the Farewell Address. 
 President Lincoln did not attend the commemoration of Washington’s 130th 
birthday in 1862, as he was mourning the recent death of his son, Willie.  We cannot 
know what Lincoln would have said to mark the occasion.  However, his executive 
orders and proclamation indicate awareness of the occasion’s importance in placing the 
memory of Washington in favor of Union victory.  Lincoln’s War Order of 23 January 
1862, for instance, called on a “general movement of the Land and Naval forces” against 
“insurgent forces” to commence on 22 February 1862.121  Demonstrating further 
awareness of Washington’s birthday—and the impact of visual possession—Lincoln 
issued a second order to Congress in the midst of its official planning, submitting that: 
 
                                                
121 Lincoln, Speeches and Writings, 1859-1865 (New York:  Library of America, 1989), 303. 
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 On the 22nd of February, in the Hall of the House of Representatives, immediately after the 
 Farewell Address of George Washington shall have been read, the rebel flags lately captured by 
 the United States forces, shall be presented to Congress by the Adjutant General, and disposed of 
 as Congress may direct.122 
 
Though members of Congress objected to the display and even proposed additional texts 
to be read in order to undercut the Confederacy, Lincoln—and by extension, the 
public—had a preconceived notion of pairing of the Farewell Address with captured 
flags well before anyone recited, “Friends and Fellow Citizens” with a common voice.123   
 By visually sidestepping the oral reading of the Farewell Address detailed in 
coverage of the event, Harper’s Weekly brought the occasion of repetition into being 
through a visual emphasis on the American flag.  The significance of this common 
vision is evident in its seemingly ordinary display amid icons of secession.  All 
customary symbols in the Stars and Stripes indicate no change in national identity since 
the secession effort of 1860-1861.  Woden Teachout has astutely noted how the Stars 
and Stripes was open to interpretative changes at the outset of the Civil War, as 
abolitionist groups excluded stars of the Confederacy, and proposed a vision of 
                                                
122 Lincoln’s “Order Respecting the Presentation of Rebel Flags” appear in The New York Herald, 11 
February 1862, pg 5; the order was also read in Congress and printed in:  U.S. Congress, Congressional 
Globe. 1862. 37th Congress, 2nd Session, 911. 
123 Rep. Owen Lovejoy (R-IL) suggested to the planning committee that the Declaration of Independence 
be read alongside the Farewell Address.  This motion was briefly considered and wisely rejected. See:  
U.S. Congress, Congressional Globe. 1862. 37th Congress, 2nd Session, 835; For the additional context of 
the decision to privilege one and forget the other, see footnote 57 of this chapter; A last-minute appeal to 
not display confiscated flags as part of the ceremony commenced in the U.S. House of Representatives on 
21 February 1862.  This controversy made for interesting debate, but proved ineffective to changing the 
original plans.  See:  U.S. Congress, Congressional Globe. 1862. 37th Congress, 2nd Session, 912-914; In 
strange manner, the New York Times editorialized that Congress made the right decision in not presenting 
the flags.  The paper, it seems, rushed to judgment in assuming the debate equated to removing flags from 
the ceremony.  Lincoln’s order to display flags commenced as planned.  Of note, the paper proclaimed, 
“We want them not hung up among the trophies of the old and glorious wars.  Better to let them rot as the 
memory of the wicked whose cause they symbolize will rot.  Let there be no memorial to keep alive in 
men’s memories the Nameless Crime [secession].”  See:  “Congress and the Rebel Flag,” New York Times, 
24 February 1862, pg 4 [Accessed through ProQuest Historical Newspapers]. 
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nationality absent the seceded states.124  Neither Confederate nor abolitionist efforts to 
challenge the original Union is incorporated into the design of “Rebel Flags.”  What at 
first appears to be a display of size or proportion is the visualization and remembrance of 
the Farewell Address via contested emblems in common space.  In similar fashion to the 
Farewell Address in the Congress and the country, “Rebel Flags” embraces the theme of 
perpetual unionism.  It visualizes the moment of remembering a text while at the same 
time reflecting the dominant logic of how the text was remembered.  “Rebel Flags,” in 
other words, is not a complementary expression removed from the Farewell Address, but 
is instead the visual display of how the Farewell Address was remembered, ignoring 
Southern sovereignty and reifying a permanent Union through an image of the 
unadulterated Stars and Stripes.    
 The expressed subject of “Rebel Flags” is subverted on two levels that exemplify 
its function as an imagetext.  First, the title paired with the illustration betrays any real 
interest in rebel flags within the norms of illustrated journalism.  Ambiguity hangs over 
Confederate icons like a shadow, keeping confiscated flags at bay from the aesthetic 
clarity of the Stars and Stripes.  The focus on flags is seemingly misapplied:  the article 
emphasizes the recital of the Farewell Address as the event most easily identifiable to 
readers in the public.  As the representative image of remembering the Farewell Address 
in 1862, however, the illustration envisions a moment of remembrance and, in this 
                                                
124. Woden Teachout, Capture the Flag:  A Political History of American Patriotism (New York:  Basic 
Books, 2009), 87; Lowance reminds us that calls for secession were not isolated to the South, but included 
abolitionists like William Lloyd Garrison, who advocated the North’s break from the South as a means of 
national purification.  See:  Lowance, “The Abolitionist Crusade,” in A House Divided:  The Antebellum 
Slavery Debates in America, 1776-1865, ed, Mason Lowance (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 
2003), 328. 
  157 
regard, clarifies its subject:  it visualizes the memory of Washington’s Union prevalent 
in and around the historical context.  By way of its close association to reciting the 
Farewell Address, “Rebel Flags” represents an imagetext of pro-Union ideology, fusing 
the symbolic associations of Washington’s text with the American flag, inviting the 
memory of the text to be read, understood, and clarified in terms of the iconic rendering.  
Washington’s words, like the flag’s enthymematic disposition in “Rebel Flags,” affirm 
the South’s place in an ideal of permanent Union, even as protests of secession are 
muted—or made invisible—to the public imagination. 
CONCLUSION 
 Lincoln won the rhetorical contest of national identity with arguments of the 
Union’s permanence.  As this study has shown, Lincoln’s forensic appeals to history 
were also translated into popular form through public commemoration and the visual 
display of icons in illustrated print.  Prior to the commemoration in Congress, Rep. 
Edward Haight (D-NY) urged Lincoln to present the Farewell Address again to the 
public, claiming the country was “vindicating its nationality by putting its flag [sic] 
insulted flag back where Washington left it.”125  The rhetorical dynamics between 
Congressional commemoration, public participation, and the visualization of 
remembrance in Harper’s Weekly fulfilled Haight’s request more than he could have 
dreamed.  Though “Rebel Flags in the Old House of Representatives” never ascended to 
public prominence as Civil War iconology, its significance resides in its seemingly 
                                                
125. “Edward Haight to Abraham Lincoln, Monday, February 17th, 1862,” available through Abraham 
Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress, Series 1. General Correspondence, 1833-1916 (Washington, 
D.C.:  American Memory Project [2000-2002]), 
http://memory.loc.gov/mss/mal/mal1/145/1456500/001.jpg [accessed15 March 2010]. 
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ordinary representation of commemorative space.  Choices of focus and display reveal 
the multiple currents by which the ideology of perpetual Union was translated from 
political discourse to the commemorative vision of the Farewell Address via the ways of 
seeing flag symbolism in the early 1860s.      
 As public memory, the Farewell Address was a powerful statement easily 
matched to the concerns of pro-Union politicians and citizens.  The imagetext of “Rebel 
Flags,” however, reminds us that the application of a speech extends beyond its verbal 
iterations and reiterations.  At the intersection of ceremonial repetition and a culture 
immersed in illustrated icons, “Rebel Flags” impels us to further examine ways in which 
repetition of discourse might be enlivened by an adjoining imagetext, should we know 
where to look for it.  As future studies consider the overlay between norms of 
remembering and ways of seeing, we may find that the memory of texts—particularly 
those resuscitated by repetition—become visibly charged through adjoining symbolic 
expressions in their political context.  As analysis of the exceptional moment following 
February 1862 demonstrates, “Rebel Flags” enhances our understanding of how the 
logic of Unionism was enlivened through national performance and associative visual 
grammars.  This symbolic weaving of speech and icons in the politically charged winter 
of 1862 ensured that the Farewell Address was translated into sight, and given a deep 
breath in a long, contested life. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
MEMORY AS DISPLAY, RECOLLECTION AS PALIMPSEST:   
REPETITION OF THE FAREWELL ADDRESS IN THE U.S. SENATE 
 
“Read in accordance with resolution of the Senate by 
(signed) J. B. Foraker, Feb.22nd 1900.” 
—First entry in the Senate’s chronicle of reading George Washington’s Farewell Address1 
 
“Tradition is the living faith of the dead, traditionalism is the dead faith of the living.” 
—Jaroslav Pelikan, The Vindication of Tradition. 
INTRODUCTION:  REPETITION IN ISOLATION 
“Read according to custom and in pursuance of an order of the Senate, by designation of the Vice 
President, Calvin Coolidge, this 22nd day of February 1923,  
(signed) Carter Glass, Virginia.” 
 The third week of February brings the commemorative performance of George 
Washington’s Farewell Address to the U.S. Senate.  The occasion marks the first 
president’s birthday.  In terms of conventional public memorializing, the display appears 
to be all for naught:  a solitary speaker recites the Farewell Address to a nearly vacant 
Senate chamber while printed copies of the text sit atop unattended desks.2  Clocked at 
nearly one hour, the ritual is challenging for even the most accomplished speakers.3  
                                                
1 United States Senate, Office of the Secretary, “Farewell Address Notebook,” from 
[http://senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Washingtons_Farewell_Address.htm] on 10 April 2010.  
All additional entries found here unless noted otherwise. 
2 “Rows of unoccupied desks” and sparse crowds “had no effect on the fleet execution of the oration,” 
according to Roll Call, “George Just Doesn’t Draw the Crowds.” February 21st, 1985, n. pag; by 1988 the 
trend was clear when the Senator reading Washington’s words “gave the traditional reading of … [the] 
farewell address to a nearly empty Senate chamber.” See:  New York Times, “Washington’s Words Echo 
Through Senate.” February 16th, 1988. 
3 The Senate’s website states the following on the length of the ritual’s proceedings: “In 1985, Florida 
Senator Paula Hawkins tore through the text in a record-setting 39 minutes, while in 1962, West Virginia 
Senator Jennings Randolph, savoring each word, consumed 68 minutes.”  See:  United States Senate 
Webpage, “Washington’s Farewell Address,” 
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Senators begin smoothly—even confidently—but eventually succumb to the paragraph-
long sentences that constitute the text’s typographic style.4  As the speaker rounds his or 
her way past Washington’s praise of union, warning of factional parties, and advice on 
the tenets of public virtue, the task is finally expended and relief comes in the form of a 
well-deserved quaff of water.  The text has been recited and the ritual is complete—or so 
it seems.  In the Senate cloakroom, outside of the view of C-SPAN cameras, a second 
dimension of remembrance begins.  Engaging a new text, the Senator scrawls his or her 
name and personal response to the Farewell Address in a leather-bound notebook, 
adding a new page to an ongoing chronicle of prior speakers dating back to 1900.  Alone 
again, our Senator has concluded commemoration of George Washington’s birthday in 
the deliberative body of the U.S. Congress.  Both the Farewell Address and the chronicle 
of responses are retired until the perennial cycle commences the following February. 
 The Senate’s commemorative ritual is as unorthodox in commemorative form as 
it is overlooked in public observation.  Scholars have either ignored a systematic account 
of the ritual, or falsely labeled the act as discontinued—testimony, perhaps, to its 
seemingly irrelevant public status.5  The unconventionality of the ritual and its elusive 
                                                                                                                                           
[http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Washingtons_Farewell_Address.htm].  Accessed on 
10 April 2010. 
4 On the artistry of Washington’s “complex style,” see:  Michael J. Hosteletler, “Washington’s Farewell 
Address:  Distance as Bane and Blessing.”  Rhetoric & Public Affairs 5 (2002), 396. 
5 To my knowledge, four respected scholars from various fields have made this false assertion.  As of this 
writing (2012), the ritual has been ongoing for well over one hundred years.  Michael Kammen falsely 
claimed, “the long-standing tradition of reading the entire Farewell Address out loud in the U.S. Senate on 
Washington’s birthday quietly vanished.”  Barry Schwartz wrote, “Every year we are reminded that the 
United States House and Senate no longer assemble for the annual reading of Washington’s Farewell 
Address.”  Finally, rhetorical scholars Stephen Lucas and Susan Zaeske suggested that the ‘Farewell’ 
“continued to be read in Congress each February 22 until the 1970s.”  See:  Kammen, “Some Patterns and 
Meanings of Memory Distortion in American History,” in Memory Distortion:  How Minds, Brains, and 
Societies Reconstruct the Past (ed), Daniel L Schacter (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1997), 
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public stature has made it almost appear unapproachable to investigation:  “Here, 
perhaps, I ought to stop.”  The Senate’s exercise seems to defy precepts of conventional 
commemoration:  a text is recited without a captive audience, then conjoined in the 
isolated expression of writing, both of which happen with perpetual regularity and 
cyclical fashion regardless of community involvement.  A written text is oralized; the act 
of speaking begets writing.  Unconventional as remembrance of Washington might be, 
the Senate’s ritual of recitation remains one of the most longstanding and relevant case 
studies of ceremonial repetition in American public discourse.  Unlocking its intricacies 
is an unavoidable obligation for this study, and a task, I will argue, that helps us further 
reconcile the question of how texts maintain, sustain, and evolve as artifacts of memory. 
 As the preceding chapters have illustrated, the life of reading takes different 
forms, and ceremonial repetition is an opportunity to expand, constrain, or reconstitute 
the meaning of a text, and re-imagine the words of others through collective 
remembrance.  Repetition alone, however, is not inherently conducive to a text’s 
extensional life:  words are publicly imagined in some way that positions texts to interact 
in public view.  The activity of reading defines this process. Texts, Giddens reminds us, 
emerge from a joint contribution, understood as “the concrete medium and outcome of a 
process of production, reflexively monitored by its author and reader.”6  Thus far, our 
exploration of ceremonial repetition has examined how texts have been woven into sites 
                                                                                                                                           
335; Schwartz, George Washington:  The Making of an American Symbol (New York:  The Free Press, 
1987), 198; Stephen Lucas and Susan Zaeske, “George Washington,” in Halford Ryan (ed), U.S. 
Presidents as Orators:  A Bio-Critical Sourcebook, (Westport, CT:  Greenwood Press, 1995), 11, 
emphasis mine.  
6 Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory:  Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social 
Analysis (Berkeley and Los Angeles:  University of California Press, 1979), 43. 
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of remembrance to interact with other messages as a means to alter public identity, 
shared history, and positions of subjectivity.  Specifically, this chapter examines the 
relationship between repetition and remembrance as a way to further scrutinize the 
process of speech becoming public memory.  By addressing the tensions inherent 
between forms of writing and speaking introduced by the Senate’s treatment of the 
Farewell Address, I seek to expand and clarify how we evaluate ceremonial repetition, 
and the tools by which we understand the transformation of a text via public 
performance. 
 Before we can unlock the tensions and modes of expression in the Senate’s ritual, 
we must first approach and reconcile the seemingly disjointed nature of the 
commemoration.  Like previous chapters of analysis, this study concerns the 
metaphrastic treatment of a text—a transformation from one form to another.  The 
Senate’s procedure of commemoration strikes an odd balance between the public display 
of the text and the private reflection on its meaning.  I argue that the Senate’s recitation 
of the Farewell Address constitutes a rare case wherein the distinctions between memory 
and recollection are separated in the act of commemoration.  Such a disjointed 
expression, I further argue, undermines the potential to constitute or reconstitute the 
extensional life for the Farewell Address in the Senate.  Arriving at this conclusion 
carries with it certain presumptions on public memory generally, and the effect of 
message forms specifically.  Delineating the role of memory from recollection dates 
back to Aristotle’s treatise De Memoria et Reminiscentia, and becomes a necessary way 
to frame the distinctive steps in both individual and public remembrance.  I do not 
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suggest that the Senate’s tradition of reciting the Farewell Address fails to recollect a 
memory of the text, but rather that the recollection, as it now occurs, is placed in a 
private, secluded, and interiorized form, distinguished from the otherwise public 
showing of its oral performance.  The Senate displays the initial point of remembrance 
while secluding the crucial ingredient of its meaning within the present context, 
effectively amounting to a thin display of the text and a thick—though hidden—claim to 
what it means.  Through this case study, I further support the contention that repetition 
alone cannot easily sustain the extensional life of a text as public memory. 
 The disjunction between memory and recollection that may or may not extend 
the constitutive life of a speech was not inherent in this ritual’s original inception.  The 
form of remembering Washington in the U.S. Senate has evolved into its current form 
from decades of practice, which comprises a slow disengagement with public 
ceremonies and embrace of therapeutic sensibilities.  Beyond a clearer sense of how the 
Farewell Address does or does not undergo alteration through repetition in the Senate, 
this study also expands our understanding of how social frameworks—a mainstay in 
public memory scholarship—influence the texture of commemoration, and how a lack of 
social framework might indicate a new ethic of remembrance that supports the presence 
of memory by oneself for oneself.   
 The overlapping historical and theoretical threads of this essay require a delicate 
approach.  In proposing my critical reading of the Senate’s ritual, I present my 
conclusions in the following manner.  First, I provide an overview on the relevant 
history and evolving dynamics of the Senate’s recitation of the Farewell Address.  
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Spanning more than a century, mouthing the words of Washington has remained the 
institution’s “oldster non-legislative ritual.”7  Second, I provide a theoretical orientation 
of public commemoration and the distinction between memory and recollection outlined 
by Aristotle and inherited by contemporary critics.  By honing the interplay between one 
text displayed (the Farewell Address), and another text concealed (the notebook of 
signatures), I argue that our best mode of understanding how the Senate remembers 
Washington’s text is found in Aristotle’s original distinction between memory and 
recollection.  Third, I present an analytical overview of reading Washington’s Farewell 
Address in the U.S. Senate, with particular interest in revealing the importance of 
rhetorical display, as well as the thematic evolution of the notebook, a depository of 
remembrance I call an institutional palimpsest.  From analysis of the recital display and 
written reflection, I conclude with relevant implications of the Senate’s use of the text, 
and a proposal for how the Senate may enrich future memory of the Farewell Address as 
productive ceremonial repetition.   
DELIBERATIVE EPIDEICTIC:  PERSONFYING WASHINGTON’S GHOST 
 
“Read pursuant to the standing order of the Senate at the request of Vice President Curtis—February 22, 
1933—(signed) Otis F. Glenn, Illinois.” 
 
 Congress was meant to argue.  A bulk of the U.S. Senate’s prescribed 
institutional protocol is to advise and consent on public law or government 
appointments.  In crucial cases, the upper house assumes a forensic perspective by ruling 
on articles of impeachment against the president.  Designed to deliberate or determine a 
                                                
7 Richard Baker, Traditions of the United States Senate (Washington, D.C.:  Senate Office of Printing and 
Document Services, 2007), 25. 
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past fact, the U.S. Senate is an unexpected place to encounter epideictic rhetoric.  Like 
most occasions in American public address, however, the annual reading of the 
Washington’s text arose from neither institutional obligation nor Constitutional 
provision.  The perpetual presence of Washington’s words in the deliberate chamber best 
resemble what Eric Hobsbawm has called an “invented tradition,” or a “process of 
formalization and ritualization, characterized by the past, if only by imposing 
repetition.”8  To suggest a ritual is invented is not inherently negative.  Hobsbawm noted 
that such rites are necessary when older practices are “not used or adapted.”9  Rituals are 
symbolic spaces, David Kertzer has noted, for our “social dependence” through a 
collective activity that may “serve political organizations by producing bonds of 
solidarity without requiring uniformity of belief.”10  Clifford Geertz’s study of rituals 
further supported these observations.  For Geertz, rituals—invented traditions 
specifically—provide a sense wherein “the world as lived and the world as imagined, 
fused under the agency of a single set of symbolic forms, turn out to be the same world,” 
and thus alter one’s perception of reality through “a form of social interaction.”11  
Rituals enact community norms for public view.  As Catherine Bell has noted, political 
rituals enact two essential functions:  the use of symbols to “depict a group of people as 
a coherent and ordered community based on shared values and goals,” and a 
                                                
8 Eric Hobsbawm, “Introduction:  Inventing Traditions,” in Eric Hobsbawm and Herence Ranger (eds), 
The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1983), 4. 
9 Hobsbawm, “Inventing Traditions,” 8. 
10 David Kertzer, Ritual, Politics, and Power, 68. 
11 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York:  Basic Books, Inc., 1973), 112 and 168. 
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demonstration—or “display”—of communal “values and goals” derived from “their 
iconicity with the perceived values and order of the cosmos.”12 
 In the realm of ritual, the Senate’s performance of the Farwell Address is a gem 
of rhetorical display.  The text is perpetually re-made anew in each performance, and 
isolated from other branches of government, thereby instilling a relationship across time, 
place, and people.  By taking on the norms of epideictic commemoration, the Senate has 
fashioned an occasion for comprehending a political collective wherein individual 
members may gain “understanding of its shared self as a community is created, 
experienced, and performed.”13  To gather around the text is an everlasting opportunity 
for speakers and listeners to reflect and re-dedicate themselves to common experiences 
and cultural memory for the future:  through a communal focus, “audience members 
share, live, and display their community.”14 
 How did the Farewell Address become the basis for sharing and experiencing 
political community in the Senate?  Prior to being the focal point of commemoration, the 
memory of Washington was a familiar ghost in the political arguments preceding the 
Civil War, particularly within the deliberative body.  In addition to Lincoln’s 
filiopietistic appeals in his address at Cooper Union, the name of Washington was 
equally essential in Congressional debates.  In 1859 Senator Andrew Johnson—who 
would become instrumental to organizing the 1862 commemoration of Washington’s 
birthday—speculated that the spirit of Washington would break the barriers of the grave 
                                                
12 Catherine Bell, Ritual:  Perspectives and Dimensions (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1997), 129. 
13 Condit, “The Functions of Epideictic,” 291. 
14 Condit, “The Functions of Epideictic,” 292. 
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if stirred by talk of disunion:  “the patriot soldier who sleeps in his honored grave will 
rise, shake off the habiliments of the tomb, and forbid the act.”15  One year later, 
Representative John Perry (R-ME) echoed a similar eerie premonition for the U.S. 
House of Representatives.  With precise detail, Perry illustrated the ghostly 
consequences should the bonds of American union dissolve: 
 We talk of disunion; and yet how can we do it without waking up the memories of the past?  
 Comes there not a voice from the sequestered shade of Mount Vernon, rolling over the waters of 
 the Potomac in trumpet tones, exclaiming:  ‘Stay the rude hand, already uplifted to disturb the 
 peaceful repose of the mighty dead and desecrate the quite home of the sleeping hero?’16 
 
Invocation of Washington’s spirit was a potent resource for political argument.  As a 
voice of immediate presence in the 1862 commemoration of Washington’s birthday, 
however, the U.S. Congress could claim the mantel of Washington’s words as their own, 
and display the distant voice and advocate for unconditional union in their immediate 
presence.   
 Andrew Johnson’s early advocacy of the resolution to recite the Farewell 
Address in 1862 provides further insight to the text’s function as commemorabilia.  To 
recite Washington’s parting message was a self-evident appeal.  “The memorial speaks 
for itself,” Johnson intoned on the Senate floor, further stating, “the times speak for 
themselves; and it does seem to me that we ought to show a willingness to recur to those 
days which gave birth to the Republic.”17  But what effect could repetition produce?  
Senator Hale, in an exchange with Johnson thought it better “to hang some public robber 
or shoot some cowardly office of the Army who has occasioned our defeats…to show 
                                                
15 Quoted in Paul C. Nagel, One Nation Indivisible:  The Union in American Thought:  1776-1861 (New 
York:  Oxford University Press), 1964, 187. 
16 Quoted in Paul C. Nagel, One Nation Indivisible, 230. 
17 Congressional Record. 37th Congress, February 11th, 1862, 738. 
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that there is vigor in the Government to deal with those that ought to be dealt with, 
[rather] than to indulge in such observances as this.”18  Yet, reciting the Farewell 
Address was a clear appeal to patriotic vigor within the occasion.  Personifying the 
Farewell Address in an official space such as the U.S. Capital utilized what Lawrence 
Prelli calls “selectively structured vantages points or perspectives” in bringing a text into 
being.19  The Farewell Address became a rhetoric of display, embodied—not merely 
invoked—within the walls of the U.S. Congress, giving listeners a limited sense—“a 
way of seeing”—how this reading of the Farewell Address was understood within its 
time.20  For the moment of disunion, I argued in the previous chapter, Washington’s 
Farewell Address contrasted the national rupture with the fatherly wish for union, and an 
effort to guilt the South to peacefully return to regional harmony. 
 Crisis prompted the personification of the text in 1862.  When the Senate 
embraced the Farewell Address twenty-six years later, the drama of display had shifted:  
Senators were now participants, not spectators, excluding other branches of government 
from ritual observance.  Beyond the situational changes to the ritual little is known about 
the organizing motive of the 1888 recitation.  Compared to the well-documented debates 
leading up to the 1862 reading, the repetition in 1888 was, by best available knowledge, 
a celebratory affair of praise rather than blame.  The Senate’s own accounting to the 
event positions the new reading arising from the deliberative body having “recalled the 
                                                
18 Congressional Record.  37th Congress, February 11th, 1862, 738. 
19 Lawrence Prelli, “Rhetorics of Display,” 14. 
20 Ibid. 
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ceremony of 1862” for the centennial of the Constitution.21  Scant details offer little 
certainty on the motive for recitation.  However, both the chief organizer and the general 
historical era lend insight to a constitutive sentiment that invited reunion rather than guilt 
of rebellion.    
 Shaped by an economic revolution and a growing perception of “political 
stability and social harmony,” the post-Reconstruction framework of American politics 
facilitated a theme of national healing.22  As Michael Kammen has claimed, after the 
“rancor of Reconstruction, many Americans perceived the Revolution—or wanted to—
as a mutually shared memory, a common core of national tradition that could banish the 
old bitterness.”23  Sectional bitterness melted into forgiveness, Kammen elaborates, 
redefining the image of the Revolutionary generation to be seen less as “revolutionaries” 
and more as “nation-builders.”24  If the political context in which the 1888 reading 
originated was more welcoming of national union than damning sectional rebellion, the 
chief advocate of the recital, Senator George Frisbie Hoar (R-MA), fit the mold.  Hoar 
epitomized the mood of national reunion with his a “Half-Breed Republican” sensibility, 
or what biographer Richard Welch, Jr. called a tendency to deviate from the radical wing 
of the Party’s Reconstruction years to emphasize “social harmony while encouraging 
                                                
21 U.S. Senate, “22 February 1862:  Washington’s Farwell Address.”  Accessed on 10 April 2010 from 
[http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Washingtons_Farewell_Address.htm]. 
22 Eric Foner, The Story of American Freedom (New York:  Norton, 1998), 116. 
23 Michael Kammen, A Season of Youth:  The American Revolution and the Historical Imagination (New 
York:  Knopf, 1978), 62. 
24 Michael Kammen, A Season of Youth; Michael Kammen, A Machine That Would Go of Itself:  The 
Constitution in American Culture (New York:  Knopf, 1986), 121. 
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economic growth.”25  Gathered around the Farewell Address, the U.S. Senate could hear 
the father of the country again, reassured that the inheritance of the textual memory 
would not be disputed. 
 Details on the 1888 reading are speculative, though the lack of pomp or debate 
surrounding Hoar’s proposal of a new reading indicates minimal objection to re-inserting 
the Farewell Address into the institutional fabric of the Senate, and setting off what 
would become a political ritual of incredible endurance.  The original resolution of 1888 
was introduced again in 1893, 1894, and 1896 until, sensing a perpetual need, Hoar’s 
1901 resolution easily passed vote.  The Senate’s order, as it remains in effect today, 
dictates the following: 
 Resolved, That unless otherwise directed, on the 22nd day of February in each year, or if that shalt 
 be on Sunday, then on the day immediately after the reading of the Journal, Washington’s 
 Farewell Address shall be read to the Senate by a Senator to be designated for the purpose by the 
 presiding officer; and that thereafter the Senate will proceed with its ordinary business.26 
 
Hoar’s 1901 resolution ensured the Farewell Address would take oral form in the Senate 
with near perpetuity.  What could not be determined, however, is the evolution and 
reception of the ritual as years progressed.   
 A historical survey of each reading of the Farwell Address since 1888 would be 
beyond the scope or purpose of this study.  However, two major transitions of reception 
and practice are important to grasping a historical perspective of the ritual, however:  the 
steady decline of collective interest in the reading, and the growing importance of the 
leather-bound notebook of signatures to the commemorative process.  Though these two 
                                                
25 Richard E. Welch, Jr., George Frisbie Hoar and the Half-Breed Republicans (Cambridge, MA:  
Harvard University Press, 1971), 90. 
26 Congressional Record, January 24th, 1901. 1385. 
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components are not directly related, each offers a glimpse into larger questions and 
implications of repeating to remember central to later analysis. 
 By the best available accounts, the Senate’s recitations of the Farewell Address 
in through the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were communal affairs, 
meaning the recitation of the text was well attended and engaging to the political 
community of Senators.  When the Senate convened for its second reading in 1893, 
Senator Pro Tempore Manderson (R-NE) delivered the iteration of the address “with 
most of the senators in their seats and with a fairly large audience in the galleries, all 
giving close and respectful attention.”27  Even newspaper reports asked the public to take 
notice of the Senate’s solemnities.  The New York Times reported on the absence of the 
reading in 1895 when the legislative needs of the Senate overpowered the epideictic 
possibilities.28  In 1896, the Senate reconvened its practice, ensuring, the New York 
Times stated, that the “memory of Washington is treasured by the Senate” with a reading 
and adjournment of other activities as “mark of respect for the name and fame of the 
great patriot statesman.”29  By a collective show of thanks to a “well modulated” 
delivery of the text, the Senate showed “gratification by vote of thanks” for the reading, 
which was given “close attention” by “a liberal attendance of Senators,” making the 
                                                
27 The Atlanta Constitution. “Reading the Address:  How Senators Commemorated Washington’s 
Birthday,” February 23rd, 1893, pg 1 [Accessed through ProQuest Historical Newspapers on 1 February 
2012]. 
28 New York Times. “Too Busy to Celebrate:  Congress Remains in Session Considering Routine 
Business,” February 23rd, 1895, pg 9 [Accessed through ProQuest Historical Newspapers on 10 March 
2009]. 
29 New York Times. “Observance in the Senate:  Washington’s Address Read by President Pro Tm. Frye,” 
February 23rd, 1896, pg 3. [Accessed through ProQuest Historical Newspapers on 10 March 2009]. 
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ceremony “thoroughly impressive” on account of its “simplicity” without 
“ornamentation.”30   
 Consistency eventually bred waning enthusiasm in the twentieth century.  In 
1900, Senator Foraker’s (R-OH) reading of the text drew an “unusually large attendance 
of Senators” that later “congratulated” Foraker on his reading of the text.31  By 1910, 
however, the recitation was delivered with only “few Senators were present.”32   
Abysmal attendance has characterized the ceremony since.  Joycle Kilmer, writing for 
the New York Times in 1917, posed the question to readers directly:  “Why is it that so 
many of us let [Washington’s] birthday pass with no thought except perhaps a 
momentary gratitude for the holiday, and regard for his memory without the slightest 
fervor?”33  Reflecting on the ritual of repetition in the Congress, the Daily Boston Globe 
speculated in 1928 that the ritual was an exercise of inculcation, “just to make sure, 
presumably, that no new member goes unadvised as to what the first President had to 
say.”34  In 1940, roughly one-third of the Senate heard Senator Burke (D-NE) deliver the 
speech, with the same number attending a later reading in 1952.35  The 1954 reading 
                                                
30 Chicago Tribune, “Washington’s Farewell Address Read by Mr. Frye to a Large Audience in the 
Senate,” February 23rd, 1896 [Accessed through ProQuest Historical Newspapers], n.pag; New York 
Times, “Observance in the Senate:  Washington’s Address Read by President Pro Tem. Frye,” February 
23rd, 1896, [Accessed through ProQuest Historical Newspapers], n. pag. 
31 The Washington Post. “Brief Session of Senate.” 23 February 1900, pg. 4. [Accessed through ProQuest 
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32 New York Times. “The Holiday in Washington:  The Capitol Decorated and Depew Reads the Farewell 
Address.” February 23rd, 1910, pg. 5 [Accessed through ProQuest Historical Newspapers].   
33 Joyce Kilmer, “Thoughts on Washington’s Birthday.”  New York Times. 18 February 1917, pg SM3 
[Accessed through ProQuest Historical Newspapers]. 
34 Daily Boston Globe. “Congress to Honor Washington Today.” February 22nd, 1928, pg.2 [Accessed 
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35 New York Times. “Birthday Evokes Washington Lore.” February 23rd, 1940, pg. 3 [Accessed through 
ProQuest Historical Newspapers]; New York Times. “Washington’s Farewell Address Read in Congress; 
Stand on Foreign Affairs Evokes Interest.” February 23rd, 1952, pg. 26 [Accessed through ProQuest 
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seemed “to take on a more contemporary aspect in the light of current debates” on limits 
to the President’s “treaty-making power” for the future.36  Interest and numbers 
dwindled further by the 1960s:  the 1962, 1964, 1965, and 1968 readings each garnered 
between only eight to ten Senators in attendance.37  By 1973 the occasion drew an 
audience of five Senators total.38 
 Awkwardness replaced reverence as the dominant sentiment of the event as it 
reached its eightieth decade of practice.  In 1976 the strange bedfellows of Washington’s 
Farewell Address and President Ford’s veto message in response to a Congressional jobs 
bill were presented in adjoining recitals.39  The Farewell Address had become a political 
mainstay, or, perhaps more directly, evidence of an essential institutional relationship 
across time.   In 1979, for example, a debilitating snowstorm ensured that the reader of 
the address—Senator John Warner (R-VA)—was one of two Senators present while 
reciting the speech.40  Speaking the 1796 text into a nearly empty chamber was a feat in 
itself for Warner, a captive audience notwithstanding:  “If George Washington could 
make it through Valley Forge, a freshman Senator from his state could certainly tread the 
                                                
36 New York Times. “Congress to Hear ‘Farewell’ Again.” February 22nd, 1954, pg. 20 [Accessed through 
ProQuest Historical Newspapers]. 
37 The Hartford Courant. “Washington Farewell Read to Congress.” February 23rd, 1962, pg. 24E; The 
Hartford Courant. “Congress Hears Farewell Address.” February 22nd, 1964, pg. 24F; New York Times. 
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38 The Hartford Courant, “Farewell Address Doesn’t Fare Well,” February 20th, 1973, pg 54 [Accessed 
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39 New York Times. “Two Presidents Heard:  A Farewell and a Veto.” February 17th, 1976, pg. 49 
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path from the Port of Georgetown.”41  The fact the text had been repeated, in other 
words, trumped the presence or absence of any political community.   
 Not all observers or participants have maintained enthusiasm in the face of a 
waning audience.  Iterations from the 1980s to present have leaned the audience—
inclement weather or not—to roughly two or three dedicated Senators, excluding the 
reader, as well as “a few tourists” who may unsuspectingly drift in and out of the 
Senate’s visitor gallery.42  Even readers—the vehicles of Washington’s words—have 
sometimes dispensed with enthusiasm for what seems a thankless task.  Some would 
gladly avoid the reading, likening it to “a burden of freshmen Senators,” a trite rite of 
passage.43  In 1985, nearly a century after the ritual’s beginning, Senator Hawkins (R-
FL) side-stepped the pomp of the day by appropriating an auctioneer’s style, reading the 
text at record speed.44  Other Senators have been more open in their dismissal of the 
event, such as Senator Kassebaum’s (R-KS) blunt autopsy of the ritual she had just 
completed:  “No wonder George didn’t read this.  It’s so long and boring.”45   
 The history of reading the Farewell Address in the Senate yields important 
conclusions.  First, the attention and institutional support for the practice wanes early in 
the ritual’s history.  By the first decade of the twentieth century, attendance and relative 
                                                
41 New York Times. “Washington Struck.” 
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focus on reading the Farewell Address recede from the comparatively popular exchanges 
in the late nineteenth-century.  The recital of the address, built on a general observance 
rather than an expression of national crisis or reunion, fails to sustain compelling 
attention.  In Randall Collins’ terminology, the recital of the Farewell Address after the 
early twentieth century would have likely produced a situation of low “emotional 
energy,” or the “highly focused, emotionally entrained interaction” that prompts 
individuals to “come away from the situations carrying the group-aroused emotion for a 
time in their bodies.”46  For Senator’s reciting the Farewell Address, the group is gone 
from the ritual.  Second, the increased attention to the notebook of signatures becomes 
an increasingly important mode of expression for participants.  The dwindling audience 
and increased propensity to scrawl ideas about the Farewell Address do not move in 
parallel order.  For a bulk of the ritual’s history, however, the perceived loss of 
interacting with others to remember the Farewell Address has been directed toward the 
act of writing. 
 The motive for the ritual’s notebook is unclear.  No one knows precisely who 
introduced the text, or what motives drove one to record the signatures of participants.  
The leather-bound text, embossed with the title, “Washington’s Farewell Address, 
Senate Official Copy,” exists as a text in perpetual progress, always incomplete and 
awaiting a new page to collect the thoughts and insights of readers.  Regardless of its 
origin or purpose, the significance of the text is undeniable.  Early entries, the first 
beginning in 1900, reflect an objective, factual, and rudimentary acknowledgment of the 
                                                
46 Randall Collins, Interactive Ritual Chains (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 2004), xii. 
  176 
Senate custom and the date of the recitation.  Signatures of this sort are stacked upon one 
another, sometimes up to four on a single page.  Beginning in the late 1940s and 
remaining steadfast since, Senators have taken to offering thoughtful, trite, and 
sometimes controversial observations about Washington, the relevance of the Farewell 
Address, and the appropriateness of recent political happenings in the text, often taking 
up a single page or more.   
 It would be difficult to prove that a lack of attendance initiated use a greater use 
of the text as a repository of emotional energy, collective effervescence, or public 
remembrance.  The historical record cannot sustain such a causal claim.  What is clear, 
however, is that the notebook was a constant fixture in the ceremony, and was available 
to Senators throughout major controversies of the early twentieth century that one might 
expect reflection from the issues and concerns raised in the Farewell Address, such as 
the League of Nations debate, the Great Depression and New Deal legislation, or the 
lead-up to World War II.  Did the Farewell Address fail to resonate in these public 
debates?  We could not suspend such disbelief.47  By simple observation, these historical 
eras are unaccounted for in any detail within the Senate’s chronicle of participants.  The 
notebook, in other words, is a medium that only became functional to commemorate 
Washington at a certain point in the Senate’s institutional culture.   
                                                
47 As one example, Kathleen Hall Jamieson has documented how Woodrow Wilson’s rhetoric advocating 
a new American foreign policy interpreted Washington’s warning of foreign alliances as a “revised 
principle” by which the U.S. could intervene in European war.  One would expect such an open debate on 
the meaning of the Farewell Address might prompt a response from lawmakers reciting the text.  See 
Jamieson, Eloquence in an Electronic Age:  The Transformation of Political Speechmaking (Oxford:  
Oxford University Press, 1988), 104-105. 
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 What started as a medium acknowledging who read the Farewell Address has—
as of the late 1940s—come to function as an institutional palimpsest, with extensional 
energy devoted to synthesizing the meaning of the Farewell Address committed to 
writing, not speech; to private reflection, not public remembrance.  This dichotomy is 
the defining component to a critical evaluation of the Senate’s ceremonial repetition, and 
the topic requiring the most careful positioning in terms of a theoretical standard of 
evaluation.  Contemporary scholarship on public memory does not distinguish between 
an act of memory and an act of recollection—memory itself is thought to be a selective, 
deliberative process.  As I explain in the following section, however, Aristotle’s original 
distinction between memory and recollection provides us with a necessary vocabulary to 
match the form of the Senate’s remembrance.  Taking a closer look at Aristotle’s brief 
but theoretically rich reflections on memory will help us position the Senate’s ritual of 
repetition within the context of extending the constitutive life of Washington’s text. 
MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION:  A THEORETICAL DISTINCTION 
 
“February 22, 1949.  Vice President Barkley honored me in asking me to read Washington’s Farewell 
Address.  As I read this I wondered what our first President would think if he were alive today.  Would he 
condemn the North Atlantic Pact as an entangling alliance?  The objective is the same today—freedom.  
The only difference is the way to obtain that freedom.  (signed) Margaret Chase Smith, U.S.S. Maine.” 
 
 The rhetoric of public memory is a textual practice.  Memory is expressed 
through language, but even more, Maurice Halbwachs noted, it is derived from the social 
frameworks that constitute our relations.  Only when an individual dreams of the past—
or has “the illusion of reliving it”—does memory occur outside “the great frameworks of 
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the memory of society.”48  When Halbwachs suggested that memory arises from 
collective frameworks, he defined such frameworks as the basis for reconstructing “an 
image of the past which is in accord, in each epoch, with the predominant thoughts of 
the society.”49  Halbwachs’ concern with locating an “image of the past” arises from a 
longer history of positioning the phenomenon of memory in the realm of human 
imagination, akin to early theoretical positing of memory as an imprint upon the soul. 
 No treatise provides a better framework for understanding the tension between 
memory, recollection, and social frameworks than Aristotle’s De Memoria et 
Reminscentia.  This tension provides an ideal fit in accounting for the persisting tension 
between individual and collective practices of remembrance, as well as spoken and 
written expressions in the Senate’s commemoration of the Farwell Address.  As I 
demonstrate in the paragraphs that follow, memory for Aristotle is an individual 
phenomenon, while recollection—a concept elaborated by later theorists—provides the 
groundwork for the communal framework of recalling the past.  By recounting 
Aristotle’s theory of memory and imagination, we can begin to reconcile the shaping and 
texturing of memory—spoken and written—as it has evolved in the U.S. Senate.   
 For Aristotle, memories are images.  The oft-quoted terms topoi and loci refer to 
“subject matter of dialectic” and “the places in which they were stored.”50  Memory, in 
this regard, resides in the same part of the soul “to which imagination belongs,” meaning 
that memory does not arise without an image.51  While Aristotle’s treatise on memory 
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50 Francis Yates, The Art of Memory, 46. 
51 Aristotle quoted in Richard Sorabji, Aristotle on Memory, 49. 
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and recollection has been received as limited 52 and hard to follow,53 his observations 
frame memory within a broader landscape of his Para naturalia series on “natural 
philosophy concerned with the capacities common to both body and soul of living 
beings.”54  Distinct from scholars who would couple memory with delivery as “one of 
the two ‘technical’ part of their subject,”55 Aristotle’s balances a philosophical and 
psychological inquiry on the meaning of memory.56  While Plato framed “objects of 
dialectical thought” as ideal Forms, existing “separately from the sensible world,” 
Aristotle understood the human capacity to recall facts or ideas firmly within a lived 
experience.57  Retaining knowledge through the senses requires, however, that it be 
“treated by, or absorbed into, the imaginative faculty,”58 effectively marrying knowledge 
of the past with sensory perception.59  Knowledge exits through the senses, yet is used in 
different forms to recall the past, Aristotle claimed, leading to a distinction between 
memory and recollection.  
 When memory is categorized as a sense of time past as well as an image of such 
moments, the distinction arises between what Bloch calls “the sensing soul” and “the 
thinking soul,” memory belonging to the former and recollection belonging to the 
                                                
52 David Bloch, Aristotle on Memory and Recollection:  Text, Translation, and Reception in Western 
Scholasticism (Leiden:  Brill, 2007), 118. 
53 Yates, The Art of Memory, 49. 
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latter.60  The capacity of memory is present, Aristotle suggests, within any animal that 
can recognize an image in their mind.  Any animal with a sense time and the ability to 
imagine can remember, yet, Aristotle clarifies, “only man can recollect.”61  In distinction 
to memory’s passive state, recollection is defined as an “active” search:  memory is 
transitory and recollection is an active cognitive process.62  Said differently, recollection 
transcends mnemonic recovery to achieve a higher level of mental “reasoning.”63  For 
Aristotle, this equates to one mentally engaging in “a sort of search” that is “an attribute 
only to those animals which also have the deliberating part.”64  Aristotle’s dualistic 
frame on humans’ relationship with the past should not be interpreted as stringent 
division.  As Bloch clarifies, Aristotle positions recollection is a process of “searching 
through images towards a goal,” which, when reached, ceases the process wherein what 
is retrieved or gained is retained, or “committed to memory.”65   
 While Aristotle’s distinctions on memory and recollection might be helpful in 
delineating a sense of the past from a selection from the past, contemporary reactions 
remain mixed.  As David Bloch notes, “modern philosophy and science” would be left 
wanting insofar as Aristotle’s theory of memory is concerned; “few would want to return 
to a purely Aristotelian theory of memory.”66  Additionally, Richard Sorabji notes the 
close distinction between Aristotle’s terms and our contemporary assumptions as he 
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claims, “Whereas we might say that memory simply supplies the material, which is then 
examined by another and more intelligent faculty, Aristotle does not.  Memory is just the 
combined state of being aware of an image in oneself and viewing it as something else 
that has taken place in the past.”67  Such critiques of Aristotle’s theory remind us that the 
broader application of this distinction comes its interpretation in contemporary theory. 
 Aristotle’s bifurcated theory of remembrance has prompted scholars to foster a 
greater awareness on the overlapping relationship between memory, speech, and 
rhetoric.  Memoria and recollection were, according to Albertus Magnus, a process of 
“rational discovery of what has been set aside through and by means of the memory.”68  
The importance of one is not fully realized without the presence of the other.  Beyond 
mnemonic devices, an “art of memory” is more appropriately defined, according to 
Carruthers, as an “art of recollection”:  mnemonic devices are in place “for the purpose 
of inventio or ‘finding’”69 a familiar step in crafting rhetorical expression.  
 Though Anne Whitehead is quick to note that both memory and recollection are 
part of a “self-motivated search” on an individual level,” other critics have found 
abundant insights from Aristotle’s memory treatise.70  Bruce Gronbeck interprets 
Aristotle’s reflections on memory and recollection as not only “theoretically 
provocative,” but invaluable to understanding why memoria was “equal in importance” 
to the other canons of the rhetorical process.71  Aristotle’s conception of memory, 
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Edward Casey adds, seems to ignore Plato’s occupation with the mystic or cosmic forces 
of remembering, and instead attributes a “link between memory and the personal past.”72  
If memory is personal, Gronbeck notes, the potentials for recollection are much more 
publicly minded.  By defining recollection in the realm of “thinking,” Gronbeck claims, 
Aristotle’s treatise referred to the search for “scientific knowledge,” or “what we would 
call generalized knowledge.”73  Aristotle’s views on recollection extend his thesis on 
memory, positing that one mentally “moves through a series of memory images that are 
related in an order of succession by locating a suitable starting point and exciting a 
physiological change which will pass from one image to another until it reaches the 
object of the search.”74  Key to this distinction is recollection’s emphasis on “the 
reconstruction of sequences of understanding.”75  Citing incarnations from theorists like 
Longinus, Bacon, and Campbell, Gronbeck argued that Memoria et Reminiscentia 
presents ideas that are “never far from the central concerns of rhetorical theory.”76  By 
recognizing individual recollections as an investigation to a temporal, generalized, and 
therefore communal sense of the past, Gronbeck claimed, Aristotle’s theory of memory 
and recollection opens new avenues to rhetoric and memory:  that which is recollected 
“is the repository of a society’s stock of knowledge—it’s collective beliefs, attitudes, 
and values,” while which is remembered is “the repository of an individual’s life 
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events—that person’s pleasurable and painful experiences.”77  This relationship is key, 
Gronbeck noted, because “[t]he recollected and the remembered … are complementary 
in that their union competes the joining of the social and personal in human affairs.”78  
Gronbeck’s argument connects the importance of communal knowledge and recollection 
to the rhetorical process that begins with memory. 
 Whether or not memory and recollection are Aristotle’s intended association with 
his definition of topoi is uncertain.  As John Muckelbauer observes, Aristotle “provided 
no more clear definition of how topos functions” other than the metaphoric “place.”79  Is 
Aristotle’s emphasis on images of memory and the deliberative search of recollection an 
answer to this uncertain question?  In Carruthers’ estimation, “topics of argument” and 
the “places of recollection” that Aristotle connects throughout Topics came into fruition 
in the Middle Ages.80  Her conclusion on the dual connection between memory, 
recollection, and the invention of arguments is central to comprehending one way of 
reading memory’s role in a rhetorical act beyond mnemonic cues and central to 
Aristotle’s rhetorical theory: 
 The idea that recollection, memoria, is itself a reasoning procedure, which makes use of orderly 
 series of mental topics (places) for the procedure of investigation, is fundamental from antiquity 
 onward both in dialectic and in rhetoric.  In each of these linguistic arts, the compositional task 
 requires invention (discover and recovery) of arguments, matters, and materials, which in turn 
 derive their power and persuasion from the mental library one put away during the study of 
 grammar.81 
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Here Carruthers indicates how we might read the art of invention as inherently tied to 
classical notions of memory and recollection:  By actively searching through images of 
the past in recollection, one can select the most appropriate starting point to build a 
claim from memory.  Though Aristotle does not inherit Plato’s conception of memory 
images being impressed onto a block of wax within the soul, he nevertheless maintains 
the essential imaging process that occurs when one inscribes events or objects in their 
imagination (phantasia).  Aristotle’s theory of memory and recollection introduces an 
orientation to remembrance that accounts both for the minute process of identifying a 
memory, as well as the parallel notion—or, Gronbeck might argue, bridge—between 
searching a series of images in recollection.  “What when the memory itself loses 
something?” Augustine asked in Book Ten of his Confessions, quickly answering, “The 
only place to search is in the memory itself.”82 
 The richer relevance of Aristotle’s distinction lies in what Paul Ricoeur 
summarizes as the line drawn between “the simple presence of memories and the act of 
recollection.”83  If we consider another observation by Ricoeur that the “verb ‘to 
remember’ stands in for the substantive ‘memory,’”84 we have drafted a continuum 
between an image of the past that is stable, sensory, and still, and a search for events and 
ideas past that is purposeful and deliberate.  For Kendall Phillips, the distinction between 
memory and recollection is a site of struggle between competing conceptions of the past.  
By matching image to memory, Phillips has argued, Aristotle’s theory positions 
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recollection as arising in a “controlled way.”85  Inheriting Aristotle’s distinction between 
sensory memory and deliberative recollection, Phillips has posited that conceptions of 
the past enter a communal framework under the aegis of three categories:  “public 
memories,” or “the articulation of the images and fantasies of specific communities 
about aspects of the past”; “public remembrances,” or “the kind of dominant, reified, and 
calcified forms of remembrance” that establish the parameters of public memories; and 
“public recollection,” or “a site in which public memories are disciplined in relation to 
the framework of public remembrance and against which recalcitrant public memories” 
attempt to alter or correct.86  Beyond Aristotle’s original distinction between memory 
and recollection, finally, Phillips argues that images take one of three major forms:  
between the emergence of memories (public memory) and the perpetual, calcified 
cultural forms and frameworks (public remembrance) of memory, there resides the 
struggle to establish new communal conceptions of the past (public recollection).87 
 Aristotle’s treatise, combined with contemporary observations and extensions of 
his original theory, productively furcate our conception of memory in order to analyze 
the Senate’s ritualistic embrace of the Farewell Address in both written and linguistic 
forms of expression alike.  As I transition to formal analysis of repetition, my focus will 
become twofold.  First, I consider the public embodiment of the Farewell Address 
repeated in perpetual fashion in the Senate.  Next, I align a content analysis of the 
Senate’s notebook as it has evolved into an institutional palimpsest of memory since its 
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origin in 1900.  Both the bodily display of the text repeated and the increasingly 
elaborate reflections of its meaning take on a consequential form in both spoken and 
written discourse.  The interaction between speech and writing, finally, becomes a major 
point of contention as we evaluate the Senate’s repetitive return to the Farewell Address 
and the search for an extensional life of reading within this political community.   
MEMORY:  LOCATING A PERPETUAL DISPLAY OF THE TEXT 
“The wisdom contained in the Farewell Address is ageless; the admonitions remain as valid as the 
circumstances which then prevailed.  To the degree those circumstances have changed, we must measure 
the advice of George Washington against the living facts of our own times.  I shall always cherish and 
remember this occasion, when it was my […] privilege to deliver Washington’s historic address, in honor 
of his birthday to the Senate of the United States.  (signed) Frank Church, February 21, 1958.” 
 What do we witness when we observe the Senate’s yearly recital of the Farewell 
Address?  As an invented institutional tradition, reciting the text functions as what Paul 
Connerton calls “rhetoric of re-enactment,” or the repetitive act that sustains communal 
memory.88  But what moment of history is being re-enacted?  In oralizing a written text, 
the Senate’s performance of the text grants Washington’s Farewell Address a local, 
vocal, and immediate presence in a way it was not invested with as a written political 
testament.  The repetition of Washington’s speech is always a re-enactment of the 
previous year’s ceremony, following the standard space, place, and time of 
Washington’s birthday in the Senate chamber, never fully actualizing a lost moment of 
history since the text in question lives beyond any commitment to space or time.  If, 
however, as Butler stated, responsibility for “reinvigorating” language is attributed to 
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“speech as repetition, not origination,”89 the expressed vitality of the Farewell Address 
in the Senate presents a potentially stifling constitutive life.  In the following analysis of 
the reading, I argue that the Senate’s yearly recital of the Farewell Address represents a 
bodily performance of memory that forges a relationship between text and place that did 
not previously exist, but that the potential for renewing the symbolic potency derived 
from repetition is stifled by the form of the ceremony, and the separation between 
speaking, writing, remembering, and recollecting that currently defines the practice. 
  “The past needs a maker of words, a poet or historian,” W. James Booth has 
noted, “to save its deeds from the oblivion of silence.”90  “In invoking it, and giving it 
voice and remembrance,” he continues, “we answer its call.”91  If forgetting is equated 
with silence, the Senate’s standing order of recitation ensures that George Washington’s 
Farewell Address will never lose its imprint on the deliberative body.  Senators give 
voice to an otherwise silent text, enacting a rhetoric of display with several components.  
Yet, the extensional life afforded the Farewell Address has remained remarkably 
continuous in form and content.  This Farewell Address is a constant performance of 
memory made verbal and visible, yet stylistically constant and stable.  
 The Senate gives the Farewell Address the voice in performance it never 
possessed as a written text.  Public speech, Walter Ong has claimed, creates the potential 
for an “event,” whereas writing creates a circumstance of “isolated” and “consciously 
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contrived” messages.92  To lock one’s ideas into paper rather than let them drift and 
mingle in a collective conscious is to practice what Ong calls “individualized thought” in 
the use of language.93  Papers and letters are not totally lost to the depths of individual 
consciousness, however.  Throughout the nineteenth-century, Ong further explains, “it 
was taken for granted that a written text of any worth was meant to be…read aloud” to 
the public.94  Once we account for the line between Washington’s call for sustained 
public virtue in 1796 in the Senate and the various members who have taken on a 
temporary second self in prosopopoeia, the Farewell Address inhabits a stable image of 
memory.  Its repetition is an act of speech amid countless other recitations that inhabit 
the Senate:  proposals for legislation, institutional journal entries, or calls for quorum, 
each of which call on fellow members to simply remain as they are—present or absent. 
 By conventional reasoning, space and public memory influence one another 
insomuch, Halbwachs stated, as groups “compose” a “fixed framework within which to 
enclose and retrieve remembrances.”95  “Most groups,” Halbwachs stated, “engrave their 
form in some way upon the soil and retrieve their collective remembrances within the 
spatial framework thus defined.”96  For the Senate, reciting the Farewell Address has 
become a means to deposit the memory of public discourse upon a common deliberative 
space in re-enactment.  Like a museum or an archive, the Senate chamber is a place 
where the memory has been inscribed, and—through over a century of practice—now a 
local spatial association for the revered text.  Instead of memories emerging from a 
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place, the memory of the Farewell Address is enlivened and proposed as fit to meld with 
the deliberative body in the deliberative space.  Washington’s voice is alive—and it lives 
in the Senate.  
 Though imbued within the spatial and temporal happenings of the Senate, the 
oralizing of Washington’s Farewell Address have remained remarkably constant through 
decades of practice.  Mary Carruthers offers further insight to the act of reading a text 
absent an extensional outlet.  Summarizing Thomas of Waley’s theory of memory and 
recitation, she suggested we may: 
 distinguis[h] between reciting and retaining and speaking; recitare is word-for-word repetition of 
 a text verbaliter, whereas retinere et dicere is recollection sententialiter (according to the sense of 
 its principal words) in order to facilitate composition.  Reciting is what children do when first 
 learning to read, but recollection is associated…with the investigative activities of invention and 
 new composition, the tasks of rhetoric and poetry.97 
 
The Senate’s oralizing of speech constitutes a memory of Washington’s text in the sense 
that the practice orients the text as a performantive display in time and space, removing 
the shackled isolation of a printed text to localize the text within the Senate chamber.  
This imagining of Washington’s words, however, is a constant, or to employ Aristotle’s 
distinction, it is as a stable sense, established and, for the foreseeable future, ever-
present.  It facilitates a memory image of the text—a Senator’s performed embodiment 
of the words—but little else.  Memory is the text displayed as a constant re-enactment:  
recollection lives beyond a word-for-word recitation.  Or, as Kendall Phillips’ 
conception of memory and recollection suggests, permanent and isolated repetition 
positions the text as an established image of public remembrance.  What is needed, then, 
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is an active and deliberate search within the text repeated to forge a new breath of life in 
public recollection. 
 Occasions wherein the recitation of the text is accompanied by some sort of 
additional remarks or cues to read the text are historically rare.  Following the 1937 
reading of the Farewell Address, for example, Senator Thomas (R-UT) began a debate 
on the divergent conclusions attributed to the text in the midst of plans to expand 
American foreign influence.  “Laudable as the reading of the address is, it may become a 
perfunctory practice or it may result in an adherence to one-sided or at least sloganized 
deductions if we do not from time to time rehearse the real meaning of the address and 
the reasons for which it was written.”98  “In a year like the present, when neutrality is on 
the minds of all, Washington’s defense of his own neutrality acts may be used to justify 
or to condemn a neutrality stand of the present,” Thomas continued, finding more use in 
debating the meaning of the text than listening to its recital:  “This is hardly fair.  It is the 
world of today that we must legislate for; not the world as it was in Washington’s day.”99 
Excerpts from the Congressional Record show that Senator Thomas’s interpretation of 
the Farewell Address in an open, communal discussion of its meaning is a rare fusion of 
epideictic observance and argumentative contestation.  Thomas’s case is the exception.  
Senators are more likely to revert to the nineteenth century practice of commending the 
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“very fine” presentations of the text, with some Senators talking about the text by 
referring to their own experiences.100   
 How can the perpetual performance of the Farewell Address differ from the 
moment of ceremonial repetition addressed in the previous chapter?  Speaking the words 
of Washington into the Old House of Representatives in 1862 positioned the text in local 
space and time, but presented an iteration that was alive to a moment of national and 
symbolic crisis.  The memory of the text repeated, in other words, was directed, 
constrained, and molded by accompanying messages:  a chaplain’s prayer, citizens’ 
petition, communal recitations, and, most importantly, the display of flags.  The Senate, 
by contrast, has made the Farewell Address a synecdoche for Washington himself, not a 
particular element or idea expressed within the text that may be re-imagined differently 
in the present.  The ritual of re-enactment is self-evident display:  Washington’s voice 
lives in the Senate, and requires no explanation, application, or discernable screen that 
accepts, reflects, and deflects the memory of the text beyond its bodily and spatial 
display.101   
 From the above overview, it appears as thought the U.S. Senate has come 
dramatically close to achieving the unattractive honor bequeathed to Zora in Italo 
Calvino’s Invisible Cities:  “forced to remain motionless and always the same, in order 
to be more easily remembered,” the city succumbs to being “languished, disintegrated, 
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disappeared.”102  Yet, each recital of the Farewell Address in the U.S. Senate in the past 
70 years has not been the same.  Indeed, individual Senators have taken great pains to 
indicate the scope of applicability that connections Washington’s text to the deliberative 
work of the Senate.  Recollection occurs side-by-side with remembrance, the only caveat 
being that the former is hidden while the latter is public.  In the following section, I 
explore the Senate’s hidden form of recollecting the Farewell Address by drawing out 
specific themes indicated in the chronicle of signatures and comments that further 
reinforce the separation between memory and recollection in the perennial performance 
of the Farewell Address. 
RECOLLECTION:  THE INSTIUTITONAL PALIMPSEST 
Feb. 22, 1963.  It was a great honor and privilege for me to read Washington’s Farewell Address  on the 
floor of the Senate.  If our first President were alive to-day I believe he would:  1. Be steadfast in his 
devotion to the principles inherent in our Constitution; 2. Vigorously oppose pressure group activities 
detrimental to the general welfare; 3. Insist on sound fiscal politics; 4.  Condemn any suggestions that the 
powers of the President should be significantly increased; and 5. Recognize that the luxury of isolation is 
no longer possible but that in formulating our relations with other nations the question must always be 
asked:  Is this in the best interest of the United States of America?  May our country be blessed with men 
possessing the vision and  capacity to George Washington—now and in the future.  (Signed) Winston L. 
Prouty, U.S.S. Vermont. 
 As mentioned previously in this essay, the focus on the Senate’s notebook was 
not initially evident.  Like a tool that goes unnoticed only to become essential to 
completing a task, the chronicle of signatures has transformed into a repository of 
recollection—a site in which readers clearly searched to find the meaning of 
Washington’s words within a present moment.   The book represents something more, 
however.  Within these pages resides a palimpsest of constitutive meaning attributed to 
the Farewell Address by a succession of Senators.  Each new entry marks a new layer of 
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meaning wherein the previous page is updated and altered, yet remains as a fragment of 
a new whole.  
 Like previous instances of ceremonial repetition examined in this work, the 
Senate’s choice of writing has important consequences to the extensional form of 
remembrance.  The act of writing has garnered substantive attention in the history of 
rhetoric.  Near the end of the classical dialogue Phaedrus, Socrates compares writing to 
the act of painting and concludes that a nobler dialectic is impossible when words 
committed to ink “cannot defend themselves” from a response.103  To achieve a true 
dialectic, and preserve one’s memory, the reasoning goes, speaking is the preferred 
mode of expressing thought.  The suspicions about writing have waned in more than two 
millennia since Plato’s text, especially since the introduction of new media, have 
introduced new points of contention on sources of information.  
 The virtues of writing are evident in a variety of critical appraisals.  Oral 
communication carries the potential to “unit[e] people in groups, whereas writing and 
reading, by contrast, are “solitary activities that throw the psyche back on itself.”104  To 
lock one’s ideas into paper rather than let them drift and mingle in a collective conscious 
is to practice what Ong calls “individualized thought” in one’s use of language.105  Paul 
Ricoeur credits writing with embodying “the meaning of the speech event, not the event 
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as event”:  “the noema of speech” is the essence captured in written texts.106  Texts, 
furthermore, enables the “universalization” of the audience, meaning an act of reading is 
a “social phenomenon” wherein a text “creates its public.”107   Writing does not have to 
wait for speech in order to constitute a public occasion; depth is inscribed.   
 Plato, Ong, and Ricoeur are not exclusive from one another.  Each provides a 
sense by which the act of writing is both isolated as well as potentially universalized, 
and—perhaps most importantly—a reflection and transformation of language.  This 
alteration between speech and writing is a familiar trend in this study, and represents one 
of the most elemental forms of ekphrasis.  Plato’s metaphorical painting and Ong’s 
interiorized thought process meet on the ground of imagining the words of another, or, in 
W. J. T. Mitchell’s summary, “Writing makes language (in the literal sense) visible (in 
the literal sense).”108  Though the act of ekphrasis is “impossible” in any literal or 
tangible sense, Mitchell nevertheless considers the phenomenon on two planes:  “(1) the 
conversion of the visual representation into a verbal representation, either by description 
or ventriloquism; (2) the reconversion of the verbal representation back into the visual 
object in the reception of the reader.”109  Arguably, the Senate’s tradition of oral 
recitation and written reflection has combined both elements of ekphrasis described by 
Mitchell.  The Farewell Address is displayed as an image of memory, while the search 
for meaning is sought in isolation and transcribed through visible scrawling.  We hear 
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the Farewell Address, but must look inward to the notebook to understand what it 
means.   
 The term palimpsest has been used as a figurative description of the memory 
embedded in landscape or veiled practices, and the Senate’s embrace of written 
memories invites the comparison in a more literal sense.  The notebook functions to 
retain meaning while simultaneously adding layers of reflections.  In this sense, it 
participates in the ritual as a palimpsest, or what Thomas De Quincey called “a 
membrane or roll cleansed of its manuscript by reiterated successions.”110  Palimpsests 
occupy a unique historical sensibility.  Charles Morris III notes that a palimpsest is an 
object “of both erasure and recovery” with meaning is “created in the ruins of prior” 
exercises, while previous marks are not “destroyed or forgotten.”111  Derived from a 
Greek word meaning “to scrape again,” the purposeful design of this tool for writing is 
to create a fresh text despite lingering traces of a prior sketching.112  Associations 
between memory and books date back to ancient observations.  As Mary Carruthers has 
noted, writers from Plato to Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian have likened memory to 
written text:  “books are themselves memorial cues and aids, and memory is most like a 
book, a written page or a wax tablet upon which something is written.”113  Plato’s 
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dialogue Theaetetus provides an elaborate description of this process and the imprinting 
of memory upon the soul. 
 Imagine…that our minds contain a block of wax, which in this or that individual may be larger or 
 smaller, and composed of wax that is comparatively pure or muddy, and harder in some, softer in 
 other, and sometimes of just the right consistency … Let us call it the gift of the Muses’ mother, 
 memory, and say that whenever we wish to remember something we see or hear or conceive in 
 our own minds, we hold this wax under perceptions or ideas and imprint them on it as we might 
 stamp the impression of a seal ring.  Whatever is so imprinted we remember and know so long as 
 the image remains; whatever is rubbed out or has not succeeded in leaving an impression we have 
 forgotten and do not know.114 
 
The sealing of a wax tablet, with bookend slabs of wood for support, was a common 
form of writing well known to Greek culture.  The process of imprinting text or images 
onto a wax-like substance within the soul is repeated in Aristotle’s mediation of memory 
(De Memoria), as well as Cicero’s description of remembering via “images in the 
localities” written “by means of letters on a wax tablet,” and later writings by extending 
to Augustine.115 The persistence of the wax tablet metaphor was—and is—Carruthers 
argues, “remarkable” in its persistence.116  
 Applying the palimpsest perspective to anthropological archeology, Geoff Bailey 
has convincingly suggested a multitude of temporal orientations that highlight the 
omnipresence of a palimpsest sensibility in a range of analytical objects.  A “Temporal 
palimpsests,” Bailey writes, is “an assemblage of materials and objects that form part of 
the same deposit but are of different ages and ‘life’ spans.”117  Elaborating on the general 
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applicability of the palimpsest perspective, Bailey argues that “the meaning of an object, 
whether we study it in isolation or in the context of other materials” invites the 
“palimpsest effect,” which, he states meaning approaching the object as ”a result of the 
different uses, contexts of use and associations to which they have been exposed from 
the original moment of manufacture to their current resting place, whether in the ground, 
a museum, a textbook, and intellectual discourse, or indeed as objects still in circulation 
and use.”118  Few objects of the material world escape a view of understanding the 
“differential duration” by which it has evolved.119  For the Senate’s chronicle of 
signatures, however, the sensibility is an ideal fit [See Figure 5].   
 The book is a chronicle of the extensional life of the Farewell Address in the 
nation’s foremost deliberative institution.  Repetition in the Senate chamber displays the 
text, but does not attempt an active search to recollect the text.  This distinction can be 
understood in Aristotle’s Memoria et Reminsciea, wherein the act of memory is closely 
defined to all animals who can impress an image of their surroundings in their mind; 
recollection is the active, deliberate search for something of one’s past.  Herein the 
Senate’s chronicle of blank pages constitutes an institutional palimpsest of recollection:  
a process of remembrance that shifts and shapes the Farewell Address as memory 
applied to the present.  In other words, the Senate’s recitation of the Farewell Address 
has inverted the traditional relationship between memory and recollection introduced by 
Aristotle and elaborated by Gronbeck and other theorists.  Memory—the image of the 
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past—is displayed in the act of reading; recollection—the active search of communal 
knowledge—is composed in a shared palimpsest of remembrance, composed in 
seclusion and locked away from view, but nevertheless recording the deliberative search 
for the meaning of the memory.  What sort of recollection does the text hold?  Further, 
what does this peculiar practice indicate within the context of ceremonial repetition and 
the process of extending the constitutive meaning of Washington’s Farewell Address?  
As we trace the Senate’s increased effort to pull the Farwell Address into its cloakroom 
corridor, we are also witnessing its attempt to modify and renew the effect of the address 
in its ever-changing second life. Our point of entry must begin with the text itself, then 
pull back and consider the larger implications of the Senate’s process of displaying 
memory and concealing recollection.   
 
 
 
FIGURE 5  The Senate’s Institutional Palimpsest.  Photograph property of the author.
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“February 24th, 1993.  To read the words of our nation’s first president on the floor of the U.S. Senate is 
a distinct honor.  The fact that his words were written as a guiding light for the future of this nation makes 
the actual moment of the delivery of the speech timeless.  Thank goodness this has become a tradition 
because as citizens we must never lose our exposure and connection to the principles of wisdom of our 
founding fathers.  The fact that Madison, Hamilton, and Jay all contributed to this speech reflects the 
sentiment of this group of dedicated patriots.  God bless America! (signed) Dirk Kempthorne, USS Idaho.” 
The Euphoria of Reading 
  By proximity and association, it is not surprising to see a recurring theme of 
Washington’s relevancy to the Senate emerge through Senators’ written reflections.  The 
transition from different decades of practice, however, illustrates key observations on 
what participants in this ritual perceive as the connection between the past and the 
present and the fluid nature of a prolonged repetition and the constitutive alteration of 
the text as it relates to the Senate’s existence.  It seems natural, provided this localizing 
of the text, that Senators participating in the ritual would associate the values and ideals 
of the Farewell Address to their own actions:  Senators see their actions embodying the 
ideals of Washington.  Yet, this transition was slow to start.  Indeed, the Farwell Address 
notebook wasn’t used outside of a name recognition log until mid-way through the 
twentieth-century.  Senators read Washington’s parting message through the tumultuous 
and significant episodes of American public life, including women’s suffrage, two 
World Wars, the Great Depression, and the dropping of atomic bombs, not to mention 
significant political movements toward labor rights and other political interests.  
Through this, the Senate remained silent by word and pen absent the words printed in the 
original address.  Following Senator Margaret Chase Smith’s (R-ME) pondering of how 
Washington would view efforts to unite North Atlantic nations into a potential 
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“entangling alliance,” however, the notebook becomes more than a register of the 
Farwell Address.  It is the site of transcendental rhetoric with the potential to engage 
through written expression.    
 Mouthing the words of Washington has meant, for some Senators, a spiritual 
euphoria.  Several readers have been moved to attest to the temporal suspension that 
exists within the performance.  While reading the text, Senator John Rockefeller (D-
WV) wrote in 1986, “one is carried back in spirit to the first years of this great nation,” 
continuing, “One feels, in reading his words aloud, the urgency of love and concern he 
felt for the fragile young nation.”  Senator Ralph Flanders (R-VT) went even further 
when he wrote, “A careful reading discovers its wisdom as no recital of words taken out 
of context can do.”  For Flanders, the Farewell Address is, as other readers such as 
Hubert Humphrey (D-MN) have suspected, not only “immortal and enduring,” but also 
accessible in performance.  “Indeed, for a few moments, half way through the address, it 
was as if ‘these councils of an old and affectionate friend’ had come alive!” Bill Frist (R-
TN) wrote in 1997.  Lack of audience is no lack of experience.  As we will note later in 
this analysis, the felt connection between a Senator and the Farewell Address has 
factored greatly in the habits of reading and remembering Washington’s text in the 
Senate. 
Change From Washington:  Relevance of the Farewell 
 Following the 1949 reading by Senator Chase, several Senators throughout the 
1950s, 1960s, and 1970s present a world of contrast to the themes of the Farewell 
Address and consider the text a corrective measure of political guidance.  Exceptions 
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exist, to be sure.  Frank Moss (D-UT), for instance, wrote in 1960 how Washington’s 
words “retain their vigor,” elaborating that the “course he charted has served us well and 
we are today the great united and powerful nation of which he spoke.”  James Pearson 
(R-KS), offered a bland assessment of the address, noting a “hope that the words of 
Washington—heard again in the Senate of the United States,” will serve the “purpose” 
of understanding the past to plan for the future.   
 Other Senator’s, however, have taken the Farewell with less optimistic points of 
view.  Though some Senators found it fitting to read the Farewell Address not only on 
Washington’s Birthday, but “in the Senate,” in Prescott Bush’s (R-CT) words, others 
have offered more pointed contrasts between the principles perceived in the text and the 
reality of the present.  Reading the Farewell affirms Senator Goldwater’s (R-AZ) belief 
in 1957 that the “troubles of mind and conscience” in the U.S. can be alleviated with 
“documents left to us” by the founding generation, foremost among them Washington’s 
text.  Frank Church (D-IN) defined the Farewell Address as a set of “admonitions” that 
remain “ageless,” that the people must measure “against the living facts of our own 
times.”  For Gordon Allott (R-CO), Washington’s Farewell Address was sage advice for 
a moment “when the mind of the people seems confused and even frustrated” in the 
present. “His advice with respect to the dominance of Party over Union as never more 
appreciable than today,” Allott continued.  In more pointed contrast, Winston Prouty (R-
VT), writing in 1963, perhaps responding to the Cuban Missile Crisis six months prior, 
contrasts the current political context with the belief that, were Washington alive, he 
would, among other things, “[r]ecognize that the luxury of isolation is no longer possible 
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but that in formulating our relations with other nations the question must be asked: is this 
in the best interest of the United States of America?”  Even when Washington’s 
principles are revised to a new ideology, his words clash with modern occurrences.   
 Political unity also becomes a key concern for Senators writing soon after the 
mid-twentieth century turn toward elaborated interpretation of the text.  Senator Lee 
Metcalf (D-MT), writing in 1966, dismisses the idea that the text embodies a vision 
“against foreign entanglements” and instead reads the central theme as “national unity,” 
an especially important observation in an age of “strife over civil rights”:  “This wise 
advice,” he continues, alluding to political unity, “is to be heeded.”  Religion and 
government is also a key concern in some of the early decades of the Senate’s elaborated 
form of commemoration through writing:  “[W]hen Washington talks about religion,” 
Senator Hayakawa (R-CA)  penned in 1977, “it seems to me he was better able than any 
political leader living today to appeal to common understandings, common assumptions 
about morality and duty such as existed in his time but exist precariously, if at all, 
today.”  Lastly, the morality of political actors is read from the address, especially in 
moments when political virtue is in question.  In the fallout of the Iran-Contra 
investigation in 1987, newly elected Senator John McCain (R-AZ) noted the contrast 
from Washington’s advice to the happenings in the present, defining the Farewell 
Address in a prescriptive light:  “closer adherence to his words is the surest path to a 
restored institution of the presidency and a renewal of faith of the American people in 
their system of government.”  What has been lost—or separated from the purity of the 
text—may be reunited with reverence to Washington’s model. 
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 These examples illustrate the common theme throughout the initial decades of 
reading and writing Washington through commemoration that apply the relevancy of the 
‘Farewell’ by drawing a contrast to the needs of the present.  In contradiction to this 
original theme early in the ritual’s mid-twentieth-century turn, more contemporary 
practice finds a repetitive turn to confirm the actions of the present as in-conjunction 
with the ideals of Washington, and indeed, the founding generation. 
Continuity With Washington:  Relevance of the Farewell 
 Contrary to the reflection that Washington may doubt the actions of the present 
in the previous section, recent decades of reading the Farewell Address in the Senate 
reflect a stronger sway to affirm either the importance of the present as a continuation of 
the past, or as the problems faced in the present as holding strong relevance to the ideals 
of Washington.  Indeed, the oft-repeated line throughout the Farewell Address notebook 
is summarized in Walter Huddleston’s (D-KY) 1978 claim that “the wisdom” of the text 
“is just as certain today as when originally delivered.”  Craig Thomas’ (R-WY) 1995 
recital, fast on the heels of the 1995 Republican Party mid-term election, suspected 
Washington’s implicit approval in the new majority:  “In a time when the American 
people have sent us to this place with a mandate for a smaller government more 
responsible to the need of its citizens—we are in this speech reminded of ideals and 
principles that lead us down the path of democracy.”  No misunderstanding of the 
Farewell Address—interpreted or not—could strike a chord further from the author’s 
intention.  Within this trend, political occurrences in the present are read anew through 
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the Farewell Address, given a new legitimacy, and tied back to the original formation of 
government.   
 Surviving national controversies are not immune from a sustained connection 
and continuation of Washington’s ideals.  In both the early Watergate fallout of 1973 as 
well as the post-Clinton impeachment trial of 1999, both Senators Charles Mathias (R-
MD) and George Voinovich (R-OH) cited Washington’s ideals of law and order in 
making the present matter to the past.  Though “clearly dated,” Mathias’ recitation of the 
Farewell Address prompted the American ideal that “government of law” and “accepted 
rules” still matters, observations no doubt influenced by Nixon’s recent resignation.  
Judgment of a president, though difficult, is affirmed through a reading of the Farewell.  
Similarly, Voinovich rationalized the recent impeachment trial of President Clinton by 
noting that Washington’s emphasis on oaths of office remains relevant in 1999:  “The 
oaths of judicial system he [Washington] refers to were the basis of the recent United 
States Senate Trial on the Articles of Impeachment against President Clinton.”  Clinton’s 
trial by the Senate may seem to be a stretch for readers of the 1796 text, but not the only 
theme affirmed in contemporary practice.  “I suspect [Washington] would be shocked at 
the role that the United States plays today in maintaining world peace—that the nation 
he helped found is the most powerful in the world,” Voinovich added.  Political vitriol 
forgotten, Washington’s vision is still embodied in the trials of a President, albeit 
through a new focus on which ideals remain central to the reading.   
 Recent readings of the address have also shown a consistent turn toward 
acknowledging the relevance of Washington without indulging specific elements of the 
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text of Washington’s ideals.  Writing in 1997, Bill Frist (R-TN) saw the importance of 
the Farewell Address in Washington’s vision of “restraint, balance, justice, self-imposed 
term-limits,” as relevant in the present day:  “As I read aloud, the words, I was moved by 
the expressed spirit of liberty which has flourished over the past 200 years,” Frist added.  
Following the events of 11 September 2001, John Corzine’s (D-NJ) 2002 reading of the 
address culminates in the belief that, “[l]ike Washington and his fellow citizens,” 
Americans would have to work toward their freedom.  The nation “must remember,” 
Corzine writes, interpreting the message in light of the tragedy on 9/11/2001, “that our 
freedom isn’t free.”  “America is a great and free nation because of leaders like 
Washington and his words are still inspiring,” Saxby Chambliss (R-GA) wrote one year 
later, alluding to nothing specific.  When events are elaborated upon, such as when 
Senator John Breaux (D-LA) wrote in 2004, the application to political issues and 
situations remain vague, often clouding the intended advice and warning of the Farewell 
Address to affirm the present:  “I think Washington would be proud of America today as 
he was in 1796 A.D.”   
 From artifact of admonition to an articulation of American pride, Washington’s 
Farewell Address has been made especially malleable through over a century of 
recitation in the U.S. Senate.  While themes of congruity and clash that define the 
temporal relationship between the political culture of the Senate and Washington’s 
political testament are important, the final observation of this analysis is the most 
important to crafting a judgment on the Senate’s ceremonial repetition of the text.  In 
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both recent decades and before, the theme of continuity with the Farewell Address has 
taken a new form of expression for reciters and writers:  a focus on the personal.   
The Farewell Address as Individual Experience 
 Washington’s text has spurred reflections of both association and dissociation in 
decades of recitation.   Both recent and historical trends of the Senate’s palimpsest 
include, however, the prominent preoccupation with the reader’s experience as the 
channel of the Farewell Address, pervading the decades of practice, particularly in the 
last twenty years of recitations.  The personal focus of the reading has not always been a 
sense of selfish interest.  “It was a great honor to have been asked to read the these 
historic words,” wrote Elbert Thomas (R-UT) in 1944, “I appreciate deeply the honor the 
Senate has thus done me.”  A similar tone of grateful thanks pervades entries through the 
1950s, though such content is later replaced with a more purposeful inward turn of 
written reflection.  Frank Church (D-IN) noted he would “cherish and remember this 
occasion” when he was given the “privilege to deliver Washington’s historic address, in 
honor of his birthday, to the Senate of the United States.”   
 For others, however, the honor was personal in a sense beyond one’s association 
to the Senate.  “Today has been a truly significant one for me!” wrote Jennings 
Randolph in 1962.  Being “the second West Virginian” to have read the text was an 
important note for Randolph, whose entire entry is dedicated to the presence of his son 
and staff in the galleries as he read the text.  Randolph’s focus on state identity marks a 
noteworthy chapter of more recent writings.  Senators Frist (R-TN, 1997), Chambliss (R-
GA, 2003), Burr (R-NC, 2005), Corker, (R-TN, 2007), Pryor (D-AR, 2008), Johanns (R-
  207 
NE, 2009), and Burris (D-IL, 2010), each underscored the honor of the speaking the 
address in the context of how many previous state representatives had preceded them.  “I 
understand that I am the first senator from Arkansas to read this address as part of this 
Senate tradition,” wrote Pryor (D-AR) in 2008, further noting, “That surprises me since 
there have been so many strong senators from my state over the years—Robinson, 
McClellan, Fulbright, Bumpers, Donald Pryor, and Lincoln—to name just a few.  
Knowing I am the first makes this honor all the more special to me.”  “It has been 60 
years since an Ohioan Robert Taff read Washington’s Farewell Address,” George 
Voinovich (R-OH) began his entry in 1999.  “I am carrying on a Tennessee tradition,” 
wrote Bob Corker (R-TN), making a rare allusion to the 1862 reading by penning, “It 
was Tennessee Senator Andrew Johnson who first introduced the petition in the Senate 
as a morale boosting gestures during the Civil War,” further listing home-state readers 
prior to 2007.  From the brief remarks of thankfulness and reverence to procedure, these 
contemporary compliments to one’s position relative to individual state histories add a 
new shape to the recollection process beyond an institutional or political community. 
 The individual, not the traditional reverence or the institution, occupy written 
reflections in more ways than one. Senators Moseley-Braun (D-IL) and Akaka (D-HI), 
writing in 1994 and 1996, respectively, each pay tribute to their their status as the first 
African-American and “senator of Native Hawaiian and Chinese descent” to have read 
the address.  This sentiment is echoed in similar expressions.  “As the third Illinoisian to 
read Washington’s Farewell Address before this chamber and [also] a great grand son of 
a slave, I am deeply honored to share this historic message with my colleagues,” wrote 
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Roland Burris (D-IL) in 2010, further noting the importance of the tradition as a way to 
“reflect upon the things that all Americans hold dear—liberty, equality, justice, and 
patriotism.”  Personal honor and reflection on the self’s role in commemoration is 
expressed, finally, in Jake Garn’s (R-UT) 1975 contribution to the institutional 
palimpsest, quoted in full as follows: 
 I have been greatly honored to be asked to present to the Senate George Washington’s Farewell 
 Address.  I am especially pleased due to the fact that I am a direct descendant of George   
 Washington’s youngest Brother [,] Charles Washington.  My paternal grandmothers maiden 
 name was Martha Virginia Washington and my great grandfathers[’], Charles Augustine 
 Washington.  He was a great, great, great, great grandson of George’s youngest full brother.   
 Because of the relationship to the Washington family it was a great thrill to present president 
 Washington’s Farewell Address. 
 
Few entries achieve the level of profound absurdity of Senator Garn’s entry, though his 
exclusive focus on his role in the ceremony underscores the emergence of the Senate’s 
palimpsest as a mode of reflecting then ritual as a mode of self-actualization or 
affirmation, detached in focus from the social frameworks of collective remembrance 
that function to direct how public memory takes form with varying points of emphasis to 
comprehend the present. 
 One can scarcely imagine how the recitation of George Washington’s Farewell 
Address in the U.S. Senate would alter in its display and performance if the above 
recollections of the text were seriously incorporated into the act of public remembrance.  
Were Senators to recite the Farewell Address and attempt to direct the meaning of the 
text toward regional state pride, the legislative agenda, or any myriad of issues that may 
or may not contradict the advice of public virtue outlined in the text, we may gain a 
better sense of how the Farewell Address is being transformed through practice.  As a 
political community, the Senate may benefit from knowing what is inside the book, too.  
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According to Senate Historian Betty Koed, the notebook is housed in the Senate 
Disbursing Office, literally locked away within the institution’s walls, only to be brought 
out once per year for the ceremonial reading of the text.120  In its current practice the 
form of display and rote recitation speaks only to a relationship between the deliberative 
body and the first president, giving viewers a sense of calm waters marked by constancy.  
Should the waves churning beneath the surface in the pages of the institutional 
palimpsest become seriously incorporated in commemoration, we could gauge the richer 
sense of how the text’s extensional life is constituted.  As the practice remains today, 
however, our image of memory remains thin—spoken into space and time with little 
symbolic effort to guide interpretations, while the written act of recollection remains 
incredibly thick—revealing a reading experience that constitutes institutional deviation 
and extension of Washington’s council, as well as the growing habitude of the Senate to 
remember a past absent a communal sensibility, by oneself for oneself.121   
IMPLICATIONS:  THICKENING THE TEXT AS MEMORY 
 
“For all our citizens who are served by our Senate, I am incredibly honored to have been able to  read 
George Washington’s Farewell Address to the People of the United States.  So much that  President 
Washington said in his address is still relevant today.  Our nation is incredibly fortunate to have had 
Washington’s leadership in founding the country.  I hope that all of us who serve in the Senate—especially 
myself—will work hard to do justice to his spirit. 
(signed) Sen. Jeanne Shaheed (NH), Feb. 27, 2012.” 
 
                                                
120 Personal correspondence with the author, 27 February 2012. 
121 Wirls and Wirls summarize the recent evolution of Senate culture in the following way:  “The modern 
Senate is defined by the combination of election-sensitive issue entrepreneurs (not unlike in the House) 
with a set of institutional norms and rules that allow and even encourage the exploitation of individual and 
minority interests (quite unlike the House).  In this way the final irony of the Senate’s development is that 
it has become the ultimate perversion of the Madisonian intention:  a Senate with greatly reduced electoral 
independence coupled with the enshrined ability to use the institution for purely individual (as opposed to 
collective) purposes—to be potentially exploited, moreover, by entrepreneurs elected for six years and 
often from relatively small states.”  See:  Wirls and Wirls, The Invention of the Senate, 213-214. 
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 In his concise and thoughtful work The Vindication of Tradition, Jaroslav Pelikan 
notes the central function past voices possess in prompting future insight and progress.  
Pelikan states, “By including the dead in the circle of discourse, we enrich the quality of 
the conversation.”122  Such an inclusion is fundamental to not only maintaining a sense 
of communal reflection on the past, but of enlivening reverence for the dead.  
“Tradition,” Pelikan famously summarizes, “is the living faith of the dead, traditionalism 
is the dead faith of the living.”123  The basis of such a relationship with the dead—and 
the combination of voices in a circle of discourse—is always an inherited gift thrust 
upon the living.  Or, as John Durham Peters has written, “In dialogue with the dead…the 
speaker must hold up both ends of the conversation.”124  What sort of conversation has 
the U.S. Senate upheld with the voice and words of Washington?  The answer, like all 
messages, varies by context.  
 As this study has suggested, the most relevant component of this peculiar mode 
of remembrance is the distinction between public display of memory and the private 
expression of recollection.  Though the Senate succeeds in forging a symbolic marriage 
between its members, its institution, and a local voice of the text, the extensional 
character of the discourse remains largely unaltered insomuch as the recollection—or 
expression of public knowledge of the text—remains secluded.  The conversation with 
Washington’s voice, in other words, is one-sided in the sense that the oralizing of the 
text does not meet a public counterpart to direct or constrain its meaning.  Within the 
                                                
122 Jaroslav Pelikan, The Vindication of Tradition (New Haven and London:  Yale University Press, 1984), 
81. 
123 Pelikan, The Vindication of Tradition, 65. 
124 John Durham Peters, Speaking Into the Air:  A History of the Idea of Communication (Chicago:  The 
University of Chicago Press, 1999), 152. 
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context of public memory studies, the Senate’s ritual of repetition appears to be 
dangerously close to imitating a dream-state.  As repetition of the Farewell Address 
continues, attendance remains abysmal, and the interior perspective of recollection is 
both invented and directed to a single consciousness, the Senate’s practice flirts with 
maintaining a political community through epideictic messages traded in intimacy.  As 
Halbwachs summarized, privatized re-enactments forge a moment that is “based only 
upon itself,” like the fragments of collective frameworks floating amid our individual 
dreams, “whereas our recollections depend on those of our fellows, and on the great 
frameworks of the memory of society.”125 
 The Farewell is read aloud to all, but understood and remembered, and 
rationalized to the present through internal reflection.  Herein lies our glimpse to the 
institutional philosophy of discourse in the United States Senate.  The reading of the 
1796 text distances the interactive and interpretive process from a collective or public 
view in favor of the private reflection, similar to the internal turn of rhetorical theory 
under George Campbell.  According to Thomas Miller, this shift in rhetoric and moral 
philosophy moved “from the sociological to the psychological, and rhetoric became 
more concerned with the workings of the individual consciousness.”126  Such a turn in 
commemorative form, as is apparent from the historical and institutional transitions in 
remembering Washington’s Farewell Address, coincides with several commentators of 
the Senate’s evolving character.  Ross Baker, among others, has noted that based on 
                                                
125 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, 42. 
126 Thomas P. Miller, repeat citation? The Formation of College English:  Rhetoric and Belles Lettres in 
the British Cultural Provinces (Pittsburgh:  The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997), 216.  
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institutional size and protocol alone, the Senate remains distinctive from other 
government bodies (such as the House of Representatives) insomuch as its procedures 
“magnify the role of the individual senator.”127  As future transitions in institutional 
identity emerge, the connection between Senate protocol and uses of discourse should be 
explored more fully and elaborated in more detail.   
 All of the above conclusions and implications are, in a strange way, repeating 
Washington’s original observation of the Senate’s institutional function with regards to 
legislation.  While George Washington’s own opinions on the Senate are open to 
interpretation, one story of his personal view carries rich precedence.  In the oft-repeated 
fable, Washington and Thomas Jefferson engage in conversation on the merits of the 
country’s new deliberative body:  “Jefferson asks George Washington why he consented 
to the idea of a Senate.  ‘Why did you pour that coffee into your saucer?’ asks 
Washington.  ‘To cool it,’ replies Jefferson. ‘Even so,’ replies Washington, ‘we pour 
legislation into the Senatorial body to cool it.’”128  As with legislation, the Senate's 
transcendence of speech and meaning speak to a longer process of applying proclaimed 
reverence to the Farewell.  Such an interior, self-congratulating focus, however, begs 
more questions on the essential importance of the rhetorical form of the deliberative 
body’s commemoration.  When personal reflection of the Farewell Address turns inward 
and, by consequence, moves the discursive construction of communal memory toward 
the institutional and personal self, the Senate takes on the public voice of Washington 
                                                
127 Ross Baker, The House and the Senate (New York:  Norton, 2008), 48. 
128 Quoted in Nicol C. Rae and Colton C. Campbell, The Contentious Senate:  Partisanship, Ideology, and 
the Myth of Cool Judgment (New York:  Roman & Littlefield, 2001), xi. 
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while only clandestinely participating in its extensional effect.  Such commemorative 
form, we should hope, extends and enriches the second life of the Farewell Address, and 
takes measures to invigorate its public memory, not to cool it. 
 According to historian Richard Baker, the Senate is an institution wherein 
“[c]hange comes slowly.”129  Provided the House of Representatives sustained a similar 
reading of the Farewell Address through the 1970s until the practice was discontinued 
because “nobody showed up,” speaks to the Senate’s unique role as the sole government 
institution purposefully and proudly embracing Washington’s 1796 text.130  A slowness 
to change, however, does not mean an intransigence to change.  In 2004 the Secretary of 
the Senate moved to upload a bulk of the Senate’s palimpsest online, ensuring that past 
reflections of Senators (only those who have retired) are available through the Senate 
webpage.131  Though still disconnected from the process of ceremonial repetition, a 
majority of the pages are public.  Now public, these concentrated artifacts of recollection 
remain distant from the act of reading the text in the present, making a connection 
between speaking and writing a difficult challenge to surmount.  Through technology, 
our insight into the dynamics of repetition has expanded.  As I turn to the next chapter of 
analysis, I raise additional questions on the influence of technology on the art of 
ceremonial repetition.  However the future of ceremonial repetition evolves, this study 
supports the growing conclusion that the memory of a text cannot live on repetition 
                                                
129 Richard Baker, Traditions of the United States Senate (Washington, D.C.:  Senate Office of Printing 
and Document Services, 2007), 1. 
130 New York Times. “Washington Farewell Address Gets Apathetic Adieu in House,” February 17th, 
1980, p. 18. 
131 Dr. Betty Koed, Associate Historian of the U.S. Senate.  Personal Correspondence with the author, 27 
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alone, but instead requires a symbolic marriage of sorts—a translation from memory to 
recollection—that alters and constrains the meaning of a text to comfortably reside in a 
new space and time.  This is a sensitive requirement, and—the Senate’s example 
notwithstanding—a rhetorical task worth pursing. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
NETWORKING THE TEXT:   
A NEW FACE OF CEREMONIAL REPETITION 
I propose the hypothesis that the network society is characterized by the breaking down of the rhythms, 
either biological or social, associated with the notion of a life-cycle. 
—Manuel Castells1 
INTRODUCTION:  NO CASINO GETTSYBURG 
 
 Sometimes a single voice is not enough.  Between autumn 2010 and spring 2011, 
a contentious debate unfolded in southern Pennsylvania on a proposed plan to build a 
casino and resort near the Gettysburg National Military Park.  Each side proposed 
different ways to “save” the city and adjoining Civil War battlefield.  For local 
philanthropist David LeVan, the solution was a proposed “Mason-Dixon Resort & 
Casino” to be located a half-mile from the battle site and memorial.  The plan met 
criticism, and, in the early months of 2011, was ultimately rejected by the Pennsylvania 
Gaming Board.2  The debate centered on perceptions of authenticity.  Proponents saw a 
solution to a troubled, small-town economy.  Opponents charged the development would 
tarnish the most sacred space of civil religion.  Perspectives spilled out in speeches, 
editorial essays, and public demonstrations.  In a noteworthy editorial supporting the 
casino plan, the Harrisburg Patriot News argued the development—though not ideal—
was no real change to the cocoon of commodity that already surrounds the historic 
                                                
1 Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society—The Information Age:  Economy, Society, and 
Culture, Volume I, 2nd Edition, 476. 
2 Laura Bly, “No Dice:  Gaming Board Rejects Gettysburg Casino,” USA Today, 14 April 2010, 
[http://travel.usatoday.com/destinations/dispatches/post/2011/04/gettysburg-pa-casino-gambling-license-
civil-war-/155900/1]. 
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space:  “Down the road from where Gen. George Picket made his bloody charge,” the 
paper wrote, “there are gift shops that sell Gettysburg general shot glasses, Abe Lincoln 
bobbleheads and commemorative beer pocket coolies and bikini underwear,” all of 
which are smaller fragments next to larger restaurants “named after famous Civil War 
figures” and the “cottage industry of ghost tours” profiting from fables of dead soldiers.3  
How would opponents of the plan convey the sanctity of public space? 
 Surprisingly, Lincoln’s own words became part of the most sophisticated appeal 
in the debate on whether or not to build a casino near Gettysburg.  The No Casino 
Gettysburg Network, a collaboration of local and national voices opposed to the plan, 
produced a litany of videotexts testifying to the virtues of Gettysburg as sacred space, 
and the downfall of commercial development in the area.  Voices like documentary 
filmmaker Ken Burns, popular historian David McCullough, and Susan Eisenhower 
(granddaughter of the former president, and resident of Gettysburg) lent credence to the 
space as an iconic, irreplaceable, and vulnerable treasure of high status.4  The group 
produced short films interspersed with interviews from well-known opponents that 
featured monuments and landscape from the battle site.  Selections from John Williams’s 
score of Saving Private Ryan added dramatic effect.5  One film, however, stands out 
among others.  Dispensing with claims or informed historical testimony, producers 
created a recitation of Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address divided among several readers and 
                                                
3 Harrisburg Patriot News, “Gettysburg Casino Should Get Final Resort License,” 5 December 2010, 
accessed from [http://www.pennlive.com/editorials/index.ssf/2010/12/gettysburg_you_bet_anti-
casino.html] on 1 May 2012. 
4 No Casino Gettysburg Network, homepage at [http://nocasinogettysburg.ning.com/] 
5 USA Today, “Gettysburg Casino Opponents Make Last-Minute Video Appeals,” 7 December 2010.  
Accessed from [http://travel.usatoday.com/destinations/dispatches/post/2010/12/gettysburg-casino-
opponents-make-last-minute-video-appeals/133894/1] on 1 May 2012. 
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intercut with both historical and contemporary scenes of the memorial site.  The result 
was a tele-visual reimagining of the text, a repetition for the digital age.  As an oral 
exercise, this Gettysburg Address featured only small literal deviations from Lincoln’s 
original text.  The new battle for Gettysburg was a rhetorical—not military—contest.  
Raising Lincoln’s voice seemed an insurmountable defense of sacred space. 
 Lincoln’s masterpiece has been equally admired and adaptable.6  Rhetorical critic 
Edwin Black called the speech a compelling artifact for its “prismatic” quality:  “its fires 
are somehow both protean and integral.”7  Sociologist Barry Schwartz has situated the 
text as a “verbal totem” by which communities negotiate their attachments, values, and 
concerns by re-reading Lincoln’s words.8  Multiple ideological movements—even 
historians—have read Lincoln’s text outside its original function as an encomium of 
national rebirth by positioning it next to a range of twentieth-century movements, such 
as progressivism, suffrage, and civil rights.9  No Casino Gettysburg adopts the address 
for its own sake, but does so in a way that ushers own attention to a new form of reading 
accurately described as a networking of the text.  The production invites a familiar 
conclusion for a new situation.  As Merrill Peterson claimed, Lincoln’s status as “the 
Christian archetype” of American civil religion designated his 1863 speech at 
                                                
6 In the most enduring reading of the text to date, Garry Wills has argued that Lincoln’s speech was “an 
authoritative expression of the American experience—as authoritative as the Declaration itself, and 
perhaps even more influential, since it determines how we read the declaration.”  See, Lincoln at 
Gettysburg:  The Words That Changed America (New York:  Simon and Schuster, 1992), 147. 
7 Edwin Black, “Gettysburg and Silence” Quarterly Journal of Speech 80 (1994):  22. 
8 Barry Schwartz, “Rereading the Gettysburg Address” Qualitative Sociology 19 (1996): 415. 
9 Barry Schwartz, “The New Gettysburg Address:  Fusing History and Memory” Poetics 33 (2005):  66-
69. 
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Gettysburg as a “prophetic text.”10  Instead of arguing that Lincoln’s call for “a rebirth of 
freedom” should be interpreted for a new cause, the 2010 video recital implies that we 
can understand what to do with the Gettysburg memorial by juxtaposing of the words of 
the text with resonant images of the battlefield.  In other words, viewers were invited to 
see how the answer to the question of development was lodged in Lincoln’s words.  
Only by reimagining the original meaning could this relationship meet public display.  
The result is a splintering effect not only on what is seen, but also on what is heard.  Six 
participants lend voice to the text, and within two and a half minutes the identity of the 
speaker alternates twenty-three times, with many more visual transitions designed to 
accompany the progression of the speech.  Any recital could attempt to reproduce or re-
enact the Gettysburg Address as Lincoln delivered it.  In the midst of a debate on 
whether or not a casino venture would tarnish the authenticity of sacred space, No 
Casino Gettysburg utilized this production to refute the exploitation of sacred soil while 
implying the immediate intimacy of Lincoln’s words reimagined [See Figure 6]. 
 No Casino Gettysburg’s take of Lincoln’s address invites the inference that 
Lincoln’s speech can reconcile the controversy over the casino development.  To achieve 
this conclusion, the video is organized around contrasting visions of past and present 
strategically intersecting voices and images in the pacing and flow of the text.  The film 
begins with a scenic black and white photo of rural landscape that dissolves into recently 
unearthed photographs of Lincoln at the 1863 dedication at Gettysburg, and, finally, to a 
close perspective of Lincoln in a sitting position, which finally transitions to an image of 
                                                
10 Merrill Peterson, Lincoln in American Memory (Oxford and New York:  Oxford University Press, 
1994), 361. 
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the first reader, Sam Waterston.   Lincoln’s original summary of the nation’s principle 
that “all men are created equal” is thrice repeated for effect, timed with images of white 
and black regiments of the Union army, adding visual and verbal significance to 
egalitarian race relations.  The production updates the conflict in question—not one of 
equality or geographic distinctions, but the conflict of authentic space. 
 A second scenic view, like that which begins the film, updates the vision and 
meaning of the words repeated.  This is a contemporary setting represented with a color-
image of a rural farmhouse and truck moving down a road, much like the landscape shot 
that began the film.  The distance between past and present is bridged through the 
associated images timed with the progress of the text.  Two scenic shots invite viewers 
to recognize the past history of the Gettysburg Address (timed with the first black-and-
white image of landscape), while viewing the contemporary moment as the new conflict 
described in the text (timed with the second color-image of modern landscape).   
 Lincoln’s reference to the immediate context of 1863 is timed to coincide with 
the updated scenery, isolating the contested place of the new millennium:  “We are now 
engaged in a great Civil War testing whether that nation or any nation so dedicated, can 
long endure.”  The past is not the Founding Fathers as it was for Lincoln, but Lincoln 
himself; the present is not 1863, but 2010.  In the new contest—fused with image and 
speech—the “struggle” or “battle” is not the Civil War (or not just the Civil War), or the 
meaning of the United States, but the meaning of Gettysburg as an unadulterated vestige 
of memory.  
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FIGURE 6  No Casino Gettysburg Film Sills, Part One.  These images are taken from the “No 
Casino Gettysburg” production of Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, 2010. Connecting different 
“fields” of battle, the video matches separate contests across time and space: “Fourscore and 
seven years ago, our forefathers brought forth to this great continent a new nation, conceived in 
liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.  We are now engaged in 
a great Civil War, testing whether that nation or any nation so dedicated, can long endure.”11 
 The implicit conclusion that Lincoln’s speech prophetically answers the call of 
protesters in 2010 continues as the reading progresses.  The film trades grotesque images 
of dead Union soldiers with gravestones, monuments, and close-up images of the 
                                                
11 The “No Casino Gettysburg” films were produced with the generous volunteer contributions of actors, 
filmmakers, and composers.  See, No Casino Gettysburg, “The Gettysburg Address.”  Accessed from 
[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kMMzY1KJVeo] on 1 March 2011.  Images used with permission of 
the producers. 
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Gettysburg Address etched in stone.  Readers implore listeners of their responsibilities to 
the past.  Indeed, a later portion of the text—emphasized with repetition of the phrase 
that listeners can “never forget” the virtues of the dead—is designed with visual 
reverence to the monuments of Gettysburg.  Lincoln’s original call for renewed 
dedication to the cause “so nobly advanced” and taken up by the living creates a new 
context for imagining the updated struggle for authenticity.  This portion of the film 
intersects images of readers parsing the text interchanged with monuments—literal 
dedications—and visitors milling about the park; an image of respectful dedication in the 
literal sense of observance, not meddling [See Figure 7]. 
 The sense of devotion and “dedication”—a phrase with a roving meaning in 
Lincoln’s usage—is visually conveyed with images of monuments paying respect for the 
dead.  In step-with Ken Burns’ reading of “us” being “here dedicated,” moreover, are the 
images of tourists milling through a bridge entering the site.  Lincoln’s term “dedicate” 
is expanded once more to be respectful attention to the past, an eschewing of any risk 
that may result in losing the site’s authentic meaning.  This production doesn’t mention 
the casino project by name, and only once draws viewers to the organization’s website 
with the added text, “Save Gettysburg” to conclude the film.  The notion of development 
has, however, been likened to a formidable foe threatening the soul of American history.  
This overproduction of the text presents Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address as both an old 
and a new appeal to dedication—verbal and visual metonymy of preserved history in the 
form of traditional monuments.   
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FIGURE 7  No Casino Gettysburg Film Stills, Part Two.  “It is for us the living rather, to be dedicated to 
the unfinished work which they fought here and thus far so nobly advanced.  It is, rather, for us to be here 
dedicated, to the great task remaining before us.”  Images used with kind permission. 
 
 No Casino Gettysburg attempts to unlock a deeper (but thinner) meaning of the 
text by turning the endgame of the message from a renewal of freedom to an idyllic 
concept of maintaining history, anchored in remembrance of the dead and respectful 
reverence.  This recital, in other words, is appealing to draw two paths from Lincoln’s 
words by their association with the timed images.  In one path, Lincoln’s speech remains 
a touching monument to the ideals of equality and freedom forged in a time of crisis.  In 
another path, the reverence for the dead is reframed as reverence for the speech itself, for 
Lincoln himself, and for the honored dead.  Placed in the context of the controversy, 
remembering the Gettysburg Address means protecting—“to be here dedicated”—the 
space and the speech from outside incursion, and assuming the status quo of respectful 
tourism.  The audience’s task, in this upending of time, is not to continue the task of 
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renewing the country’s virtue of democratic principles, or even to remember the 
Gettysburg Address as an encomium, but to preserve sacred soil by remaining vigilant of 
encroachments on history.  Maintaining the public scenery has surpassed the previous 
invitation to maintain a public idea. 
 Confusion arises, finally, as to the significance of this production’s readers.  
Consistent with the preservation of history imagined in monumental form, the selective 
elements of each reader’s biography contribute to the popular image of American 
history.  With the exception of Paul Bucha, a Medal of Honor Recipient, each reader has 
popularized or represented American history in popular form.  Actors Stephen Lang, 
Sam Waterston, and Matthew Broderick have each played either Lincoln, or other well-
known figures of the American Civil War; Ken Burns, lastly, is the producer of a 
popular documentary, The Civil War, which represents, in the words of Eric Foner, “the 
most successful presentation of history for a broad popular audience during the 1990s.”12  
McCullough’s presence is puzzling, except when positioned as a well-known author of 
American history, though not particularly in antebellum era writing.  To rationalize each 
voice as Lincoln, listeners and viewers need to appropriate an image of war and 
history—whether that image is one of participation in past wars, producer of popular 
media.  Stephen Lang should not be his villainous character from the 2009 film Avatar; 
Broderick should not be the namesake from Ferris Bueller’s Day Off; Waterston should 
not be a tough lawyer from Law & Order.  To save the memory of Gettysburg, the No 
Casino Gettysburg campaign employed voices that collectively spoke to an image of 
                                                
12 Eric Foner, Who Owns History?  Rethinking the Past in a Changing World (New York:  Hill and Wang, 
2002), 189. 
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history and war informed largely by premises of popular culture, a hotchpot reading that 
reinforces the distance between respectful memories of the past from the adulterating 
stain of capitalist ventures on civil religious soil.   
 No Casino Gettysburg’s example is recounted at length as a way of introducing 
the new world of repetition in twenty-first century practice.  This artifact upends our 
conceptions of how place, time, and persona are conceived in the traditional act of 
reading.  Though not ceremonial in the traditional sense of being organized around a 
national holiday or communal remembrance, the above treatment of Lincoln’s speech 
offers a preview for the style and form by which contemporary publics and communities 
have remembered and repeated their revered texts.  In this chapter I argue that 
contemporary practices of ceremonial repetition have embraced a network sensibility 
both within media channels and without.  This heightened emphasis on splintering the 
text results in a greater emphasis on implied relationships between words, images, and 
bodies than has been discussed in preceding chapters.  The remarkable characteristic of 
contemporary episodes of ceremonial repetition is the dichotomous gulf between an 
overabundance of associative relations forged in a digital environment, and the 
seemingly austere modes of speaking through multiple voices in traditional public 
settings.  The adoption of a style, I argue in later examples, has resulted in greater 
opportunity to convey and reconstitute the meaning of a text while also adding greater 
weight to how the purpose of remembrance is conveyed.   
 In addition to exploring the network style in ceremonial repetition, this chapter 
emphasizes the rhetorical possibilities and limitations regarding materiality and 
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ceremonial repetition.  As Carole Blair has suggested, texts must be inhabited in some 
substantive form to be recognized.  “Rhetoric is not rhetoric until it is uttered, written, or 
otherwise manifested or given presence,” Blair has argued.13  Material adaptations in 
space and time become a major source of harnessing or altering the impact of such 
rhetoric.  For the examples included in the remainder of this chapter, materiality refers to 
texts operating within both media environments as well as physical environments of 
place.  “Reproduction is an intervention in the materiality of the text,” Blair continues, 
“and it is important to grapple with the degrees and kinds of change wrought by it.”14  
The material fusion of image and text, place and text, and body and text invite certain 
presumptions of public memory intended from an act of reading.  To facilitate this 
exploration of material and rhetorical intersection, I first review the relevant features of 
Aristotle’s enthymeme as a useful framework to analyze the mixture of cues bound up in 
a networked text.  Second, I elaborate on the precise features of a network sensibility, 
how it is attributed to new media environments, and how such practices are translated in 
public performances beyond the scope of video production.  Finally, I analyze three 
relevant case studies that exemplify the contemporary turn toward networking the text as 
ceremonial repetition.   
 The examples analyzed in this chapter can be grouped in two distinctive contexts, 
each with a distinctive material form.  In one environment, the digital splintering and 
matching of words to images, people, and places occur in a media environment.  The No 
                                                
13 Carole Blair, “Contemporary U.S. Memorial Sites as Exemplars of Rhetoric’s Materiality,” in 
Rhetorical Bodies, edited by Jack Selzer and Sharon Crowley (Madison:  The University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1999), 18. 
14 Carole Blair, “Contemporary U.S. Memorial Sites as Exemplars of Rhetoric’s Materialitiy,” 38. 
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Casino Gettysburg example above and the FOX Sports’ reading of the Declaration of 
Independence described later illustrate this subset.  In another environment, text, image, 
persona, and place again merge through multiple voices, though here in a physical—not 
media—place, exemplified in two distinctive readings:  The recital of the U.S. 
Constitution in the House of Representatives, and the reading of Martin Luther King 
Jr.’s “I Have a Dream speech by Watkins Elementary School students in Washington, 
D.C.  Each example illustrates the blessing and bane of reimagining a text in the age of 
the network.   
 More than other examples introduced in this study, moreover, the act of 
networking the text brings to the fore a fundamental question introduced in Walter 
Benjamin’s important essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.”  
Contrary to the claim that repetition extends and illuminates the life of a text outlined in 
chapter two, Benjamin stressed the tension between art and its replica, noting how the 
“aura” is lost in reproduction.  The “authenticity” is “jeopardized by reproduction when 
substantive duration ceases to matter,” Benjamin noted, “[a]nd what is really jeopardized 
when the historical testimony is affected is the authority of the object.”15  John Durham 
Peters clarifies this point when he compares art to “a mortal being,” which “has a 
unique, irreplaceable body from which it cannot be separated without dying in some 
way.”16  As I argue in the pages that follow, the network style—regardless of its 
                                                
15 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, ed, Hannah Arendt, (New York:  Schocken Books, 1968), 221. 
16 John Durham Peters, Speaking Into the Air:  The History of the Idea of Communication (Chicago and 
London:  The University of Chicago Press, 1999), 238. 
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application inside or outside a media environment—inherits potentials and pitfalls that 
call into question the quality of a text’s life in the age of seemingly endless repetition. 
ENTHYMEMES LIVING IN MEDIA ENVIRONMENTS 
 Aristotle’s definition of the enthymeme is vital to determining the suggested 
memory of ceremonial repetition, particularly when the act of reading combines 
different forms (verbal and visual) in reimagining the text.  The enthymeme is “the 
‘body’ of persuasion,” Aristotle wrote, representing a syllogistic conclusion with one or 
more premises brought into being by the audience.17  Paradigm reasoning (inductive) is 
distinctive from enthymematic reasoning (deductive), Aristotle noted, primarily because 
of a speaker’s selection of premises.  When speakers rely on an audience accepting a 
premise, furthermore, “it does not have to be stated, since the hearer supplies it.”18  In 
Book Two of On Rhetoric, Aristotle noted that a conclusion derived from premises can 
be presumed by the audience as either “demonstrative” of agreed fact or “refutative” of 
agreed difference.19  Elaborating these sketches of the enthymeme’s importance and 
functions, Lloyd Bitzer draws further clarification.  To suggest an enthymeme is an 
“incomplete syllogism” is not entirely clear, Bitzer suggests.  By contrast, such a 
description should imply that 
 the speaker does not lay down his premises but lets his audience supply them out of its stock 
 knowledge of opinion and knowledge.  This does not mean that premises are never verbalized, 
 although to verbalize them often amounts to redundancy and poor rhetorical taste.  Whether or 
 not premises are verbalized is of no logical importance.  What is of great rhetorical importance, 
 however, is that the premises of enthymemes be supplied by the audience.20 
 
                                                
17 Aristotle, On Rhetoric:  A Theory of Civic Discourse, translated by George Kennedy (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 1991), 30. 
18 Aristotle, On Rhetoric, 42. 
19 Aristotle, On Rhetoric, 187-189. 
20 Lloyd Bitzer, “Aristotle’s Enthymeme Revisited” Quarterly Journal of Speech 45 (1959):  407. 
  228 
Comprehending the enthymeme is like interpreting a non-existent question-and-answer 
session, Bitzer claimed:  enthymemes occur “only when speaker and audience jointly 
produce them.”21  If critics analyzing a text for its enthymematic qualities must account 
for agreed-upon premises, what may comprise a premise?  Thomas Conley posits that a 
speaker’s use of examples, probabilities, and general signs could hypothetically 
constitute a premise in such reasoning and analysis.22   
 The extensional constitutive life of a text performed in repetition benefits from 
an enthymematic reading.  As J. Anthony Blair has argued, visual messages can be 
argumentative, and by implication of Conley’s reference to signs as premises, a key part 
of an enthymematic design.  Blair specifically has noted that visual messages must 
engage a reader’s “choice buttons” in terms of belief, attitude, or action in order to be 
deem argumentative:  “Once the choice light flashes,” in Blair’s words, “persuasion is 
occurring.”23  Cara Finnegan further supports the designation of visual images as key 
premises.  In her analysis of contested photographs depicting evidence of drought 
conditions in the 1930s, she describes the “naturalistic enthymeme,” or the process by 
which “the viewer of the photograph ‘fills in the blank’ with the assumption that the 
image is ‘real,’” or an unadulterated representation of the world.24   
                                                
21 Bitzer, “Aristotle’s Enthymeme Revisited,” 408; Also see Walter Fisher, “Uses of the Enthymeme,” 
Speech Teacher 13 (1964): 197-203. 
22 Thomas Conley, “The Enthymeme in Perspective” Quarterly Journal of Speech 70 (1984):  169.  The 
thesis that signs can be used as premises is echoed in Valerie J. Smith, “Aristotle’s Classical Enthymeme 
and the Visual Argumentation of the Twenty-First Century” Argumentation and Advocacy 43 (Winter-
Spring 2007):  117. 
23 J. Anthony Blair, “The Possibility and Actuality of Visual Arguments” Argumentation and Advocacy 33 
(Summer 1996):  36. 
24 Cara Finnegan, “The Naturalistic Enthymeme and Visual Argument:  Photographic Representation in 
the ‘Skull Controversy,’” Argumentation and Advocacy 37 (Winter 2001), 143; Also see Finnegan’s 
discussion of “image vernaculars,” or the “enthymematic modes of reasoning employed by audiences in 
  229 
 An enthymematic approach to ceremonial repetition, though implied in previous 
chapters, is essential to critically evaluate the range of symbolic associations built into 
readings profiled in this chapter.  By scrutinizing moments of repetition for the unstated 
premise invited from a producer or speaker to an “ideal reader,” critics can account for 
the predominant memory by which past words are reimagined in public display.25  Our 
present historical moment, by contrast, finds texts conveyed through multiple voices and 
splintered with a dizzying array of suggestive visual and verbal cues, complicating the 
critical task.  As the content and form of a message interact, so too the nature of such 
interaction—and the enthymematic relations implied therein—are shaped and defined by 
the channel or media by which a message is communicated. 
 Communication theorists have long been fascinated by the influence of media.  
As Raymond Williams summarized, “media” was presumed to be “an intervening or 
intermediate agency or substance” up through the 17th century, only later to be defined 
as a short-hand reference to “broadcast service.”26  The importance of media in 
communication studies was argued most forcefully by Marshall McLuhan, who 
                                                                                                                                           
the context of specific practices of reading and viewing in visual cultures,” elaborated in her work, 
“Recognizing Lincoln:  Image Vernaculars in Nineteenth-Century Visual Cultures” Rhetoric & Public 
Affairs 8 (2005):  31-58. 
25 The “ideal reader” is a key dimension to constitutive theories of rhetoric described in chapter two, and 
elaborated in detail by James Boyd White.  For clarity, White noted that the ideal reader is “a character in 
the world created by the text.  For in acting on the reader as he does, the writer calls on him to function out 
of what he knows and is—for one who brings nothing to a text cannot be a reader of it—and to realize 
some of his possibilities for perception and response, for making judgments and taking positions.  To 
engage with a text is to become different from what one was.  There is a sense in which every text may be 
said to define an ideal reader, which it asks its audience to become, or to approximate, for the moment as 
least, and forever perhaps.”  See White, When Words Lose Their Meaning:  Constitutions and 
Reconstitutions of Language, Character, and Community (Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press, 
1984), 15. 
26 Raymond Williams, Keywords:  A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, Revised Edition (New York:  
Oxford University Press, 1983), 203. 
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famously posited both that “the medium is the message,” and mediums are also an 
“extension of ourselves” shaping the “scale and form of human association and 
action.”27  Mark B. N. Hansen has offered additional insight to McLuhan’s thesis.  For 
Hansen media are not merely channels for producing messages, but the means of also 
interpreting messages.  “Even though there is and can be no such thing as a medium 
without content,” he notes, “to reduce the social impact of a medium to the content it 
conveys is to overlook the profound changes that ensue from revolutions in cultural 
techniques of information processing and consumption.”28  When we observe a message 
being transferred into a new medium, we are witnesses to an upending of how the 
message is (re)produced and observed.  For W. J. T. Mitchell, this means that media act 
as more of a “support system” than mere “support” in conveying a text:  “Like 
organisms, they [texts] can move from one media environment to another, so that a 
verbal image can be reborn in a painting or a photograph, and a sculpted image can be 
rendered in cinema or virtual reality.”29  To translate this observation to our own 
concerns, texts not only live second lives, but also live in distinctive rhetorical 
environments, sometimes transplanted from oral speech to video production; from 
written text to oral performance; from a singular expression to a network of voices.  
Each choice alters the shape and potential of speech remade for the imagination. 
                                                
27 Marshall McLuhan, “Understanding Media,” in Essential McLuhan, edited by Eric McLuhan and Frank 
Zingrone (New York:  Basic Books, 1995), 151-152. 
28 Mark B. N. Hansen, “New Media,” in Critical Terms for Media Studies, eds. W. J. T. Mitchell and Mark 
B. N. Hansen (Chicago and London:  The University of Chicago Press, 2010), 175. 
29 W. J. T. Mitchell, What Do Pictures Want?  The Lives and Loves of Images (Chicago and London:  The 
University of Chicago Press, 2005), 203 and 216. 
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 As numerous critics agree, the transition of message content to television and 
online environments has been unmistakable.  Kathleen Hall Jamieson highlighted the 
altered form of public discourse with the new environments of radio and television.  
“Electricity,” Jamieson noted, “transported communication into an intimate 
environment,” shifting a speaker’s focus from the stump environment to the home 
environment, while also prompting the rise of autobiographical and narrative styles to 
replace the fiery confrontation traditional to political oratory.30  Electricity alone did not 
alter the form of communication in the media age, however.  The key word defining the 
new media environments of the twenty-first century is “network,” a term Alexander R. 
Galloway defines as the fusion of “the Old Saxon words net, an open-weave fabric used 
for catching or confining animals or objects, and werk, both an act of doing and the 
structure or thing resulting from the act.”31  The network is the energy and backdrop for 
ceremonial repetition, beckoning listeners to understand and remember texts “as systems 
of connectivity.”32  The network atmosphere of cyberspace technologies represent “new 
realms of space—or a third nature—generated by digital computation and 
communication flows of numerical data encrypted to represented video images, spoken 
language, musical performances, textual script, graphic displays or hardware 
instructions.”33  Life, messages, and space itself, in other words, exists online.  Jorge 
                                                
30 Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Eloquence in an Electronic Age:  The Transformation of Political 
Speechmaking (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1988), 55. 
31 Alexander R. Galloway, “Networks,” in Critical Terms for Media Studies, eds. W. J. T. Mitchell and 
Mark B. N. Hansen (Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press, 2010), 283. 
32 Galloway, “Networks,” 283. 
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Reina Schement and Terry Curtis elaborate on the nature of cyberspace as a network of 
communal attachments, variant from other media, when they suggest 
 [i]ndividuals who live fragmented lives continue to experience the desire for community and for 
 dialogue.  As social, family, and political attachments weaken, individuals recreate 
 interconnectedness through the use of communication technologies.  Increasingly, Americans live 
 in communities structured by communication networks.  These communities exist as connections 
 without the geographic boundaries of village or town.  In a highly mobile population friends and 
 even the nuclear family stay ‘together’ through frequent telephone calls, shared audio and 
 videocassettes, and a few letters.  Their actual physical contact sometimes only occurs between 
 long intervals of separation.  These communities constitute both a response to fragmentation and 
 a reification of fragmentation.  In effect, they are virtual communities.34 
 
This description of contemporary public messages further supports the notion that texts 
also live within the emerging network of human communication.  Like the family and 
friend connection noted by Schement and Curtis, the text repeated can live outside 
physical space and yet still invite and connect a range of viewers and listeners around its 
suggested meaning.   
 Manuel Castells argues that the impact of network associations has influenced 
nearly every facet of contemporary life.  In his influential work The Rise of the Network 
Society, Castells presents a sprawling overview on the social, political, and cultural 
implications of a world wherein the flow of information undergoes radical alteration:  
messages once thought to be whole and sent in a linear direction are now splintered into 
shortcuts that defy presumptions of time, space, and subjectivity.  In Castells’ words, 
“societies are organized around human processes structured by historically determined 
relationship of production, experience, and power,” and the information age is nothing 
                                                                                                                                           
33 Timothy W. Luke, “Simulated Sovereignty, Telematic Territoriality:  The Political Economy of 
Cyberspace,” Spaces of Culture:  City, Nation, World, edited by Mike Featherstone and Scott Lash (New 
Brunswick and London:  Transaction Publishers, 1995), 148. 
34 Jorge Reina Schement and Terry Curtis, Tendencies and Tensions of the Information Age:  The 
Production and Distribution of Information in the United States (New Brunswick and London:  
Transaction Publishers, 1995), 148. 
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less than “the emergence of a new social structure.”35  What characteristics might we 
locate in this new media environment (arguably a new media world)?  Foremost among 
the changes relative to ceremonial repetition are perceptions of time and space.  We no 
longer perceive information in spaces, but instead experience messages through “a 
process,” Castells calls the “space of flows,” an uncertain terrain set up around electronic 
connections that “links up specific places, with well-defined social, cultural, and 
functional characteristics.”36  Rather than gather around the Old House of 
Representatives, or any number of city halls or churches, our meeting place in the 
networking of a message is beyond our physical experience.  I need not be or even know 
about Gettysburg, Pennsylvania to become a witness to Lincoln’s text renewed.  We live 
in places.  We experience information, however, in an abstract sense:  “meaning is 
increasing separated from knowledge,” ushering “a structural schizophrenia between two 
spatial logics that threatens to break down communication channels in society.”37   
 While traditional conceptions of time may have been organized around the 
certainty of death, a network sense of information has effectively postponed death 
indefinitely, meaning we are “in the midst of mixing tenses to create a forever universe, 
not a self-expanding but self-maintaining, not cyclical but random, not recursive but 
incursive:  timeless time, using technology to escape the contexts of its existence, and to 
appropriate selectively any value each context could offer in the ever-present.”38  Pushed 
to a greater degree, the information network sensibility is a compression of our temporal 
                                                
35 Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, 2nd Edition (Chichester, West Sussex, United 
Kingdom:  Wily-Blackwell, 2010), 14 and 26, emphasis in original. 
36 Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, 443. 
37 Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, 458. 
38 Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, 464. 
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senses, and therefore an elimination of time as planned or experienced sequentially.  
Indeed, I need not encounter No Casino Gettysburg’s artifact prior to the Pennsylvania 
Gaming Board’s decision to cancel the proposed plan.  The repetition is, in short, flying 
through cyberspace.  As a viewer, I encounter the message beyond any traditional sense 
of space, and outside the prescribed limits of time.  To repeat the Farewell Address in 
perpetuity in the U.S. Senate, furthermore, is to mark the yearly rotation of time until the 
third week of February.  When repetition moves into the media environment, however, 
the associational relationship between text and time, or text and place, is upset—
occurring in this time and every time in the viewer’s experience, and, even more, beyond 
the space of communal reflection in the “space of flows.”   
 When I suggest that a moment of ceremonial repetition is enacting a text with a 
network sensibility, I am primarily proposing two important observations.  First, the text 
inhabits a media environment that enables its presence to be altered or affected by that 
medium’s arrangement of time, space, and subjectivity of an audience.  Second, this text 
also takes on the norms of a network of connections.  This means a transition has 
occurred from a singular, mono-voiced performance of a text to a multi-faceted, poly-
vocal presence of a text repeated.  Some repetitions carry both components of the 
network sensibility.  Repetitions by the U.S. House of Representatives and the Watkins 
Elementary students incorporate the second—not the first—component of this style.    
Without focusing on ceremonial repetition per se, David Birdsell and Leo Groarke note 
how this networking effect might look in the realm of visual communication: 
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 Shot length has been reduced in almost all commercial television, and the number of shots per 
 minute has surged.  Much as cubism tried to present multiple perspectives unfolding over time 
 and/or space on a single, two dimensional frame, the quick-cut video editing style of the 1990’s 
 prefers several quick perspectives on a subject over the single, probing, shot that holds an image 
 for minutes at a time.  The result is a combination of visuals that decenters a unitary 
 perspectivism.  No one camera is all-knowing and the subject is deliberately distorted with the 
 use of negative effects or other filters that ‘reveal’ different elements of the subject-as-source of 
 videographic play.39 
 
These observations illustrate the intricate complexity of both the No Casino Gettysburg 
production and the later ceremonial recitations outlined in the following pages.  In 
contemporary ceremonial repetition, no one voice is the single authority or channel of 
the text.  Listeners experience the words of another as not only re-imagined with a 
voluminous display of images, but through a myriad echo of voices.  The text, in short, 
is fragmented, splintered, and branched through voices that redirect the flow of a speech 
on pivots occurring at the sentence or word level, yet each connects to one another while 
to, taken together, give the semblance of completed discourse.  In the following analysis, 
I elaborate on the implied enthymematic possibilities enacted when the life of reading is 
either experienced in or transferred from the digital world and the physical world alike.  
By critically evaluating the relationships between sight and sound, we may posit not 
only the implied memory of a public address inherent in its performance, but also better 
understand the limits and potentials of ceremonial repetition in a new age. 
Flirting With Simulacrum:  The Declaration Of Independence, 2002-2011 
 In his justification for analyzing the Declaration of Independence as a rhetorical 
document, Stephen Lucas noted that the “apotheosis of the Declaration as a sacred creed 
is so deeply embedded in our national consciousness that we typically see its original 
                                                
39 David Birdsell and Leo Groarke, “Toward a Theory of Visual Argument” Argumentation and Advocacy 
33 (Summer 1996):  7. 
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purpose in universal terms almost totally divorced from the events of 1776.”40  As 
several studies have noted, the original document was a public appeal to formally break 
ties between American colonies and Great Britain.  For James Boyd White, the text 
presents its reader with a new constitutive framework, “meant to work a change of 
feeling in the reader:  to move him from his ordinary state of consciousness, in which his 
ordinary sense of value and civilization operate, into a willingness to pledge his all in a 
battle to save the country it has defined as his.”41  Crafted with a clear purpose and 
remembered well beyond its original scope, the Declaration of Independence has 
garnered a unique reputation through repetition, none more compelling for analysis than 
the recent trend initiated by FOX Sports of melding the text with the American Super 
Bowl. 
 The Declaration does not easily lend itself to the repetitive act.  As Pauline Maier 
notes, however, recitations were the most common way the text was “made known” 
following its publication.  Some readings were than informative.  Indeed, recitations 
were performed by the Continental Army, directed by George Washington, and 
deliberately displayed within sight of British troops.42  Formal ceremonial performances 
of the text ebbed in the first two decades after it was published, but took on added 
significance within the partisan rancor of the 1790s.  Federalists considered the Fourth of 
July a “rite of passage” that was “consummated”; Republicans, by contrast, framed the 
                                                
40 Stephen E. Lucas, “Justifying America:  The Declaration of Independence as a Rhetorical Document,” 
ed, Thomas W. Benson, American Rhetoric:  Context and Criticism (Carbondale, IL:  Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1989), 68. 
41 James Boyd White, When Words Lose Their Meaning:  Constitutions and Reconstitutions of Language, 
Character, and Community (Chicago and London:  The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 239. 
42 Pauline Maier, American Scripture:  How America Declared Its Independence From Britain (London:  
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holiday as evidence of “promises not yet fulfilled,” and still “unfolding.”43  It is little 
wonder, then, that partisan interests molded separate celebrations; Federalists largely 
ignored recitations of the Declaration while Republicans relished the yearly reminder of 
Jefferson’s centrality to the American political experience, and, hopefully, a new 
political era.44  It was not until the War of 1812 and dissipating factionalism between the 
two major political rivals when the reading of the Declaration of Independence was 
reconstituted with “new meaning and vigor” for the generation removed from the 
Revolutionary War.45  Though it remains unclear how nineteenth-century 
commemorations remembered the text’s relation to its historical origin, efforts to 
visualize the founding document of the United States has been an equally challenging 
and robust effort. 
 Jefferson’s text outlived both the author and the original purpose, taking on a 
new role as a “sacred document” essential for anyone seeking “the moral high ground in 
public debate.”46  In addition to being central to the antislavery arguments of the 1850s 
and 1860s, the Declaration was often transplanted from its customary celebration date of 
July 4th to August 1st, marking Freedom Day celebrations with the implied promise of 
actualizing the text’s original idea.  Preceding a collective focus on the Emancipation 
Proclamation, it was common to hear the Declaration of Independence read aloud, 
                                                
43 Len Travers, Celebrating the Fourth:  Independence Day and the Rites of Nationalism in the Early 
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44 Travers, Celebrating the Fourth, 184. 
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sometimes in conjunction with state laws granting slaves emancipation.47  Ties between 
founding promises and antebellum politics also took on visual expressions.  In an 1861 
lithograph titled “The American Declaration of Independence Illustrated,” artist 
Dominique Fabronious depicts a striking juxtaposition of text and American race 
relations.  At the center of the image, Fabronious presents two men—one black and one 
white—in a basket raised by an American eagle.  The freed slave casts off his chains and 
his white counterpart proclaims, “Break every Yoke; let the oppressed go free.”  With 
clear inspiration from Jefferson’s text, the two Stars and Stripes flags bear the mottoes, 
“All Men are Created Equal,” and “Stand by the Declaration.”48  Absent the act of 
repetition, the lithograph brings the founding document before the eyes, prompting 
viewers to expand the meaning of the text for the political moment.   
 Visualizing the Declaration of Independence through performance is no easy 
task, however.  As previous scholars have noted, the text is most potently rich when read 
as an elaborate justification for Revolution (military or political), yet remains undeniably 
powerful as a source of moral contemplation beyond original intent.  Following the 
traumatizing events of 11 September 2001, the Declaration of Independence experienced 
newfound relevancy in public display.  Bradford Vivian’s analysis of the one-year 
commemoration of 9/11, which featured a recital of the Declaration’s introduction and 
preamble, highlighted the manner by which sacrosanct texts were positioned as 
“neoliberal epideictic,” or an “apolitical vocabulary of democratic excellence,” absent 
                                                
47 J. R. Kerr-Ritchie, Rites of August First:  Emancipation Day in the Black Atlantic World (Baton Rouge, 
LA:  Louisiana State University Press, 2007), 112. 
48 “The American Declaration of Independence Illustrated,” published by Thayer and Co. (Boston), 1861.  
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historical context or the cultivation of civic virtue.49  Neoliberal epideictic, Vivian 
concluded, “reduces the rhetorical rituals of public memory to discursive forms deprived 
of deliberative consequence, to mere symbols of tradition.”50  Though tempting as a 
ceremonial fixture to nothing in particular, the Declaration has also proven itself 
malleable to the network environment prior to the one-year commemoration of 9/11.51 
 Like the fusion of text and image displayed in the No Casino Gettysburg 
production, the FOX Sports production of the Declaration attempts to unfold an alternate 
interpretation through the splicing and layering of the text with associated images and 
personas.  In this case, the featured readers of the text are past and present players and 
managers in the National Football League, as well as members of the U.S. Armed 
Forces.  This production—a self-proclaimed “Super Bowl tradition”52—has aired on 
national television on three separate occasions, meeting the largest television audience in 
the world in 2002, 2008, and 2011, respectively.  According to the television studio 
behind the recitation, the original reading in 2002 was a purposeful response to the 
                                                
49 Bradford Vivian, “Neoliberal Epideictic:  Rhetorical Form and Commemorative Politics on September 
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50 Vivian, “Neoliberal Epideictic,” 14. 
51 Reading the Declaration of Independence through the network sensibility is not wholly new.  National 
Public Radio frequently streams an audio performance of the text read by correspondents each 4th of July.  
Moreover, in early 2003, a production simply titled The Declaration of Independence was released.  
Produced by Rob Reiner and co-directed by Frank Cappra III, the feature positioned prominent Hollywood 
actors—Michael Douglas, Kathy Bates, Mel Gibson, Whoopi Goldberg, and Morgan Freedom—reciting 
the text, each trading single lines or phrase in a fractured performance.  A four-minute introduction by 
Freedman provided a general overview on the historical exigence of the text as well as the contradictions 
of ideals and practices of freedom in 1776.  The justification of the reading, moreover, hinges upon a 
reification of the line, “I am so proud to be an American.”  A copy of the fifteen minute film is available 
online through [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jYyttEu_NLU]. 
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attacks of 9/11.53  Compared to the longer historical tendency of reciting the text as part 
of a political prayer, or the invocation of a written text into a contested environment, 
FOX Sports has created an image of the text unrecognizable and unjustified to past 
iterations. 
 This production embodies all the characteristics of networking the text.  
Jefferson’s text is truncated.  Athletes and military personnel read through excerpts, 
including the introduction and preamble, but excising the text’s reference to “The history 
of the present King of Great Britain,” and closing the reading with the promise of 
remaining dedicated to a sense of “sacred honor.”  We are left, in other words, with the 
establishment of an American identity as free and independent, but absent of any 
justification as to why a world may consider the move just and necessary.  Three 
versions of the performance remain distinctive.  The 2002 rendition lays the framework 
for remembering the text, and features a litany of professional football players and (to a 
lesser extent) retired politicians to stich to the reading together.54  The performance 
underscores a sense of unique resilience by frequently featuring its readers in front of 
national monuments or iconic images, such as the Golden Gate Bridge, the Statue of 
Liberty, or the Saint Louis Arc.  Viewers are invited to become witnesses to Jefferson’s 
Declaration anew while images interspersed with the reading profile Jefferson’s hand 
adding letters to the page as they are read aloud.  Even more distinctive than scenic 
backdrops or the suggested relations between the text’s origin and modern times is the 
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preceding and concluding dimensions of the broadcast.  Viewers see bodies and hear 
voices (though often not together) echoing the sentiments of debate defining the original 
plan to disband from Great Britain.  In six-and-a-half minutes of airtime, viewers are 
introduced to historical actors portraying Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Paine, John 
Adams, and Thomas Jefferson reciting quotations attributed, but not explicitly credited, 
to each figure.  These expressions need not even remind us of the same thing.  John 
Adams reminds us of the inevitability of independence, while Thomas Jefferson’s 
likeness recounts the principle that the “tree of liberty is refreshed from time to time with 
the blood of patriots and tyrants,” a quote wherein Jefferson was reflecting on 
revolution, not predicting its inevitability.55  On screen a quill pen scrawls the 
Declaration to paper, blending into the volley of lines between professional athletes and 
politicians, slowly piecing together the gradual construction of the text.  
 The 2008 reading sharpens the focus of the Declaration considerably.  Here the 
voices and faces of readers expands to include individuals from politics, football, and the 
military to deliver Jefferson’s words.  As communication scholar Michael Butterworth 
has noted, the 2008 production was “sport culture’s rhetorical endorsement of the ‘war 
on terror.’”56  The arrangement of text, image, and reader, Butterworth claimed, limits 
the notions of democratic citizenship around the sacred words of the Declaration.  This 
version repeats the use of historical actors and dialogue, reconnecting the concerns of the 
present to the decision of revolution. Butterworth’s reading of this production is 
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convincing:  In this reading, the Declaration connotates sacrifice.  Readers, including 
Petyon Manning, former Senator Jack Kemp, and NFL commissioner Paul Tagliabue, 
recite individual lines from recognizable backdrops of the Jefferson Memorial, Navy 
Aircraft carriers, as well as Ground Zero in New York City.  The relationship between 
American defense and the Declaration is presented as a natural comingling, even if 
mention of why the colonies should revolt is relegated to silence.  Specifically, 
Butterworth has noted, the memory of Pat Tillman plays a significant role in re-casting 
the Declaration as a memory of national sacrifice.  Tillman’s death in Afghanistan in 
2004 was especially noteworthy since he left his multi-million dollar contract to serve in 
the Army Rangers.  Though critical of the war effort, Tillman’s example is portrayed as 
an endorsement of the production’s narrative, despite the grudgingly acknowledged fact 
that his death to “friendly fire” was originally portrayed as heroism in crisis.57  
Nevertheless, Tillman’s widow, Marie Tillman, is prominently featured in FOX Sports’ 
2008 production, reading the abbreviated sentence, “We mutually pledge to each other 
our lives, our fortunes…” standing next to a memorial dedicated to her husband.  As 
Butterworth observed, the story of Tillman served “as a metonym for all the over 4,000 
Americans who have died in the ‘war on terror,’ echoing the common refrain, ‘You shall 
not have died in vain.’”58   
 If the 2008 production of the Declaration limited the inference of the Declaration 
to supporting military obligation and sacrifice, the 2011 version is nothing less than a 
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higgledy-piggledy mess of crisscrossing symbolism.  Rather than constrain the meaning 
of the Declaration to national pride, or an endorsement of military defense, the 2011 
reading expands its applicability to nearly any activity conceivable in American public 
life.  Replacing the original role of re-enactors to set the importance of the text, this 
version features introductory and closing remarks by NFL commissioner Roger Goodall 
and former Secretary of State Colin Powell.  “The Declaration of Independence is a 
remarkable document that defines our national character,” Powell begins, delivering a 
preview of the recitation co-written by himself, Goodall, and FOX Sports producer 
Jennifer Pransky.59  Goodall, for no apparent reason, states that the Declaration began 
our defense of liberty and path toward a “more perfect union” drawing a path from 
revolution to the establishment of American government in the U.S. Constitution.  This 
founding document, like the imagined productions since 2002, has evolved.  “Slowly the 
differences between us have changed from reasons to fight to causes to celebrate,” 
Powell intones.  The consistent theme suggested in this performance is harmonious 
diversity.  “Each American citizen breaths life into the Declaration of Independence 
everyday we live free,” Goodall declares prior to the reading.60  We can be free any way 
we so choose; to be free is simply to be. 
 This diversity of perspectives is portrayed in the visual accompaniment to the 
text.  Well-known athletes and military personnel again read lines from the Declaration 
while positioned next to a variety of communities representative of some segment of 
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American society:  the Baltimore Recruiting Battalion, the George Washington Carver 
High School football team from New Orleans, Mike Farm Enterprises (a small business 
from Ohio), members of the Pittsburgh Youth Symphony Orchestra, employees from the 
Green Bay Packaging, Inc., and the El Centro Chicano student group from Stanford 
University.  The array of voices, faces, and perspectives channeled through the text is 
overwhelming.  If the previous incarnations of FOX Sports’ Declaration were implied 
resilience of the United States, or endorsements of American foreign policy, the most 
recent display of the text amounts to countless possible conclusions:  the Declaration 
reifies the American military; racial diversity; prosperity for small businesses; the arts; 
young people; football; the list could go on. 
 The three versions of Declaration read in a network environment invite 
interpretations that are subject to multiple overlapping channels and inferences.  The 
most compelling inference, however, is the connection between America’s founding and 
American football.  The Declaration becomes a text not only filtered through a multitude 
of images and voices, but also a text that is to be read and understood within the context 
of a national sport.  The resounding inference implied between bodies seen and voices 
heard is the comparison is between the revolutionaries who forged independence then 
and the athletes and politicians of today.  Jefferson, Adams, Hancock, and Paine united a 
disparate citizenry then; a sport does the same today.    
 Does one contest (the Revolution) help us understand another (the Super Bowl)?  
For clarity, consider a segment from the original 2002 broadcast shown prior to the 
reading of the Declaration.  In lead-up to the game, a series of players were taped 
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reading segments—often a single line—from speeches by John F. Kennedy, Theodore 
Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt, and Adlai Stevenson.  This collection of fragments 
stitched together was a way, the announcer intoned, to “look to the past to point us in the 
present direction.”61  The shallowness of this brief exercise makes the recitation of the 
Declaration of Independence look like a careful study by comparison.  Kennedy’s 
memorialization of Robert Frost, wherein he describes a nation’s habit of remembrance 
as an indicator of a its character, is seemingly stitched without context or explanation to 
inspiring fragments from Theodore Roosevelt’s “Strenuous Life” speech of 1899, lines 
of FDR’s First Inaugural, Adlai Stevenson’s 1952 speech to the American Legion, and 
connected back again to Kennedy’s inaugural line promoting a sense of individual 
participation in national affairs.62  These text fragments—read through the performance 
of football players—convey a reassuring sense of rejuvenation by draining the memory 
of each address to the rhetorical depth of a Hallmark card.  Commentary following the 
reading clarifies the motivation even further.  The Super Bowl, viewers are told, is not 
only about celebrating football, but “freedom as well; the freedom to honor men whose 
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contributions may be on the playing field, but whose happiness lies in the thrill of effort 
and the joy of achievement.”63  The FOX Sports’ production of the Declaration of 
Independence invites a reconstitution of freedom to include spectatorship itself.  When, 
in an uncertain event, the rites of citizenship required mending, the Declaration of 
Independence was folded into a memory of such thinness that it could include nearly any 
way of being,  
 If “[f]reedom is common sense,” as Goodall suggests at the conclusion of the 
2011 production, any and every definition of civic engagement—including a couch-
bound holiday of commercial spectacle—is folded into the ideal of the text, and the 
virtue expected of the audience.  The FOX Sports production of the Declaration never 
articulates why a reading of the text necessary, or how some years warrant a reading and 
others do not.  Neither does the production offer clues to what the performance tells us 
about what is expected of ourselves beyond the confidence that comes from continual 
support—of America’s iconic status, of the military campaigns around the world, and of 
any and all ways of being.  In three iterations, the Declaration is displayed and enacted 
as the ultimate condensation symbol:  increasingly expected to be anything and 
everything, and, in the event of close interrogation or uncertainty, nothing.64 
 The FOX Sports production of the Declaration is abysmal on several fronts.  It is 
also incredibly important.  Few productions dramatically highlight the cyclical function 
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and existence of repetition.  Media technologies have not only enabled a new form of 
ceremonial repetition in voice and image, but have in more dramatic fashion created a 
new environment where the possibility of art’s death is impossible.  Instead of 
accounting for the oral performance of a text alongside a verbal or visual counterpart, the 
conflation of text, performance, and image have collapsed into hybrid textuality that 
allows for repetition on an infinite loop in remote corners of cyberspace.  More 
consequential to the function of reading, however, is FOX Sports’ flirtation with 
simulacrum, or what Jean Baudrillard warned as a “reversal of origin and end,” meaning 
our frames of reference between object and replica are “no longer mechanically 
reproduced, but conceived according to their very reproducibility, their diffraction from 
a generative core called a ‘model.’”65   We need not take on Baudrillard’s thesis that 
simulacra rule our message habits wholesale to acknowledge that some forms of 
ceremonial repetition take on the style and sensibility of the simulacra by design.  A text 
that is produced with no apparent reference to the occasion, an increasingly 
universalized scope of implied virtues, and relegated to life of endless cycling in the vast 
corners of a media environment is a text designed—or in this case, appropriated—
primarily for its repeatability, not its useful presence to remind a community of 
something within itself.  
Community Without History:  The Constitution in the U.S. House, 2011 
 The next two examples in this chapter illustrate the dynamics of ceremonial 
repetition and the network style outside media environments.  The 2011 Congressional 
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reading of the U.S. Constitution and the ongoing ritual of reading Martin Luther King, 
Jr.’s “I Have a Dream” speech both exercise a multi-vocal delivery of the text within a 
scene of significant space.  To repeat a speech is to suggest a line between past and 
present, and to occupy its discursive space as memory.  To occupy space is also an 
interruption in time.  “If time is conceived as a flow or movement then place is pause,” 
Yi-Fu Tuan has noted, further arguing, “While it takes time to form an attachment to 
place, the quality and intensity of experience matters more than simple duration.”66  
Places are ideal vehicles for cultivating a public memory of discourse.  As Pierre Nora’s 
influential distinction between lieux de memoire (sites of memory) and millieux de 
memoire (real environments of memory) illustrates, “[m]emory takes root in the 
concrete, in spaces, gestures, images, and objects”; to exist and persist, memory “relies 
on the materialist of the trace, the immediacy of the recording, the visibility of the 
image.”67  Though space is implied as a visual cue in the No Casino Gettysburg and 
FOX Sports productions, the following two examples provide important conclusions on 
the limits of the network style, its suggested community of readers, and its relative 
importance to the surrounding space in which a text is invited to both inherit and inhabit 
shared remembrance. 
 Next to the Declaration of Independence, the U.S. Constitution is the most 
revered and contested document in United States political culture.  Unlike the 
Declaration, however, the Constitution does not possess a heritage of performance.  In 
                                                
66 Yi-Fu Tuan, Space and Place:  The Perspective of Experience (Minneapolis and London:  University of 
Minnesota Press, 1977), 198. 
67 Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History:  Les Lieux de Memoire,” Representations 26 (1989), 9 and 
13. 
  249 
his sweeping study of public interpretations of the text, Michael Kammen notes that 
Americans “have known the Constitution best when they have revered it least,” 
elaborating that “idolatry has too often served as a convenient cover for ignorance.”68  
Further hindering the text’s role as potential commemorabilia, the Constitution defies 
associations with one particular point in time, as evidenced by attempts to commemorate 
the text’s centennial met multiple interpretations on precisely when the text came into 
fruition.69  Given the text’s function as an original set of national laws, it is perhaps 
fitting that such a document elides easy association.  As James Boyd White posits, the 
text invites a collective, evolutionary world to the reader.  First, the Constitution 
introduces multiple voices to the fore, presenting the voice of ordinary citizens—“The 
People”—as both author and audience of their own order.70  As the text progress, it shifts 
authority to different branches of government.  Yet, even as modes of power are brought 
into being, White claims, the text is silent on the exact exercise of power that resides 
therein.  Like a trust, the Constitution invites readers into a world where it fosters a 
continuation of a culture.  Or, in White’s assessment, “it at once performs a separation of 
powers and establishes a trust, places confidence in others to do what should be done.”71  
The ingenuity of the Constitution resides in what it begins, not in what it permanently 
means:  the text is “a new conversation on a permanent basis,” and “by its very nature 
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lifeless and inert unless it is put to work in the world by the citizens who live under it.”72  
By design, the Constitution is a text designed as a start, not a conclusion.  How, and 
under what circumstances, does a text with an uncertain point of origin that represents 
the beginning of a conversation become the object of ceremonial repetition? 
 Public inclination to recite the Constitution has varied with interest in the text 
itself.  Though Constitution Day (September 17th) has been a “pale shadow of its 
halcyon period following World War I,” it remains one of the rare occasions in which 
public recitations of the text became part of the ceremonial fabric marking the holiday.73  
In one example, the 142nd anniversary of the Constitution’s adoption, schoolchildren 
recited key phrases and the preamble of the text to mark the holiday.74  Given its content 
and structure, the key site of remembering and interpreting the Constitution is the 
Supreme Court.75  At the outset of 2011, however, a controversial display took form 
calling for a return to the founding text, and enactment as the means of public awareness.  
Spurred by a perceived crisis of American government resulting from a lack of attention 
to the Constitution, the commemorative recital of the text in the House of 
Representatives is yet another example of the new face of ceremonial repetition in the 
twenty-first century. 
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 This moment of rhetorical history occurred on 6 January 2011, the second day of 
legislative business following the 2010-midterm elections.  The day was memorable by 
design.  Not only was the Republican Party resuming majority power in the lower house 
of Congress, but the ceremonial enlivening of the document also marked the so-called 
“tea-party-ization of Congress.”76  The emergence of the “Tea Party” represents one of 
the most significant developments of contemporary American political culture.  Best 
accounts mark the emergence of the Tea Party in early 2009, representing what David 
Barstow calls “an amorphous, factionalized uprising with no centralized structure” 
whose recurring solution to policy objectives in the twenty-first century is “strict 
adherence to the Constitution.”77  Adam Liptak went as far as to credit Tea Party 
influence with making “the Constitution central to the national conversation.”78  More 
often than not, however, the dominant interpretation of the text proposed by Tea Party 
advocates grew from the principle of originalism, or at the very least, the text’s 
commitment to limited powers.  Prior to the 2010 elections, polling indicated a Tea Party 
energized by a perception of unwarranted power during President Obama’s first term, 
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[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp/dyn/content/article/2010/12/29/AR2010122901402.html]. 
77 David Barstow, “Tea Party Lights Fuse for Rebellion on Right,” The New York Times, 16 February 
2010, [http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/16/us/politics/16teaparty.html?_r1&pagewanted=all]; Most 
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well as an acronym for “Taxed Enough Already.”  See:  T.E.A. = Taxed Enough Already,” POLITICO, 8 
April 2009, [http://www.politico.com/blogs/anneschroeder/0409/TEA__Taxed_Enough_Already.html#]; 
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78 Adam Liptak, “Tea-ing Up the Constitution,” The New York Times, 13 March 2010, 
http:www.nytimes.com/2010/03/14/weekinreview/14liptak.html?pagewanted=all. 
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namely, “the recent health care overhaul, government spending and a feeling that their 
opinions are not represented in Washington.”79 
 Upon regaining the majority in the House of Representatives, plans were quickly 
put into place to publicly proclaim dedication to the Constitution as word made flesh in a 
formal House ceremony.  Two points in the rules adopted for the 112th Congress ensured 
a new emphasis on the Constitution.  First, a rule was added requiring that a bill or joint 
resolution may not be introduced unless “the sponsor submits for printing in the 
Congressional Record a statement citing as specifically as practicable the power or 
powers granted to Congress in the Constitution to enact the bill or joint resolution.”80  
Second, a motion was inserted under “Additional Orders of Business” that “The Speaker 
may recognize for the reading of the Constitution on the legislative day of January 6th, 
2011.”81  In rule and display, the 112th Congress would attempt to embody the text.   
 Instead of tracing the recital of the text from beginning to end, I offer insight of a 
different sort regarding this phenomenon of ceremonial repetition.  My conclusion is 
this:  the recital of the U.S. Constitution by the House of Representatives in 2011 failed 
from a rupture between the text as it was remembered and the motivation for the reading.  
Two supporting claims support my argument.  First, the particular edit of the text used in 
recitation subverted any notion that the multitudes of voices performing the text were 
                                                
79 Kate Zernike and Megan Thee-Brenan, “Poll Finds Tea Party Backers Wealthier and More Educated,” 
The New York Times, 14 April 2010, 
[http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/15/us/politics/15poll.html?pagewanted=all]; Kate Zernike, “Tea Party 
Disputes Take Toll on Convention,” The New York Times, January 26th, 2010, 
[http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/26/us/politics/26teaparty.html?pagewanted=all]; As of this writing, the 
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Caucus information is available from [http://teapartycaucus-bachmann.house.gov/]. 
80 U.S. House of Representatives, “H. Res. 5,” 5 January 2011.  Accessed from 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hres5eh/pdf/BILLS-112hres5eh.pdf on 1 May 2012, page 31. 
81 Ibid. 
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part of a political community.  Second, the content of the text matched with the austere 
nature of the reading failed to prompt a compelling enthymematic inference on the text’s 
extensional life.  We are in vastly different territory, in other words, from the film and 
online environments that surrounded No Casino Gettysburg and the FOX Sports’ 
Declaration.  Instead, we are left with only the presence of legislative space and voices 
of representatives as symbolic associations between the text repeated and the memory to 
be cultivated.  The mismatch of edits and performance, I argue in the pages that follow, 
hindered any effort toward a meaningful remembrance of the text. 
 Original planning for the recital drew public interest, even as most commentators 
suspected the move as pure “political theatre.”82  As the first-of-its-kind occurrence, the 
Constitution was not only to be read, but also to be performed by members of the House 
of Representatives themselves.  What would have taken about thirty minutes as an oral 
exercise by one person, in other words, was networked throughout more than ninety 
minutes of Amendments and Articles read line-by-line, person-by-person.  Planning the 
event fell upon Rep. Robert W. Goodlatte (R-VA), a vocal critic of the Affordable Care 
Act passed in the 111th Congress.  “It stems from the debate we’ve had for the last two 
years about things like the exercise of authority in a whole host of different areas by the 
EPA, we’ve had this debate in relation to the health care bill, the cap-and-trade 
legislation,” he summarized, continuing, “This Congress has been very aggressive in 
                                                
82 National Public Radio, “Congress’ Constitution Reading:  A New Chance to Debate Document,” 6 
January 2011, [http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2011/01/06/132703433/congress-constitution-
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Angeles Times, “House Reads the Constitution, Line by Line,” 6 January 2011, 
[http://articles/latimes.com/print/2011/jan/06/new/la-pn-constitution-congress-20110106] on 14 March 
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expanding the power of the federal government, and there’s been a big backlash for 
that.”83  As various newspapers noted, however, the inspiration seemed largely as 
“recognition of the influence of the Tea Party” on the contemporary Republican Party.84   
 As Jennifer Steinhaur noted in the New York Times, the precise edit of the 
Constitution used in the 2011 ceremony presented lawmakers with a peculiar version of 
the text:  “any portion of the Constitution that was superseded by amendments—
including the amendments themselves—would not be read, preventing lawmakers from 
having to make reference to slaves…or to things like prohibition.”85  This strange—and 
arguably unnecessary condition—led to a performance of the text that undermined the 
potential communal possibilities of the reading.  Redacting mention of slavery or its 
ascribed euphemisms prompted a brief debate prior to the actual reading.  Prior to 
engaging the text, Rep. Jay Inslee (D-WA) rose to address the question of whether the 
Congress would read “the entire original document without deletion,” a condition 
unconfirmed prior to the recital, and a detail, as Inslee stated, that would help members 
                                                
83 Goodlatte quoted in Stephen Dinan, The Washington Times, “‘We the people’ to Open Next Congress,” 
23 December 2010, [http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/dec/23/we-the-people-to-open-
next=congress?page=all] on 12 March 2012.  Few readers should doubt that the recital of the Constitution 
in 2011 emerged from the passage of the Affordable Care Act in 2010.  Goodlatte credits Virginia 
Attorney General Kenneth T. Cuccinelli II with the idea.  Cuccinelli was one of the first to file suit against 
the law, arguing its unconstitutionality.   
84 The Wall Street Journal, “House Reads Constitution, Gets Civics Lesson,” 6 January 2011, 
[http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/01/06/house-read-constitutiongets-civics-lesson] accessed on 14 
March 2012; Jennifer Stenhauer, “Constitution Has Its Day (More or Less) in House,” New York Times, 6 
January 2011 [http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/07/us/politics/07constitution.html], Accessed 14 March 
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85 Jennifer Steinhauer, “House Reading of Constitution Is Not Without Issues,” The New York Times:  The 
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issues/?pagemode=all], on 14 March 2011. 
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“all be on the same page” and “reading in good faith” for the day.86  The exchange 
teemed with defensive posturing, with the Speaker pro tempore rebuffing Inslee’s 
questions, noting flatly, “This is not a debate.”87  Indeed, it was a peculiar 
commemoration.  Once Inslee was recognized, however, the implications of staging this 
Constitution came into clearer focus.  Inslee honed the political subtext of the occasion, 
stating, “I take it that since we have not had discussion about which language to read or 
not, that this is not intended to create any statement of congressional intent about the 
language but, rather, to do our best to have a moment of comity to read the language as 
best as we can ascertain it.  Is that correct?”88  Goodlatte’s response, neither denying nor 
affirming, was as concise as it was noncommittal:  “I think the gentleman has stated that 
very well.”   
 Rep. Jesse Jackson, Jr. (D-IL) took the point more seriously.  From Jackson’s 
point, “given the struggle of African Americans, given the struggle of women, given the 
struggles of others to create a more perfect document, while not perfect, a more perfect 
document, to hear that those elements of the Constitution that have been redacted by 
amendment are no less serious, no less part of our ongoing struggle to improve the 
outcry and to make the country better, and our sense in our struggle and whom we are at 
the Congress of the United States at this point in American history and our desire to 
continue to improve the Constitution, may of us don’t want that to be lost upon the 
reading of our sacred document.”  In Jackson’s argument, the redactions were “of 
                                                
86 U.S. House of Representatives, “Reading of the Constitution—(House of Representatives-January 06, 
2011),” Accessed through [http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi/bin-query/C?r112:./temp/~r112Xi8yu1] on 14 March 
2012. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
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consequence to whom we are.”89  If the House of Representatives are participants of the 
same textual community, ought not the community jointly recognize the nature of the 
text and the nature of the reading? 
 Jackson’s observations are as equally true of the House of Representatives as a 
community of memory, as it was true of the Constitution as text of history.  As Robert 
Bellah et al. note, a community of memory, such as a political institution requires an 
evolution in the substance and breadth of its relation to the past that unites its members.  
Such a community is not built on a shared meaning of the present alone, but “will 
remember stories not only of suffering received but of suffering inflicted—dangerous 
memories,” those which “call the community to alter ancient evils.”90  By excising 
selectively from the Constitution’s language, Goodlatte’s preferred edit relegated key 
provisions of the document that might be central to cultivating a community of memory 
in the expansive House of Representatives membership.  This observation goes without 
noting the other obvious devaluation of the edit:  the intrinsic framework of the text 
itself.  In this atypical recital, listeners and participants alike were in the strange situation 
to encounter the text promising to begin a political conversation through the ages while 
only hearing, in select portions, a response without a call.  For example, the Twenty-
First Amendment (repealing prohibition) was read aloud with no reference to the 
Eighteenth Amendment that would necessitate the aforementioned change.  This text 
invited readers and listeners into a world of the present without a past.  Gone is any 
                                                
89 Ibid. 
90 Robert N. Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart:  Individualism and Commitment in American Life, 2nd 
Edition (Berkley and Los Angeles:  The University of California Press, 1996), 153. 
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extension of the Constitution as the start of a political exchange.  Listeners were 
presented instead with a new form of reading the text beyond questions of original 
intent, historical arguments about the document, the precision of its language, or textual 
arguments.91  This Constitution resides firmly in the present, absent any contextual 
assistance from either outside or inside the document to gauge its significance or 
potency.   
 The lack of historical attention to the Constitution contributes to the second flaw 
of this moment of ceremonial repetition:  the lack of a compelling enthymematic 
association for the text’s extensional reconstitution.  As White’s instructive reading of 
the text indicates, the voice of the Constitution is one that introduces the people’s voice, 
then moves to provide its reader with a tour of different realms of power within the new 
political world.  The House of Representatives seems to be the ideal body from which to 
perform a networking of the Constitution.  Different voices representing diverse 
communities and districts could be proposed to speak for the people, emphasizing the 
position of the House as the only governing body in the U.S. to be elected “by the people 
directly” from its inception.92  This balance, however, eventually becomes untenable as 
the text moves from different branches of government.   
 One suggested inference of space and bodies enacting this recital offers little 
corresponding memory from which to accentuate.  Lacking precedent or a national 
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relationship to the Constitution by date or place, the reading by the House of 
Representatives seems to represent a larger communal vision of Constitutional principle 
rather than a memory sought out from the text.  Can the conversation started by the 
Constitution be continued in the present moment?  The range of personalities and 
interests in the House of Representatives combined with the networking of the text 
provide such possibility.  As Goodlatte clarified prior to the recitation, two 
representatives—Lamar Smith (R-TX) and John Lewis (D-GA)—presented excerpts 
notably to their experience:  As chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Rep. Smith read a 
portion of the text pertaining to that branch of government, while Rep. Lewis recited the 
Thirteenth Amendment on the basis of his history advocating civil rights.  Aside from 
these rare moments, the striking presence of multiple voices and personas enacting the 
text was a resource with little visible application.   
 In a political moment designed to remind viewers and audiences that the 
Constitution was alive in the House of Representatives, the display and embodiment of 
the text lacked enthymematic potency.  A failure to cultivate a community of memory by 
acknowledging both the shared national past from establishment to reform—as well as 
the silencing of the text’s own historical evolution—leave the performance with a stale 
air of exact present-ness, unable or unwilling to move out of the institution’s exact 
moment.  This component is especially harmful given the emphasis on reform and 
alteration emphasized prior to the recital and in the 2010 campaign of prominent Tea 
Party candidates.  Perhaps it was political happenstance, then, that in the performance of 
the Constitution—complete with interruptions by Goodlette offering to “yield time” to 
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each individual speaker—that Articles IV and V were inadvertently skipped altogether.93  
This omission accidentally quieted the text’s affirmation that states are guaranteed a 
republican form of government, and that, when they see fit, Congress may propose 
Amendments to add to the Constitution.  What was missing from the design and original 
performance of the Constitution was a sense of what is possible in the present from what 
is historical in memory.  For a politically charged commemoration originating from an 
ideological commitment to alter current laws and practices of government, the 2011 
reading excises the most fundamental memory of the Constitution to complement such a 
situation:  the ability of law to change.  By recognizing these elements within the poly-
vocal performance may have cultivated a greater respect for the institution’s shared past 
and its possibilities for a collective future.  As it happened, however, neither textual life 
nor institutional identity was effectively commemorated or expanded.  Viewers were 
witnesses to a failed act of remembrance, a rhetorical stillbirth. 
Enacting Proof and Suspending Time:  “I Have a Dream,” 2005-Present 
 Two weeks after the House of Representatives recited the Constitution, students 
from Watkins Elementary School in Washington, D.C. gathered at the Lincoln Memorial 
to pay tribute to Martin Luther King, Jr. on the occasion of his birthday.  One-by-one, 
children positioned on the precise step of the Lincoln Memorial where King once spoke, 
approached a microphone and delivered a rendition of the revered “I Have a Dream” 
speech.  Like the House of Representatives, members of the NFL and the military, and 
                                                
93 Rep. Goodlatte returned to the House floor following the official recitation to officially perform the 
skipped Amendments.  See Josiah Ryan, “Parts of the Constitution Inadvertently Skipped in ‘Historic 
Reading’ on Floor,” The Hill, 6 January 2011, [http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/136475-entire-
section-of-the-constitution-inadvertently-skipped-in-this-mornings-historic-reading]. 
  260 
the half dozen voices enacting Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, the students’ performed 
the speech through a network sensibility.  The question of how the memory of this 
canonized text is made public has elided scholarly attention, even though the text has 
remained the dominant framework by which official and local communities have 
commemorated King since his assassination.   
 For better or worse, the “I Have a Dream” speech has been extended as a 
dominant memory of King.  Like the marriage of holiday and text through the recital, the 
distance between man and text in American public memory is very narrow.  The 
Watkins reading adds something new to the equation, however.  Like the reading of the 
Constitution by the members of the House of Representatives profiled above, the 
primary symbolic cues interacting with this text are material.  No formal oration or 
elaborate display accompanies the reading of the speech except the monument scenery 
and the collection of youthful bodies reciting the speech verbatim.   Compared to the 
repetition in the House, however, contemporary readings of “I Have a Dream” are more 
effective in cultivating a memory of the speech through performance.  Herein the ritual 
of reading turns the process of prosopopoeia and ekphrasis around:  the act of reading 
brings the memory of the speech before the eyes.  As I argue in the analysis below, the 
Watkins students succeed within the network style in ways the House of Representatives 
and others have failed.  Lastly, this reading exemplifies the possibilities of networking 
the text and extending a public memory of speech through the relationship of text, space, 
and presence. 
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 This interaction between old words and material bodies invites two important 
conclusions.  First, I argue that the Watkins reading of the text demonstrates the 
effective potential of ceremonial repetition as a material expression of collected bodies.  
Indeed, more than any previous example cited in this study, this performance utilizes the 
network style as an integral component to enacting the memory of the speech.  Second, 
in positioning the reading of the text within the symbolic space of the Lincoln Memorial, 
the performance invites an inference of suspended time, an attribute with equally 
positive and negative implications as constructive commemoration, and the broader 
remembrance of King.  Finally, by considering the pedagogical usefulness of this 
performance, I suggest ways in which this practice might be utilized in broader 
applications in the future.  Prior to analyzing the performance itself, however, it is 
important to consider the historical trend in remembering Martin Luther King Jr. and the 
canonized “I Have a Dream” speech. 
 Preceding Barack Obama’s speech as the first African American to accept a 
major-party nomination in U.S. history, Michael Powell of the New York Times 
illustrated the important overlap between the millennial era and the memory of Civil 
Rights.  Obama’s rise in American politics carried added significance, Powell wrote, 
because some supporters “figured this dream for dead so many decades ago.”94  Powell 
was referring to the many individuals who witnessed both King’s famous speech in 1963 
address as well as Obama’s acceptance speech forty-five years later.  The language 
remembering the man, the moment, and the speech is telling.  King’s text is so ingrained 
                                                
94 Michael Powell, The New York Times, “45 Years Later, Witnesses to Dr. King’s Dream See a New 
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in the American language of racial equality that a single word—“dream”—epitomizes a 
distance comprising decades of struggle and uneven progress.  In his careful analysis of 
the text, J. Robert Cox suggested that King’s dream phrase “articulated a temporal 
movement of long-suffering and the redemption of human struggle,” essentially 
resolving the distance between promises of American freedom and the inadequate 
position of African Americans.95  “Past and future are identified,” Cox elaborated, in 
King’s “image of ‘sons of former slaves and the sons of former slave-owners’ who ‘will 
be able to sit down together at the table of brotherhood.’  The dream is fulfilled in the 
lives of those who have inherited the legacy of slavery but who chose to struggle as 
brothers and sisters.”96  Though King’s address was primarily an appeal against 
moderate gradualism,97 the dream vision animated the national imagination and became 
the enduring reference to fulfilling American Civil Rights following King’s death in 
1968. 
 Multiple sources have contributed to anchoring public memory of King in this 
single oration.  Coretta Scott King, who organized the King Center in Atlanta in her 
husband’s memory, maintained an annual “State of the Dream” speech throughout the 
1980s and 1990s.98  Various birthday celebrations embrace the rich metaphor, and, as 
Harry A. Reed has noted, citizens have been reminded “to ‘Fulfill the Dream,’ ‘Continue 
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the Dream,’ ‘Make the Dream a Reality,’ ‘Reclaim the Dream, ad infinitum.”99  By the 
time a federal holiday was voted into law, the King Center was producing and 
distributing “a kit containing instructions on proper remembrance of King,” contents of 
which included “postcards of King, photos of the King family, a cassette recording of 
King’s ‘dream’ speech, and suggestions for appropriate Christian, Muslim, Hindu, and 
Jewish services.”100  The center also encouraged (and discouraged) particular activities.  
Among those actions most smiled upon in memorializing King were “participating in a 
peaceful march,” “singing ‘We Shall Overcome,’” as well commemorations large and 
small, such as “naming buildings after Dr. King, ringing bells, studying King’s life at 
church, using commercial advertising to teach about King, and signing a ‘living the 
dream’ card” in personal observance.101   
 To critics of this isolated view of King, such a narrow remembrance has 
encouraged a “vapid” and “sanitized” effect on the memory of a truly radical persona.102  
After all, King’s voice not only favored peaceful integration, but also took on a range of 
issues concerning social justice—including American poverty and hard questions on 
capitalism—as well as his forceful critique of American foreign policy and the war in 
Vietnam.103  To remember King through his “I Have a Dream” speech is, from multiple 
critical perspectives, limiting.  In Leigh Raiford and Renee C. Romano’s analysis, 
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memory of King is often “sterilized” to focus on “his nonviolent, integrationist rhetoric, 
especially for the ‘I Have a Dream’ speech, with its hope that one day little white 
children and little black children would hold hands and be judged on the basis of their 
character rather than the color of their skin.”104  The goal in 1963, by implication, has 
taken a synecdochic quality as distance between the memory of King and the memory of 
the speech dissipated:  “[h]e was the dream.”105  As these memories fuse closely 
together, moreover, remembering the speech becomes a commemorative measuring stick 
of United States equality.  Or, as Edward P. Morgan describes it, revisiting the “I Have a 
Dream” speech profiles the extent to which the United States has advanced “in realizing 
King’s powerful oratorical challenge of 1963.”106    
 Since January 2005, organizers from the National Park Service and Watkins 
Elementary School in Washington, D.C. have participated in memorializing the King 
holiday through the words of the “I Have a Dream” speech.  The history of this exercise 
began as a purely pedagogical undertaking.  Through a contact between the school and 
the National Parks Service, faculty and students were invited to bring their instruction 
and performance of the text from the classroom into a public experience.  The event has 
thrived since 2005.107  Six weeks prior to the reading students study the historical 
context of the Civil Rights movement and listen attentively to King’s speech in order to 
best match his original mannerisms and syntax.  According to Maryam Abdul-Tawwab, 
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a 3rd grade teacher and assistant organizer of the event, the Watkins reading of “I Have a 
Dream” folds together three goals:  education of the past, oratorical excellence, and lived 
history.108  Inhabiting the physical and discursive space of the “I Have a Dream” speech 
marks the culmination of a rich pedagogical experience.  More than education alone, I 
postulate that the Watkins Elementary recital brings a demonstrative effect to the act of 
ceremonial repetition not witnessed in the previous examples of the network style. 
 The Watkins reading of “I Have a Dream” does not reconcile the persisting 
tension regarding the dominant tendency to remember King through his famous speech.  
It does, however, perform exemplary demonstrative rhetoric because of a confluence of 
physical and environmental cues within the ceremonial reading.  Here is an instance 
wherein the enthymematic quality of the reading is not merely the pairing of text recited 
and formal public address, political illustration, or a community journal, but the 
interaction of space and bodies bringing the words into being.  In the words of Carole 
Blair, this reading presents a compelling match between memory of the text and a 
material form of delivery.  Two material components weigh heavily in the contemporary 
performance of King’s “I Have a Dream” speech:  the iconic backdrop of the Lincoln 
Memorial and the fourth-grade students themselves.  I now present interpretations on 
how each shapes the life of this reading. 
 Viewers and listeners of this event are presented with a detailed reproduction of 
King’s speech outside its calendric time, with King’s birthday substituting for August 
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28th.  On the exact step of the Memorial where King delivered his speech, children enact 
his words, substituting their bodies and voices for his—performing a distinctive public 
display of prosopopoeia.  A place is distinctive, Dickinson, Blair, and Ott have argued, 
when it functions as “a marker of collective identity,” and a signifier of deep relevance, 
“offering a unique access to the past.”109  As Benjamin Hufbauer’s summary of the 
Lincoln Memorial, illustrated, the symbolic nature of this place has been a significant 
site of transition, “from a racist temple about the Union into a symbol of equality.”110  If 
monuments, in the words of Kirk Savage, “make credible particular collectivities” and 
also silent “rival collectivities,” the inclusion of the Lincoln Memorial in the Watkins 
reading reifies the symbiotic relationship between King’s speech and the sacred space of 
the Lincoln Memorial, perennially re-inscribing the text onto the surface of the space.111 
Reading and remembering King’s speech on the steps of the Lincoln memorial rehearses 
a national memory of galvanizing political action, and extends the relationship between 
speech and space, investing the act of reading and the space of commemoration with the 
intentions of King.  This exact attention to material detail carries important implications 
for the second component of this recital:  the readers themselves.  Fusing place and 
speech in celebrations of King’s address functions, finally, the same way Kenneth Burke 
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described the potential of a poem’s “sensory imagery”:  “inviting the reader…to make 
himself over in the image of the imagery.”112  To recall the classical concepts introduced 
in chapter one, the Watkins reading of King’s address performed a dual function of 
remembrance:  as prosopopoeia, the students take on King’s presence at the Lincoln 
Memorial.  As ekphrasis, the students make visible and perform what King described in 
words:  the dream realized. 
 The scene of children gathered to recite King’s speech brings the performance of 
the text into the realm of bodily action.  Bodies were once privileged vehicles of 
remembrance.  As Paul Connerton has argued, a body, “reduced to the status of a sign, 
signifies by virtue of being a highly adaptable vehicle for the expression of mental 
categories.”113  Framed within the physical space of the Lincoln Memorial, the collected 
voices of Watkins Elementary students invite a dominant memory from the text 
embodied in the act of reading.  Octaves fluctuate, volume ebbs and flows, and the faces 
speaking King’s words constitute a blur of gender, race, and expression.  The implied 
enactment of King’s address would not be possible without networking the text through 
this multitude of voices.  The multi-vocal distribution of the speech isn’t designed to 
match images with individual words in a quick-cut edit placing sight with its intended 
syllable.  Instead, this display of memory implies a performance through practice of 
what was originally pledged through words alone. 
                                                
112 Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form:  Studies in Symbolic Action, Third Edition 
(Berkeley:  University of Los Angeles, 1973), 281. 
113 Connerton, How Societies Remember, 95. 
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 This reading brings the common memory of King’s call for racial harmony 
before the eyes:  the performance shows listeners “little black boys and black girls” 
joining in remembrance with “little white boys and little white girls as sisters and 
brothers.”114  Such effect could not be achieved through a lone voice repeated the words.  
It is only through the networking of the text—outside the environment of 
telecommunications or videography—that King’s words are displayed through the 
multitude of personalities and voices represented for the occasion.  This matching of a 
collective body to a collective memory represents a full enactment of physical 
remembrance, or what Connerton describes as the effort to “stylistically re-enact an 
image of the past” that will “keep the past also in an entirely effective form in their 
continuing ability to perform certain skilled actions.”115   
 The Watkins reading takes the enactment of the past described by Connerton one 
step further.  Rather than re-enacting an image of the past (King speaking at the Lincoln 
Memorial), students are also, by virtue of their age and diverse demographics, displaying 
a more precise memory of the speech through enactment.116  By virtue of their diverse 
collective status, students both enact and re-enact the speech as memory.  As Gerard 
                                                
114 Martin Luther King, Jr., “I Have a Dream,” in A Testament of Hope:  The Essential Writings and 
Speeches of Martin Luther King, Jr., edited by James Melvin Washington (New York:  HarperCollins, 
1986), 219. 
115 Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1989), 72. 
116 This is similar to what observers of Barbara Jordan’s 1976 keynoted address to the Democratic 
National Convention call a moment of “enactment.”  Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson 
define this rhetorical phenomena a moment when “the speaker incarnates the argument, is the proof of the 
truth of what is said.” Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, “Form and Genre in 
Rhetorical Criticism:  An Introduction,” in Readings in Rhetorical Criticism, Fourth Edition, ed, Carl R. 
Burchardt (State College, Pennsylvania:  STRATA Publishing, Inc., 2011), 444; Leland Griffin refers to 
the inception stages of social movements and the importance of “body” rhetoric in much the same way.  
See:  Leland M. Griffin, “The Rhetorical Structure of the ‘New Left’ Movement:  Part I,” Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 50 (1964):  127. 
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Hauser argues, the demonstrative capacity of language is made real when “seeing is 
believing”:  this materialization of rhetoric occurs when rhetorical actions “marshal 
verbal and formal resources that induce the audience to undergo the fantasia of imagined 
seeing.  The fantasia of seeing, in which the audience is brought into the emotional ambit 
of eyewitnesses, then carries the demonstrative force of self-evident, valid proving.”117  
In a rare connection between the content of a text and the inferred meaning of its 
performance, the Watkins recitation of the speech draws focus to King’s hope of bi-
racial reconciliation, or the common connotation of King’s speech as a realization of the 
“dream.”  These bodies reading the text are both re-enacting King’s words and also 
proving a dream brought into sight.  
 Though enactment brings focus to the memory of the speech within the moment 
of commemoration, this reading leaves a key dimension of the speech uncertain, raising 
questions still unanswered.  First, close attention to detail of physical place shifts 
perception of time, both within the moment of remembrance as well as the text itself.  In 
other words, King’s words, read without adulteration, are conveyed with a dual sense of 
purpose:  one that mimics King’s appeal to a reluctant administration and an undecided 
public, while at the same time displaying the culmination of King’s hopes for a more 
equal, integrated future of American race relations in the present.   
 What remains unclear, however, is whether our memory of King’s speech assigns 
the listening public to keep enduring the hardships of civil rights, or if redemption has 
been achieved.  Is the dream a work-in-progress, or has it been achieved?  As one 
                                                
117 Gerard A. Hauser, “Demonstrative Displays of Dissident Rhetoric:  The Case of Prisoner 885/63,” in 
Rhetorics of Display, ed, Lawrence Prelli (Columbia:  University of South Carolina Press, 2006), 234-235. 
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student participant responded when asked whether King’s dream has been finalized, 
“No, not yet. It's come close, but not yet.”118  Listening to the “I Have a Dream” speech 
invites a similar suspension of perceived time akin to what Cox described in his close 
reading of the original speech as the “eschatological vision”:  “time is both what has 
been promised but is ‘not yet.’”119   
 The suspension of time, while encouraging as thoughtful epideictic 
remembrance, carries potentially negative implications.  This interaction between author 
and audience (or readers) is managed on a recognizable plane of interpretation.120  As 
several critics of the dominant memory of American civil rights have noted, however, 
the vision of King shaped only by the March on Washington (which hardly ever 
mentions appeals for employment, a key reason for the March), minimizes the 
complexity of King, his critiques of American power, and his challenges to the moral 
and social status quo into a single message.  Remembrance anchored in the “I Have a 
Dream” speech has resulted, Reed argues, in a skewing of “the growth and complexity 
of King’s thinking and mask[ed] disturbing aspects of American race relations.”121  
Indeed, whereas the Senate has failed to present a compelling vision of Washington’s 
                                                
118 “Students from Watkins Elementary School Pay Tribute to Martin Luther King Jr.,” FOXDC News, 13 
January 2011, [http://www.myfoxdc.com/story/17976651/students-from-watkins-elementary-school-pay-
tribute-to-martin-luther-king-jr]. 
119 J. Robert Cox, “The Fulfillment of Time,” 201. 
120 The celebration invites the inference that the dream is closer to being realized.  Once could imagine, 
however, a hypothetical recital of the same speech on the House floor prior to a debate on affirmative 
action legislation, wherein the likely sentiment struck resides in King’s reference to judging people “not 
by the color of their skin but by the content of their character.”  This memory of the speech was of greater 
relevance through such debates in the 1980s and 1990s.  See:  David Zarefsky, “George Bush and the 
Transformation of Civil Rights Discourse, 1965-1990,” in Civil Rights Rhetoric and the American 
Presidency, eds, James Arnt Aune and Enrique D. Rigsby (College Station, TX:  Texas A&M University 
Press, 2005), 231-267, especially 244-245. 
121 Harry A. Reed, “Martin Luther King, Jr.:  History and Memory, Reflections on Dreams and Silences,” 
151. 
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Farewell Address from memory to recollection, the Watkins reading of King’s address is 
susceptible to a similar fate:  instead of keeping a recollection of the text silent from the 
display of memory, the organizers are vulnerable to maintaining a singular, unwavering 
recollection of the text in perpetual public view, regardless of the changing needs of the 
present.122   
 One could easily imagine alterations to the current commemoration of King to 
stave off limiting the memory of the text to a singular vision.  As mentioned earlier, part 
of Watkins’ mission in the display is to cultivate an appreciation for history and oratory 
through preparatory exercises that precede re-enactment of the speech.  In this regard, 
the elementary program is aptly positioned to carry out the potential of mimetic 
pedagogy and liberal arts education.123  If fourth-grade students can commemorate King 
via the “I Have a Dream” speech, similar opportunities to incorporate the enactment of 
others text central to American Civil Rights remain a productive pathway between 
formal remembrance and civic education.  Within the realm of extending the life of 
public address by conveying the virtue of a text, the Watkins reading of King’s words 
achieves greater resonance of memory with less effort than its contemporary 
practitioners within media environments.  When matched to a discernable memory, 
networking the text can be a productive stylistic choice that cultivates the extensional 
character of public address.  Where this community takes their remembrance now that it 
has been achieved is a facet of ceremonial repetition that remains to be seen. 
                                                
122 When asked if she expected the new tradition of reciting King’s address to continue indefinitely, 
Maryam Abdul-Tawwab verified that student involvement in the activity would ideally outlast the current 
faculty at Watkins Elementary.  
123 Robert Terrill, “Mimesis, Duality, and Rhetorical Education” Rhetorical Society Quarterly 41 (2011), 
303. 
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CONCLUSION 
 The network style of ceremonial repetition has introduced a diverse range of 
opportunities and constraints for publics imbuing the life of a text with fresh 
commemorative energy.  As the case studies included in this chapter have proven, the 
usefulness and applicability of splintering the text into a diffuse, multi-vocal iteration is 
apparent both within emerging media environments and without.  Within the sphere of 
video production and the marriage of word and image, the network sensibility produces 
an impressive level of possible meanings for a text repeated.  Compared with the isolated 
speakers in examples introduced in previous chapters, the network treatment delivered 
unto the Gettysburg Address and Declaration of Independence allows for producers of 
such rhetoric to match associative images with the text on the basis of a sentence or 
single word.  For FOX Sports, the producer of the networked Declaration of 
Independence, the new style forged a possibility to recast the text as affirmation of 
America’s greatness, as an endorsement of the war on terror, and, in its final incarnation, 
a range of public and private experiences ranging from military preparedness, 
professional football, the arts, and business.  As I argued above, the network style 
eventually created an untenable environment for the Declaration:  pushed to the point of 
being something for everything, the memory of the text repeated implied something less, 
not more, certain.  Virtue is presented as an oddly self-evident practice, evident in 
everything we do. 
 The enormous possibilities offered within a media environment can be fatal to 
the life of reading.  As the reading of the Constitution in the House of Representatives 
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and the “I Have a Dream” speech at the Lincoln Memorial illustrate, moving the text 
outside a media environment and into a historical space is no guarantee for success, 
either.  The incongruity lingering from the House reading of the Constitution is less 
derived from a sense of rhetorical space and more a result of mismatched intentions with 
the form of the text.  One can lend the organizers of the repetition credit that, as elected 
officials, they were collectively participating in bringing life to a document and enacting 
the people’s voice.  This relationship between citizen and representative, people and text 
is an admirable civic gesture of a political community pledging its adherence to a 
governing framework.  However, as I argued above, this reading of the text was more 
about prospect than retrospect.  The memory implied in the reading by the House of 
Representatives in 2011 denies the very quality of the text that motivated the recitation 
in the first place.  For ideologues interested in proposing changes to a current design of 
laws, forgetting the virtue of advancement made for not only transparent political 
posturing, but also a rhetorical opportunity of comparison and memory unfulfilled. 
 The emerging tradition of reciting King’s “I Have a Dream” speech to 
commemorate the civil rights leader’s birthday illustrates the constructive application of 
the network style beyond the realm of cyberspace.  This performance contributes to our 
canvas of ceremonial repetition in two important ways.  First, it exemplifies the power of 
demonstrative repetition wherein the dominant memory of the speech is implied and 
enacted in reading itself.  The nearly one hundred children of different races and genders 
move the promise (or accomplishment) of King’s dream into the visible, and constitute a 
memory in practice brought before the eyes of the audience—all without altering or 
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editing the text of King’s address.  Second, and more closely related to the subject of this 
chapter, the Watkins reading illustrates the effective application of a network style in 
enacting the memory of the speech.  King’s hope of a future with racial harmony is 
evident in the performance, and also reinforced in the multitude of voices converging 
within his speech.  Whereas networking the text creates confusion and hodgepodge 
inferences in the 2011 FOX Sports production of the Declaration of Independence, 
splitting the delivery of the text among multiple voices reinforces and clarifies the 
implied public memory of “I Have a Dream” carried out in performance.   
 The drawbacks of the network style are varied to each example covered in this 
chapter, but reducible to the broader question of persistence over time.  For texts encased 
in a media environment, the moment of ceremonial repetition remains, as Manual 
Castells notes, an everlastingly continuum.  Digitized repetition removes the text from 
physical space as well as any discernable moment in which repetition became necessary 
(if one even knows why).  Thus, repetition risks becoming an airless affair without roots 
in space or time, conceivably playing on a repeated loop to viewers without knowledge 
of the occasion, the relation of the text to a community of listeners, or the significance of 
choices that change the words we hear again.  Similarly, organizers of the Watkins 
reading must decide whether or not repetition outside a media environment will result in 
a dynamic and changing vision of the past, or if the “I Have a Dream” speech will 
remain in the public imagination as an unaltered image throughout independent needs or 
urgencies. 
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 In closing, our examination of the network style leaves us with a familiar 
constraint by which to understand ceremonial repetition:  the tension between what 
Burke called using a symbol to achieve “exposure without collapse, discipline without 
exclusion.”124  When ceremonial repetition is filtered through the network sensibility, 
organizers and public communities turn to a multitude of voices and associations to 
bring a text to life.  The life of reading, which should bring a text into a present moment 
and invite listeners to consider an ethical position with regard to their circumstance, 
remains vulnerable to the separation of a text from its discernable context and the 
potential barrage of associative symbolism attainable when text and image are 
orchestrated on a word-by-word basis.  In other words, networking the text creates a 
potential constraint in locating the virtue by which listeners may understand the present 
moment.  The exception to this practice, as noted above, is to incorporate the multitude 
of voices within the network style to become an active component in the ethic of 
reading.  In achieving such balance, the Watkins reading of King’s speech has exposed 
an image of remembrance and ethic of remembrance without collapsing the text in 
symbolic disarray.  In the final chapter of this study, I synthesize the observations made 
in the preceding case studies, and outline the tentative conclusions and remaining 
questions related to the time, place, and meaning of ceremonial repetition. 
                                                
124 Kenneth Burke, Counterstatement, 182. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
I had dreamed of speaking with the dead, and even now I do not abandon this dream.  But the mistake was 
to imagine that I would hear a single voice, the voice of the other.  If I wanted to hear one, I had to hear 
the many voices of the dead.  And if I wanted to hear the voice of the other, I had to hear my own voice.  
The speech of the dead, like my own speech, is not private property. 
—Stephen Greenblatt.1 
ENCOUNTERING THE SECOND LIFE OF PUBLIC ADDRESS 
  
 Texts entomb ideas.  Ernest Wrage justified analysis of speech texts by defining 
for their status as indicators of social thought.  “From the study of speeches,” Wrage 
stated, “may be gained additional knowledge about the growth of ideas, their currency 
and vitality, their modification under the impress of social requirements, and their 
eclipse by other ideas with different values.”2  Public address scholars are quick to 
highlight the importance of language as a vehicle of civic debate, and have contributed 
much to our understanding of ideas in process.  As James Jasinski has noted, however, 
this scholarship often reflects a lop-sided emphasis on the text as an intrinsic entity, 
paying less attention to how episodes of public discourse evolve with public use, or 
“what happens to ideas in practice.”3  If texts entomb ideas in historical context, 
audiences are excavators of verbal sites, hoping to discover something new or uncover 
something already known through a fresh encounter.   
                                                
1 Stephen Greenblatt, Shakespearean Negotiations:  The Circulation of Social Energy in Renaissance 
England (Berkeley and Los Angeles:  University of California Press, 1988), 20. 
2 Ernest Wrage, “Public Address:  A Study in Social and Intellectual History,” in Readings in Rhetorical 
Criticism, 4th Edition, ed. Carl Burgchardt (State College, PA:  STRATA, 2010), 31.  
3 James Jasinksi, “A Constitutive Framework for Rhetorical Historiography:  Toward an Understanding of 
the Discursive (Re)constitution of ‘Constitution’ in The Federalist Papers, in Doing Rhetorical History:  
Concepts and Cases, edited by Kathleen J. Turner (Tuscaloosa and London:  The University of Alabama 
Press, 1998), 73, emphasis in original. 
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 Ceremonial repetition brings Wrage’s vision of texts as the vessels of ideas full 
circle.  By examining the rhetorical strategies of framing, form, and display, critics 
account for the application of old ideas in new settings and the extensional constitution 
of public address as public memory.  Performing a text in a new environment ushers an 
epideictic experience, entailed in what W. James Booth has called bearing “witness,” or 
asking oneself “to remember, to be a living memory, to guard the past, to ask others to 
do likewise, and to illuminate the trances of the past and their meaning.”4  The methods 
for illuminating texts as memory are as varied as the communities who find answers in 
the words of others.  In this closing essay, I attempt to weave together the dominant 
threads of my argument outlined in preceding chapters.  My overarching goal is to 
summarize the dimensions of ceremonial repetition evident in previous chapters, provide 
a larger reflection on the implications of repetition for our understanding of the text in its 
epideictic setting, and the reflect on conditions through which repetition might best 
extend the virtues expected in commemorative practice.   As this discussion will 
illustrate, acts of reading, remembering, and repeating texts are individual steps to a 
larger rhetorical process:  translation. 
EXAMINING DIFFERENT FORMS OF THE TEXT 
 
 As I noted in the first chapter, a significant challenge to doing rhetorical criticism 
of ceremonial repetition is the relative lack of contemporary studies on the recital as a 
rhetorical strategy and a substantial history of communities channeling texts as 
purposeful vehicles of commemoration.  In classical theories of education, exercises in 
                                                
4 W. James Booth, Communities of Memory:  On Witness, Identity, and Justice (Ithaca and London:  
Cornell University Press, 2006), 73. 
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declamation, prosopopoieia, and ekphrasis were designed to groom a speaker’s arsenal 
of invention, persona, and methods of vivid description.  When directed to individual 
cognitive and rhetorical development, such practices strengthen a students’ ability to 
engage the imagination of audience.  When transferred to epideictic occasions of 
collective reflection, such practices contribute to the constitutive extension of past ideas 
in the public imagination.   
 To seriously consider what James Boyd White refers to as the “life of reading” a 
text requires a recalibration on our conventional presumptions about the limits of the 
text.  The precise quality of a text is a source of lively debate in rhetorical studies, with 
two distinctive philosophies that respectively position the text as either an artistic design 
of dispositional wholeness, or as “fragments of culture that, when collected by the critic, 
comprise the object of rhetorical criticism.”5  As a cultural practice of communication, 
ceremonial repetition engages each of these perspectives.  Texts are often read to 
purposefully maintain the artistic and linguistic craft of the author’s design, while 
simultaneously incorporating accompanying forms of expression that cull a reading 
experience that is selective or directed to particular points of relevancy within a cultural 
                                                
5 Leff’s project, close-textual analysis, generally refers to the careful intrinsic evaluation of a speech text 
as an art form.  In one notable excerpt from a foundational essay, Leff noted, “A well constructed oration 
contains a high degree of artistic integrity and density, and its proper understanding requires careful 
interpretive work.”  See Michael Leff, “Textual Criticism:  The Legacy of G. P. Mohrmann,” Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 72 (1986):  381.  Michael Calvin McGee’s project, vastly different from Leff’s thesis, 
speculated that the conventional treatment of rhetorical “texts” were really collections of contextual 
“fragments.”  In one intriguing example, McGee speculated the possibility that “‘texts’ have disappeared 
altogether, leaving us with nothing but discursive fragments of context.”  See Michael Calvin McGee, 
“Text, Context, and the Fragmentation of Contemporary Culture,” Western Journal of Speech 
Communication 54 (1990):  287, emphasis in original.  Robert Hariman summarizes the tension between 
what he calls “neoclassical” and “poststructural” critics as the formative debate in rhetorical criticism.  See 
Robert Hariman, “Afterword:  Relocating the Art of Public Address,” in Rhetoric and Political Culture in 
Nineteenth Century America, edited by Thomas Benson (East Lansing, MI:  Michigan State University 
Press, 1997), 165-179. 
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context.  For the critic of ceremonial repetition, this dual embrace and mixture of 
messages means redirecting the critical question of analysis.  Instead of reading 
messages repeated as isolated texts that remain consistent through time, analysis is 
focused to other rhetorical messages emerging from the epideictic context that 
accentuate, narrow, or dispense with particular associations in the text’s new life.  
Repetition, in other words, is a potentially productive component to a text’s meaning, 
not a rote exercise of constancy and stability.  This orientation of the text carries two 
implications for research.  First, our conception of the text is altered to account for the 
weaving of messages in an epideictic context, and not limited to only the iconic 
discourse worthy of a community’s attention.  Second, and related to the first point, the 
life of reading can emerge from several different messages sources within such 
commemorative contexts.  
 Repetition reflects a community’s relationship to the text and the expansive 
memorialization of the text.  Again, White’s thesis of constitutive rhetoric remains a 
crucial framework from which to read moments of ceremonial repetition.  Any text, 
White has noted, is “always a reconstitution of the culture” and is “necessarily about the 
culture, whether it idealizes it, ironically repudiates it, or elaborates its coherences.  The 
text is not a closed system but an artifact made by one mind and offered to another; it 
recreates the materials of the world for use in the world.”6  Analyzing acts of repetition 
within a broader associative ceremonial context means accounting for how past 
discourse is memorialized and shaped by the “poetics of culture,” or what Stephen 
                                                
6 James Boyd White, When Words Lose Their Meaning:  Constitutions and Reconstitutions of Language, 
Character, and Community (Chicago and London:  The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 280. 
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Greenblatt has called the “collective production of a text’s meaning.”7  Like Jasinski’s 
model of extensional constitutive rhetoric, Greenblatt argued that the participatory role 
of a public in constructing a text’s meaning was found in the “social energy” around the 
text:  the “verbal, aural, and visual traces [that] produce, shape, and organize collective 
physical and mental experiences.”8  How are texts imbued with the social energy of 
collective remembrance?  Separate case studies included in this analysis suggest that 
critics turn to formal oratory, the implied fusion of text and image, the implications of 
reading in conjunction with writing, and the potentials and pitfalls of a text’s 
environment (both mediated and physical space).  Though more methods of 
remembering a text exist, each chapter of this study has contributed not only to a clearer 
understanding of a text as an iconic point of reference, but as a means of negotiating a 
communal identity. 
 Chapter three identified what may be the most traditional and enduring form of 
remembering the text.  Frederick Douglass’s keynote speeches at August First 
celebrations in the late nineteenth century illustrate how accompanying speech in 
proximity to repetition invite listeners to understand old words in a new way.  This mode 
of analysis closely mirrors the work of James Jasinski and Jennifer Merceica on the 
extensional character of the 1798 Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions.  Their scholarship 
profiled “the way constitutive invitations become realized, and constitutive legacies 
established.”9  John Rodden has called this sort of analysis “a rhetoric of reception,” 
                                                
7 Stephen Greenblatt, Shakespearean Negotiations, 4-5. 
8 Greenlatt, Shakespearean Negotiations, 5. 
9 James Jasinski and Jennifer Merceica, “Analyzing Constitutive Rhetorics:  The Virginia and Kentucky 
Resolutions and the ‘Principles of ‘98’” in Shawn J. Parry-Giles and J. Michael Hogan (eds), The 
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meaning that the act of receiving a text is also a way of understanding how it is used:  
“Receivers,” Rodden elaborated, “are also givers, lenders, borrowers, searchers—giving 
thanks, bestowing largesse, deriving glory, seeking authority.”10  
 Arguably the 1863 Emancipation Proclamation is the artifact of public discourse 
with the greatest need of a rhetoric of reception to establish its importance.  As David 
Brion Davis has commented, the text alone was neither stirring nor exemplary:  “The 
context and even the content of Lincoln’s words did not really matter.  They would soon 
be forgotten.  What mattered was the symbolic emancipation moment.”11  Separated 
from this moment, the Emancipation Proclamation was inherited into August First 
gatherings across multiple locations and recitations decades after Lincoln’s death.  
Analysis of three speeches by Frederick Douglass reveals the Emancipation 
Proclamation was remembered as a discursive event-in-process.  Divorced from its 
traditional January 1st calendar date, the document took on a roaming form, folded into a 
general holiday to commemorate human freedom evident in the successes and failures of 
the time.   
 As social energy around the text repeated, Douglass’s discourse ranged from 
moments of tense scrutiny, contested agency, and, in his most effective August First 
address in 1885, evidence of the audience’s agency in prompting political change.  In the 
midst of a bleak social and political era for African Americans in post-Reconstruction 
                                                                                                                                           
Handbook of Rhetoric and Public Address (West Sussex, UK:  Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2010), 
333. 
10 John Rodden, The Politics of Literary Reputation:  The Making and Claiming of ‘St. George’ Orwell 
(New York and Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1989), 70-71. 
11 David Brion Davis,” The Emancipation Moment,” in Lincoln the War President, ed, Gabor Boritt 
(Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1992), 88. 
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America, Douglass recast the Emancipation Proclamation as a single, monumental 
achievement brought about through the means of political involvement and civic 
engagement, tailoring a remembrance of the text unlike either his previous speeches or 
the dominant trend of remembering the text as Lincoln’s accomplishment.  This appeal 
to memory invited audience members to keep a close relationship with the text as an 
ongoing process, won by protest and maintained by present-day activism.   
 Frederick Douglass and August First ceremonies represent a rich context of 
reimagining the Emancipation Proclamation.  Future studies should consider the 
tumultuous reputation of this text carried out in various performances.  For example, in 
1913—the fiftieth anniversary of the decree’s signing—W. E. B. Du Bois and Jane 
Addams organized an extraordinary rally in Chicago wherein a performance of the text 
took center stage.  “Are we walking in the path which Abraham Lincoln blazed?” Du 
Bois asked, continuing, “Are we determined that this nation shall not be an oligarchy, 
half slave and half free, but a democracy based on the franchise of all men—and all 
women—regardless of their wealth, or their race, or the color of their grandfathers?”12  
Even more insight may be gleaned by following habits of repetition into the modern age.  
Martin Luther King Jr.’s early oratorical career, for example, included speeches at 
Emancipation Day gatherings.  At one such setting, King defined the time as a Janus-
faced occasion:  “We stand today between two worlds:  the dying old and the emerging 
                                                
12 Du Bois quoted in “Return to Ideas of Lincoln Urged:  Speaker at Celebration of Emancipation Calls 
Martyr Great Democrat,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 13 February 1913, pg. 5.  Accessed through ProQuest 
Historical News Papers. 
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new.”13  Du Bois’s emphatic emphasis and King’s relative silence both present strategies 
for embracing or managing the memory of the Emancipation Proclamation within their 
respective contexts.  Though public address is clearly a rich vehicle for public memory, 
future critics should also consider the longitudinal attitude toward the text, including 
moments of communal silence or deflection. 
 Chapter four explored the rhetorical possibilities of iconology and repetition, and 
presented an argument for reading the remembrance of a text as both heard and seen.  
The political and ideological commitments to commemorating the Farewell Address in 
1862 were exceptionally rare.  Though reverence for Washington’s testament reflected 
high public commitment, and the exceptional public participation and social energy 
around the text was no doubt influenced by the perception of crisis:  national separation 
was part of the ceremonial experience, and the intention of Founders like Washington 
were clearly up for grabs.  Prompted by popular sentiment and filtered through a 
widespread political ideology, celebrations of George Washington’s birthday in 1862 
illustrate the impressive potential of ceremonial repetition within a moment of political 
crisis.  In response to a filiopietistic competition for Washington’s legacy, the 
widespread recitations of the Farewell Address mark a unique example of nearly 
uniform commemoration across contexts within this study.  Even more compelling, 
however, was the juxtaposition of image and text as a basis for remembrance.  Lincoln’s 
insistence of keeping confiscated Confederate flags at the reading of the Farewell 
                                                
13 Martin Luther King Jr., “Facing the Challenge of a New Age,” Address Delivered at NAACPT 
Emancipation Day Rally,” in The Papers of Martin Luther King, Jr., vol.4:  Symbol of the Movement, 
January 1957-December 1958, eds. Clayborne Carson, Susan Carson, Adrienne Clay, and Virginia 
Shadron (Berkeley:  University of California Press, 2000), 73-89. 
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Address coupled with Harper’s Weekly’s choice of making the sight of flags the 
vicarious window into commemoration of the text amounted to a rare moment of verbal 
and visual symmetry.  Bucking the trend to display flags through precise detail and 
aesthetic clarity, the “Rebel Flags” illustration offered a vision of the moment and the 
text wherein the dominant public memory of the Farewell Address mirrored the display 
of dueling icons of nationality, creating a visual embodiment of textual repetition. 
 The implications of this conclusion are important to understanding the visual 
realm of ceremonial repetition.  The fusions of illustrated journalism and ceremonial 
repetition, I argued, created a unique moment of rhetorical ekphrasis—translating “the 
visible into words which are somehow communicated as a visual experience”—for the 
occasion.14  “Rebel Flags” reminds us that the extensional character of public discourse 
is charged and renewed in verbal as well as visual display.  Instead of maintaining a 
traditional sense of aesthetic clarity and precision, “Rebel Flags” appropriates a style of 
depiction that mirrors the dominant memory of the Farewell Address while depicting the 
aftermath of the text’s performance.  “Rebel Flags” reminds us that the life of reading 
can also include a the potential of reverse ekphrasis to constitute a communal vision, 
translating speech verbalized to the memory of speech brought before the eyes.  
 On first sight, the U.S. Senate’s longstanding ritual of reciting the Farewell 
Address to mark George Washington’s Birthday appears to derail any clear 
understanding declamation rhetoric.  The act is nearly an isolated performance, an ill-
fated attempt to align the political place of the deliberative chamber in Congress with the 
                                                
14 Webb, Ekphrasis, 20. 
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discursive space of the Farewell Address brought into oral form. By stripping the 
recitation of the Farewell Address down to the bare act of verbalizing the text while 
simultaneously nurturing a robust palimpsest of reflections on the meaning of the words, 
the Senate highlights (and reverses) the traditional relationship between memory and 
recollection outlined by Aristotle, highlighting an essential framework implied in 
analyzing repetition as public memory. 
 As countless contributors to public memory studies remind us, our perceptions of 
the past must take textual form.  Repetition, moreover, is a rhetorical event akin to a 
spatial design.  James Young, whose work on Holocaust memorials has illustrated the 
central and fluid meaning of material substance, has summarized the interactive 
components of space and memory, arguing that “in the absence of shared beliefs or 
common interest, art in public spaces may force an otherwise fragmented populace to 
frame diverse values and ideals in common spaces,” prompting a material “illusion of 
common memory.”15  Like an empty space filled with a deliberate structure or design, 
repetition interrupts an otherwise constant flow of time.  Or, as Paul Ricoeur has 
suggested, the creative dimension of repetition resides in its “opening up of the past 
again to the future,” a sort of “ontological recasting of the gesture of historiography, 
seized in its most fundamental intentionality.”16   
 The distinction within the Senate’s reading of Washington is the separation of 
memory and recollection, the former being an image of the past and the latter being an 
                                                
15 James Young, The Texture of Memory:  Holocaust Memorials and Meaning (New Haven and London:  
Yale University Press, 1993), 6. 
16 Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting [trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer] (Chicago and 
London:  The University of Chicago Press, 2004), 380. 
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active, deliberate search for such an image.  Through the one hundred plus years of 
practice, the Farewell Address has become a strange discursive space wherein Senators 
reside, and, in past experiences, used to share common space and time for remembrance.   
Using Aristotle’s distinction between memory and recollection, the current tradition of 
repetition in the Senate positions the reading of the text—unadorned and unchanging—
as the locating of a memory, while, by contrast, the recollection of the speech—
reorganizing, renegotiating, and reimagining those words—occurs beneath the 
metaphorical surface in pages of signatures and scrawling recording readings past.  The 
individual and communal directions of expression have switched:  the memory, or image 
of the text, is the outward display and performance of the reader, while the search, or 
altered reception of the text, is moved inward.  The Senate remembers where one 
expects it to recollect, and recollects where one expects it to remember.  This strange 
encounter of ceremonial repetition is not without its intellectual insights, however.  The 
philosophical implications of this relationship indicate a greater emphasis on individual 
sustenance from the message rather than a communal, public, or collective sense of 
identity.  As critics continue to consider the value of studying different forms of 
declamation, our attention should be focused on the separation (or fusion) of texts 
behaving as memories and audiences taking on the work of recollection.  The Senate’s 
palimpsest is but one example of a community’s habit of depositing recollections of the 
text; we may well discover many more should we know where to look. 
 Technological innovation has led to a new face of ceremonial repetition defined 
by the mixture of multiple voices, bodies, and images coalescing around the act of 
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repetition.  In the past decade alone, various episodes in declamation have altered the 
landscape of how texts are received and displayed in public remembrance.  No change 
has been more easily identifiable and essential this current phase of textual iteration than 
the proliferation of the network sensibility.  As I argued in chapter six, the network style 
is discernable when the act of reading is divorced from the conventional expectations of 
a single voice dedicated to reproducing a text from beginning to end.  In what Manuel 
Castells calls the “space of flows,” or a “structural logic” that is “spaceless,” it is 
possible to remember a text through multiple voices that fragment and branch the words 
of discourse in multiple directions, often without a dedicated sense of the text’s original 
disposition.17  Even more, the act of reading endures beyond its occasion.  The hyper-cut 
editing style that enables a collective performance of the text also removed the act of 
reading from a firmly established time, meaning the discursive space of reciting a text is 
an amorphous condition both beyond immediate experience and simultaneously 
accessible to all. 
 This altered landscape means the enthymematic potential of reading is 
heightened, as the interactions between sight and sound, and the fusion between words, 
images, and personas is accelerated.  If the Senate’s practice was a literal separation of 
memory and recollection, the various modes of repeating a text in an age of the network 
sensibility have fastened the two together in material embodiment.  Respective 
productions of the Gettysburg Address by No Casino Gettysburg and the Declaration of 
Independence by FOX Sports both illustrate this fast-paced fusion of image and word, 
                                                
17 Manuel Castells, The First of the Network Society, 2nd Edition (Chichester, West Sussex, United 
Kingdom:  Wily-Blackwell, 2010), 443. 
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often with an implicit conclusion derived from the confluence of image and text.  Texts 
are constantly uprooted and moved across various themes and associations, implying 
both contemporary relevance and an answer to a pressing issue in the present. 
 Even more surprising than the emergence of the network sensibility in online and 
video environments is the proliferation of the style from the realm of media technology 
to material space.  The 2011 reading of the Constitution in the House of Representatives, 
and the newly emerging ritual of reciting Martin Luther King Jr.’s “I Have a Dream” 
speech for the civil rights leader’s birthday both recall the networked form of repetition 
applied in physical spaces of political significance.  This new wave of ceremonial 
display, or bringing the text before the eyes of viewers, is built upon a more sensitive set 
of implicit premises.  As I argued in the previous chapter, the network style may be best 
utilized for performances that incorporate a multitude of voices as a dimension the 
intended remembrance.  
 As the habitude of reading words of another through the network sensibility 
continues to spread, critics should consider the constitutive implications of ceremonial 
repetition on such a broad scale.  Specifically, the act of reading as ceremonial 
remembrance begs the question of the exact source of such memory.  Is ceremonial 
repetition more positively evaluated when it accurately reflects the content of the 
speech?  How is public knowledge shaped if not through sight and repetition?  Is it 
possible that a strange reading of a text, such as FOX Sports’ empty production of the 
Declaration of Independence, could constitute public attitudes toward the text, and 
thereby cultivate a new memory of the 1776 document shaped through widespread 
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viewership?  Such questions of meaning and the constancy of embodying the text raise 
important questions on effect, or how ceremonial displays of a text influence public 
knowledge.  If not for the education of facts in a public sense, however, ceremonial 
repetition is an opportunity to present members of a community with a sense of virtue 
somehow garnered from the act of reading.  The result of this process is best understood 
as a translation of public language and an interpretation of virtue, topics I now turn to in 
greater elaboration. 
REPETITION AS TRANSLATION:  THE VIRTUE OF THE TEXT 
 The burden of case studies is locating the common kernel that binds each 
together.  As I’ve mentioned earlier in this chapter, the universal question of ceremonial 
repetition concerns the nature of the text.  Each individual case for analysis has sought to 
broaden our thinking about the stability and change inherent in repetition.   In his aptly 
titled essay, “The Problem of the Text,” literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin explained the 
transition a text undergoes from its original form to later iterations.  A “reproduction of 
the text by the subject (a return to it, a repeated reading, a new execution quotation) is a 
new, unrepeatable event in the life of the text, a new link in the historical chain of speech 
communication.”18  This observation—that texts live multiple lives—has been an 
essential presumption of this study.  The life of the text is matched in endurance only by 
the metaphorical spatial dimensions of the text.  As Kenneth Burke noted, our repeated 
relations with language entails a natural “deepening and widening” of symbols through 
                                                
18 Mikhail Bakhtin [trans. Vern W. McGee], Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, edited by Caryl 
Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin:  University of Texas Press, 1986), 106. 
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“exposure without collapse, discipline without exclusion.”19  What keeps the life of 
reading from moving too close to either extreme? 
 Burke’s observation echoes the important thesis by Hans-Georg Gadamer’s on 
interpretive horizons and the extensional character of a text.  Gadamer’s claim of refers 
to how publics “account for “everything that can be seen from a particular vantage 
point,” depicting how “one’s range of vision is gradually expanded.”20  The expansion of 
the text means two things:  first, the essence discovered in a text is cultivated from “the 
interpreter’s own thought” that facilitates a “re-awakening of the text’s meaning.”21  
Gadamer further posited that the “interpreter’s own horizon” was essential to the text’s 
meaning, framing the act of interpretation as “a possibility that one brings into play and 
puts at risk, and that helps one truly make ones own what the text says,” or the “fusion of 
horizons. … not only mine or my author’s but common.”22  A “fusion of horizons” 
implies, in other words, something is at work in a textual encounter beyond the separate 
existences of text and individual perception. The lingering question is deceptively 
simple:  if each reading of a text is an individual event, how can critics evaluate an 
isolated iteration as superior to another?  This question does not lend itself to a 
comprehensive answer, but an ideal beginning point allows us to return to the prospect 
of constitutive rhetoric and the ethical character derived from the construction of texts, 
or, in our present focus, the re-imagination of public discourse. 
                                                
19 Kenneth Burke, Counterstatement (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London:  University of California Press, 
1968), 182. 
20 Hans-Georg Gadamer [Trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall], Truth and Method, Second, 
Revised Edition (London and New York:  Continuum, 2006), 301. 
21 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 390. 
22 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 390. 
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 The function of language is translation.  Ideas and experiences—so radically 
complex and individualistic—must be simplified, distilled, and communicated to forge a 
sense of public understanding.  From the foundational presumptions of the symbol and 
the referent, the signifier and the signified, and the basic necessity of a common verbal 
and visual grammar to decipher communication, human beings are translators of one 
another’s messages.  “How would we ever come to associate an idea with a verbal sound 
pattern, if we did not first of all grasp this association in an act of speech?”  Ferdinand de 
Saussure asked in his well-known Course in General Linguistics.23  If texts entomb ideas 
and, in some non-physical form represent a discursive space or rupture in communal 
time, how do publics and outside auditors unlock a text and locate a new translation?  
What counts as a legitimate reading of public discourse past, if not an accurate depiction 
of the author’s original message?   
 Part of the answer resides in James Boyd White’s lucid observations on legal 
criticism.  White follows the path laid before him from Gadamer and Burke by 
positioning translation the operative process in our understanding of legal precedent and 
decision-making.  Specifically, White notes that the “process of giving life to old texts 
by places in new relations” is a foundation of legal criticism.24  When examined closely, 
White’s overview on legal criticism is a generic cousin of ceremonial repetition:  publics 
remembering through repetition accomplish in communal display what judicial 
arguments convey in a legal ruling.  White clarifies that translation is a process of 
                                                
23 Ferdinand de Saussure [trans. Tory Harris], Course in General Linguistics, edited by Charles Bally and 
Albert Sechehaye (Chicago and La Salle, Illinois:  Open Court, 1972), 19. 
24 James Boyd White, Justice as Translation:  An Essay in Cultural and Legal Criticism (Chicago and 
London:  The University of Chicago Press, 1990), 91. 
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matching what is given to the community (the text) with what the community brings to 
situation (repetition): 
 putting two things together in such a way as to make a third, a new thing with a meaning of its 
 own.  The effect of the composition is not to merge the two elements, or to blur the distinction 
 between them, but to sharpen the sense we have of each, and of the differences that play between 
 them.  Such a composition naturally dissolves in time, and must be remade afresh, in new 
 forms.25 
 
White’s topoi for analyzing legal discourse is a constructive comparison to better clarify 
and scrutinize the discursive action (and interaction) unfolding in ceremonial repetition.  
Artifacts of public discourse, like legal precedents, exist in the world, but come to be 
realized more fully as meaning is revisited, revised, and, in our case, repeated.  If 
communities know what a text said in the past, what can such ideas accomplish in the 
present? 
 As I’ve already suggested, analysis of ceremonial repetition is best framed as the 
repetition of a text as memory and the associative symbolism and intersecting messages 
that reveal a purposeful remembrance around the text.  Arguably our sense of 
remembrance could be the “third” which White speaks of above—an outgrowth from the 
interaction of the text and a public’s treatment of it.  Future critics of ceremonial 
repetition should remember, however, that a text repeated is still designed to do 
something for the public involved.  Epideictic occasions serve the functional task of 
visualizing and cultivating communal virtue.  In Gerard Hauser’s description, epideictic 
orators instruct the audience on civic morality by profiling “accounts of nobility worthy 
                                                
25 White, Justice as Translation, 263. 
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of mimesis,” or “deeds unfathomable were they not publicly exhibited and validated.”26  
This public vision of epideictic occasions—highlighting the civic virtue to be 
understood—accentuates the display of the text central to ceremonial repetition.  
Elaborated further, repeating the text of another could be a way of accentuating that 
which should be valued, guarded, and exalted in public practice, revealing a point on the 
continuum between the thinness of universal consensus in the text and a thickness of a 
communities that are defined by—and also help define—the act of reading. 
 In the midst of robust conversations on the extensional character of speech texts 
and the multiple lives of public address, we should finally remember that the dead really 
are deceased.  Their words were intended for a different time.  Repetition is a mode of 
translating words that are otherwise lost in time.  This is not to discourage ceremonial 
repetition as an empty gesture.  Instead, the radically situated character of public 
discourse reminds critics that when we say that dead authors live through declamation, 
we must remain cognizant that audiences are, in the simplest terms, still talking to 
themselves.  The objective of ceremonial repetition is to locate the virtue within the text, 
or to invent an appropriate virtue through the act of reading.  The implications of this 
conclusion are important to understanding how positions of subjectivity are defined and 
reified through ceremonial repetition.  Indeed, when public virtue is positioned as the 
coveted “third” dimension White defines between a text and a reader, critics of 
ceremonial repetition begin to search for ways in which forms of repetition foster a 
vision of virtue relating to the ethics of a civic community.  Rhetoric that subverts 
                                                
26 Gerard Hauser, “Aristotle on Epideictic:  The Formation of Public Morality,” Rhetoric Society 
Quarterly 29, number 1 (Winter 1999):  19. 
  294 
attempts to pull public virtue from a text repeated might be placed on par with the notion 
of liberal consensus or thinness, contrary to a thick reading of a text, or the deliberate 
attempts by interpretive communities to forge a vision of public morality out of 
ceremonial repetition.  From the wholeness of the text—read from beginning to end—
communities are stitching together a display of morality, not precisely a “fragment,” but 
nonetheless a representative part culled from the larger whole.  Repetition is the 
opportunity for remembrance; whence such discursive space is opened, the words of 
another blend with our own social energy, becoming, in Barry Schwartz’s apt analogy, a 
“verbal totem” for collective remembrance.27 
 Selecting virtues from which to bring a text before the eyes of a wider audience 
leaves receivers with an array of options.  The first option is to select or accentuate a 
theme within the text that carries a resonant public understanding, or rich enthymematic 
potential.  Historical episodes of existential crisis are opportune moments wherein 
repeating a text may be most beneficial, publicly understood, and rhetorically 
productive.  One reason the 1862 reading(s) of Washington’s Farewell Address were 
effective was the widespread public understanding and agreement on the master theme 
of Washington’s testament:  union.  Despite reciting passages irrelevant to the moment 
(independence in foreign affairs, the benefits of public education), the experience of 
combining the Farewell Address with public recitations prompted the emergence of a 
common third entity, or a recommitment to political Unionism—not the union of 
Washington’s text, but the recollection cultivated from a Union-centric ideology.  
                                                
27 Barry Schwartz, “Rereading the Gettysburg Address” Qualitative Sociology 19 (1996): 415. 
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Absent the Civil War and extensive debates about Washington’s rightful place as a 
United States republican or Confederate rebel, communities and planners would be less 
certain in predicting the intended virtue of the text was publicly understood and 
interpreted from such repetition. 
 Public knowledge of the text also makes light work for the Watkins Elementary 
School reading of Martin Luther King Jr.’s “I Have a Dream” speech.  This reading and 
its judicious selection of a resonant theme within the text, displays a vision akin to 
King’s words as living proof of its material embodiment.  Though both the 1862 reading 
of the Farewell Address and the contemporary remembrance of King call upon virtues 
within the respective texts from identifiable public sentiments, the reading of King has 
the potential, as I noted in chapter six, to reify remembrance as continually the same.  In 
other words, while the Farewell Address is remembered in the Senate with a myriad of 
virtues attributed to the text (unknown outside to listeners outside the Senate walls or 
those who don’t visit the Senate’s website), the Watkins Elementary reading of King 
may potentially constrict the message of the speech to a single theme or virtue.  In his 
important volume Matter and Memory, Henri Bergson describes the transition memory 
takes from a recollection to physical habit through repetition.  Bergson elaborates, noting  
 a learned recollection passes out of time in the measure that the lesson is better known; it 
 becomes more and more impersonal, more and more foreign to our past life.  Repetition, 
 therefore, in no sense effects the conversion of the first into the last; its office is merely to utilize 
 more and more the movements by which the first was continued, in order to organize them 
 together, and, by  setting up a mechanism, to create a bodily habit. … Of the two memories, then, 
 which we have just distinguished, the first appears to be memory par excellence.  The second, 
 that generally studied by psychologists, is habit interpreted by memory rather than memory 
 itself.28 
 
                                                
28 Henri Bergson [trans. N. M. Paul and W. S. Palmer], Matter and Memory (New York:  Zone Books, 
1991), 83-84, emphasis in original. 
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Bergson’s distinction pertains to a diminished emphasis on an individual action through 
the cultivation of habit.  Though his subject pertains to individual psychology, these 
observations can easily be applied to several examples cited within this study.  “Habit 
memory,” as Paul Ricoeur summarizes Bergson’s claim, does not require an evocation 
of preceding lessons, but is instead so firmly engrained that it becomes a physical 
impulse; memory of a particular event, by contrast, is distinctive and representative of an 
individual time.29  For the Senate, part of breaking a public perception of autonomous 
habit should include a more public attempt to remember the Farewell Address in 
conjunction with its act of repetition.  For Watkins Elementary students and the National 
Parks Service a similar prescription is potentially necessary:  to explain how King’s 
speech allows listeners to better understand a memory of the speech as it exists today.  
Though repetition is not equitable with sameness, the strategies of commemorating 
communities should remain mindful of presenting an image of the text that can be 
interpreted as merely habitual. 
 The second option for locating virtues within ceremonial repetition is to simply 
invent an arrangement where one did not previously exist, or where one is not 
symmetrically attainable through a base interpretation of the text.  This theme is 
particularly evident in more contemporary examples.  FOX Sports’ production of the 
Declaration of Independence, for instance, restricts the remembrance of the text to one 
supporting America’s foreign wars, or any ill-defined characteristic of American life.  It 
does this, moreover, while removing from the text that very element which might justify 
                                                
29 Paul Ricoeur [trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellaur], Memory, History, Forgetting, 25. 
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the reason for the message and the original argument supporting independence—the list 
of abuses by King George III.  A similar theme can be determined in the reading of the 
Constitution in the House of Representatives, which was contextually motivated from an 
originalist conservative ideology, and a belief that the Constitution’s application could 
be embodied without giving discursive space to moments of its own history; praising the 
text for the possibility of future legislative change while purposefully eradicating its own 
sense of change through the act of reading.  The question for receivers inventing virtues 
through repetition need not be reduced to one of accuracy, per se.  Frederick Douglass’s 
views on the Emancipation Proclamation were historically subjective and rhetorically 
flexible at most August First occasions.  But the virtue of public participation and 
activism were not only resonant within the needs of the late nineteenth century, but 
helped to expand the collective history and social standing of African Americans and 
abolitionists throughout a bleak moment of political history.  It was within the discursive 
space of Lincoln’s 1863 decree that Douglass forged a remembrance by which his 
audience could identify as common history and the model for emulation in the present 
moment.   
 Whether determined from existing public memory of the text, invented from a 
perceived situational need or some combination of the two, future critics of declamation 
rhetoric should consider a number of important questions regarding the transformation of 
meaning and effect.  Namely, the resonance of display carries constitutive dimensions of 
self and communal identity.  The endurance and effect of such ceremonial displays, 
however, has yet to be determined.  One possible mode of accounting for the altering 
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remembrances of a text through declamation is the application of symbolic convergence 
theory.  As Ernest Bormann has noted, a “rhetorical vision,” or group perception of the 
world is nurtured through the employment of “fantasy themes,” or “creative and 
imaginative interpretation of events that fulfills a psychological or rhetorical need.”30  As 
fantasies are shared, communal identity is reinforced and expanded.  The effect, in 
which case, is determinable through the sharing of a fantasy them, when members “have 
charged their emotional and memory banks with meanings and emotions that can be set 
off by a commonly agreed upon cryptic symbolic cue.”31  Arguably, future critics of 
ceremonial repetition can study the rhetorical vision of past texts both within verbal 
repetition and remembrance, as well as illustrated and embodied artifacts of public 
display. 
 The distinct possibility remains, however, that rather than observing a form of 
recollection chaining out through symbolic convergence theory the life of a text is best 
lived (for both dead author and living audience alike) on a limited basis.  Arguably, the 
more compelling the circumstance, such as a national or existential crisis, the more 
likely the presence of a speech repeated will resonate within a common cultural premise.  
Again, the existential crisis of 1862 is a terrific example:  in the most unconventional of 
moments, reading Washington’s paragraph-long sentence and tangled written cadences 
made sense to a large contingent of the population who yearned to bear witness to Union 
in performance, memory, and display.  The best potential impact of repetition, these 
                                                
30 Ernest G. Bormann, The Force of Fantasy:  Restoring the American Dream (Carbondale and 
Edwardsville:  Southern Illinois University Press, 2001 [1985]), 5; Jasinski and Mercieca also suggest 
Bormann’s framework could be a useful gauge for analyzing the extensional life of public address.  See:  
“Analyzing Constitutive Rhetorics,” 319. 
31 Bormann, The Force of Fantasy, 6. 
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chapters indicate, resides in a deep rather than long—or continuous—impression on the 
public imagination. 
 Further, moments of crisis allow for greater flexibility in wrestling a text’s 
attachment to rhetorical genre.  Here, too, future critics should consider the implications 
of how much the genre of a text—despite consistent dedication to content and form—is 
dependent on the occasion alone.  Washington’s Farewell Address was never as 
argumentatively charged than when it was recited in 1862.  Redirecting the text from an 
epideictic to a deliberative style provides an even more compelling overturning of pre-
existing meaning, attaching the concerns of the present within such words.  The 
alternating function of genre is also an apparent element of the Watkins Elementary 
School recitation of the “I Have a Dream” speech.  King’s deliberative call to end 
segregation and cease both political extremism and apathy is the contemporary mode of 
understanding his birthday within the present context.  What is gained and what is lost 
when a text repeated is vaulted into a new generic format?  Do some directional 
movements enhance a constitutive charge while others diminish such impact?  Questions 
of effect and the generic constraints remain rich fields of study for future students of 
ceremonial repetition. 
CONCLUSION 
 Language is inheritance.  While public address is still our best way of 
understanding the introduction and evolution of public ideas, those ideas are also the 
heritage of communal relations.  As I’ve tried to show in this study, conflict and 
resolutions of such debates can take several forms, particularly when the legacy of a text 
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is open for question.  Though the exact meaning of ideas or discourse as always open to 
new interpretations and gets dispersed in a variety of discursive forms, ceremonial 
repetition remains one of the most rhetorically significant methods of renegotiating and 
reimagining the texture and shape of our linguistic heritage. 
 Organizers of ceremonial repetition would do well to recognize their power of 
remembrance, the responsibility to strategically do more than merely repeat the words of 
others, and to account for the communal implications of such choices.  As this study has 
shown, a selection of text, channel, and occasion all greatly influence what new 
recollection will emerge from a text repeated.  The reappearance of the text is an 
opportunity to invite public participation and alter perceptions of civic virtue and 
communal relations.  Ceremonial repetition, above all, should tell us something about 
our present moment and, most importantly, ourselves.  If communities are willing to take 
on the responsibility of the past and blend their voices with the words of others, such 
display has the potential to be educational, to encourage a renewal of common values, 
and—when placed against a recognizable public need—to be worth the wait.   
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